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[. . .]The entire world is experiencing a major economic cri-
sis, which can be likened in its effects on the world’s banking
systems, to an economic natural disaster. Large and well estab-
lished banks on both sides of the Atlantic have become victims
of the recession and governments in many countries are rowing
for all they are worth to save whatever can be saved. In such
circumstances every nation thinks, of course, first and foremost
of its own interests. Even the biggest economies in the world are
facing a close struggle with the effects of the crisis.
The Icelandic banks have not escaped this banking crisis any
more than other international banks and their position is now
very serious. In recent years the growth and profitability of the
Icelandic banks has been like something akin to a fairy tale.
[. . .]Over this period the Icelandic banks have grown hugely and
their liabilities are now equivalent to many times Iceland’s GNP.
Under all normal circumstances larger banks would be more
likely to survive temporary difficulties, but the disaster which is
now engulfing the world is of a different nature, and the size
of the banks in comparison with the Icelandic economy is today
their main weakness.
When the international economic crisis began just over a year
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ago with the collapse of the real estate market in the US and
chain reactions due to the so-called sub-prime loans, the position
of Icelandic banks was considered to be strong, as they had not
taken any significant part in such business. But the effects of
this chain of events, have turned out to be more serious and wide
ranging than anyone had expected.
In recent weeks the world’s financial system has been subject to
devastating shocks. Some of the biggest investment banks in the
world have become the victims and capital in the markets has in
reality dried up. The effects have been that large international
banks have stopped financing other banks and complete lack of
confidence has developed in business between banks. This has
caused the position of Icelandic banks to deteriorate very rapidly
in the last few days.
[. . .]A decision on wide-ranging rescue measures for the Icelandic
banks is not only a matter of tax payers shouldering a heavier
load temporarily, but concerns the position and future of the
Icelandic nation as a whole. [. . .]There is a very real danger,
fellow citizens, that the Icelandic economy, in the worst case,
could be sucked with the banks into the whirlpool and the result
could be national bankruptcy. No responsible government takes
risks with the future of its people, even when the banking system
itself is at stake. The Icelandic nation and its future takes
precedence over all other interests.
[. . .]I said yesterday evening that it was my judgement and that
of the Government that there was no reason to introduce special
measures on our behalf. No responsible government introduces
dramatic measures on the banking and financial system of the
nation unless all other courses are closed. The position has
12
today altered completely and for the worse. [. . .]We now need
responsible and measured reactions.
[. . .]I would like to diffuse all doubt that deposits by Ice-
landers and private pensions savings in all Icelandic banks
are secure and the exchequer will ensure that such deposits are
reimbursed to savers in full. No one need be in any doubt on this.
Fellow countrymen,
[. . .]I am well aware that this situation is a great shock for
many, which raises both fear and anxiety. In such circumstances
it is extremely urgent that the authorities, companies, social
organisations, parents and others who can contribute make every
effort to ensure that daily life is not disrupted.
If there was ever a time when the Icelandic nation needed to
stand together and show fortitude in the face of adversity, then
this is the moment. I urge you all to guard that which is most
important in the life of everyone of us, protect those values
which will survive the storm now beginning. I urge families to
discuss together and not to allow anxiety to get the upper hand
even tough the outlook is grim for many. We need to explain to
our children that the world is not on the edge of a precipice and
we all need to find an inner courage to look to the future.
[. . .]We will have the opportunity to rebuild the financial system.
We have learnt from those mistakes which were made during that
period of massive growth and that experience will prove to be valu-
able when put to the test. [. . .]The task of the authorities over the
coming days is clear: to make sure that chaos does not ensue if
the Icelandic banks become to some extent non-operational.
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For this the authorities have many options and they will be used.
Both in politics and elsewhere it will be important to sheathe
our swords. It is very important that we display both calm and
consideration during the difficult days ahead, that we do not lose
courage and support each other as well as we can. Thus with
Icelandic optimism, fortitude and solidarity as weapons, we will
ride out the storm.
God bless Iceland.”
Icelandic Prime Minister Geir Haarde in a TV speech on October 6, 2008, ad-




The goal of this dissertation is to develop a better understanding of systemic
risk in interbank markets. The importance of this task has become clear during
the recent financial crisis. Originating in the subprime mortgage market in the
United States, and fuelled by the increasing interconnectivity of international
financial institutions, the crisis quickly spread to almost all industrialized coun-
tries. At the height of the crisis, on 15 September 2008, the US investment bank
Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy, causing an almost complete breakdown
of interbank markets. These markets, however, are of uttermost importance for
the liquidity provision of banks. Without functioning interbank markets, the
maturity transformation of banks breaks down and the credit provision to the
real economy is impaired. Even though there exist a number of interconnections
amongst banks, due to their importance for financial stability, the structure and
dynamics of interbank markets is the main focus of this thesis.
In order to restore the stability of the financial system, governments and central
banks worldwide had to resort to unprecedented non-standard measures, many
of which are still in place. In 2009, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) esti-
mated the overall cost of the financial crisis to be US$ 11.9 trillion, including the
cost of emergency measures to troubled financial institutions.1











































Emerging and Developing Countries
World
Figure 1.1: Impact of the financial crisis on fiscal balances and public debt. Source:
International Monetary Fund (2010) Data and own representation.
The emergency measures that were required in many countries to stabilize the
banking system had a severe impact on fiscal balances and public debt, as can
be seen in Figure 1.1. In the worst period of the crisis (2007-2009), the fiscal
balance in advanced economies2 has dropped from −1.05% to −8.74% of GDP,
while public debt increased from 73.2% to 90.1% of GDP. The composition of this
additional debt can be seen in Figure 1.2 for the G20 countries. About 5.5% of
the additional debt in advanced G20 countries stem directly from financial-sector
support, and additional 2% from fiscal stimulus packages directly related to the
crisis. These numbers highlight the great importance of the subject of this thesis.
The severity of the crisis was not only caused by the depth of the crisis itself,
but also by the speed it unfolded. During the period of the “great moderation”,
with low asset volatility, low inflation and small business cycle fluctuations, sys-
(2009).
2Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, euro area, Hong Kong SAR, Israel, Japan,
Korea, New Zealand, Norway, Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan Province of China,
United Kingdom, and United States.
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Figure 1.2: Composition of government debt as debt-to-GDP ratio for the period of
2008/2009. Source: IMF Staff Note (2009)
temic risk was building up in the form of increasing interconnectivity of financial
institutions, and decreasing asset transparency. After a certain tipping point,
the building systemic risk rapidly manifested and lead to the financial instability
that was observed in the aftermath of 15 September 2008. This tipping point
behaviour is what Haldane (2009) calls the “knife-edge”, or “robust-yet-fragile”
property of interbank markets and is a well known phenomenon in the analysis
of complex systems.3
In order to understand the dynamics that is at the core of this behaviour, a
number of questions have to be answered:
(Q1) What are the causes and different manifestations of systemic risk?
(Q2) How can systemic risk be measured, especially while it is building?
(Q3) How do different forms of systemic risk contribute to overall systemic risk?
What is the dominant form of systemic risk?
(Q4) Are the existing reform proposals sufficient to effectively counteract sys-
3See also Haldane and May (2011), Battiston et al. (2009).
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temic risk?
The structure of this thesis will follow along the lines of these questions. While
each question is addressed in every subsequent chapter to some extent, this intro-
duction focuses largely on question (Q1), chapter (3) focuses on question (Q2),
the chapters (4) and (5) focus on question (Q3) and the concluding chapter (6)
focuses to a large extend on question (Q4).
1.1 Systemic Risk
Systemic risk is a broadly defined term that has changed considerably in the
course of the recent financial crisis. Until then, systemic risk was predominantly
understood as the probability of contagion effects that cause cascades of defaults.
The crisis, however, revealed that systemic risk might also emerge from two other
sources: (i) a common shock, leading to a simultaneous default of several financial
institutions at once; and (ii) informational spillovers where bad news about one
bank increase the refinancing costs of all other banks.
A categorization of systemic risks is given by Bandt et al. (2009) who distinguish
between a broad and a narrow sense of systemic risk. In their classification,
contagion effects on interbank markets pose a systemic risk in the narrow sense,
whereas systemic risk in the broad sense is characterised as a common shock to
many institutions or markets. This distinction is followed by the Financial Sta-
bility Board (FSB) who defines systemic risk as “a risk of disruption to financial
services that is (i) caused by an impairment of all or parts of the financial system
and (ii) has the potential to have serious negative consequences for the real econ-
omy” (see International Monetary Fund et al. (2009), as well as the background
paper Financial Stability Board et al. (2009b)). The ECB suggests that systemic
risk can be described as the risk of experiencing a strong systemic event that
adversely affects a number of systemically important intermediaries or markets
(European Central Bank (2009)). The trigger of the event could either be a shock
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from outside or from within the financial system. The systemic event is strong
when the intermediaries concerned fail or when the markets concerned become
dysfunctional. Since all these different dimensions of a systemic event interact
with each other, it is clear that systemic risk is a highly complex phenomenon.
1.1.1 Contagion
Contagion occurs due to direct linkages between financial institutions. Probably
the most prominent example of these linkages is contagion via interbank markets.
The interbank market can be described as a financial network consisting of a set
of nodes, i.e. banks or other financial institutions like hedge funds or insurance
companies, and a set of edges which form the connection between these insti-
tutions. An extensive review on the literature of financial networks is given in
Allen et al. (2010). The interconnection in the interbank market can lead to an
enhanced liquidity allocation and increased risk sharing amongst the banks, as
Allen and Gale (2000) argue. At the same time, however, increased connectivity
can also amplify contagion effects.
Analyzing linkages in the form of overlapping claims, Allen and Gale (2000) find
that contagion is more likely to occur if the network structure is incomplete, as in
comparison with complete networks it is only able to absorb smaller idiosyncratic
shocks. Gai and Kapadia (2008) support the result that higher connectivity in
the financial system reduces the probability of contagion. However, they identify
that the consequences in case contagion nevertheless occurs are more severe as
the possibility increases that institutions might repeatedly be affected. Haldane
(2009) argues that connectivity is a knife-edge property. Up to a certain point,
financial networks and interbank linkages serve as a mutual insurance of the fi-
nancial system and thus contribute to systemic stability. Beyond this point, the
same interconnections might serve as a shock-amplifier and thus increase systemic
fragility.
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The stabilizing function of an interbank market might, furthermore, be affected
by the structure of financial markets. Iori et al. (2006) find that contagion prob-
ability is lower in case the interacting institutions are homogeneous, i.e. they are
similar their characteristics such as size or investment opportunities, as thus no
institution becomes significant for either borrowing or lending. This result, how-
ever, is in contrast with Georg and Poschmann (2010) and Georg (2010), who
find no significant evidence that the heterogeneity of the financial system has
a negative impact on financial stability. Haldane (2009) describes the financial
system in the built-up of the crisis as being characterized by complexity and ho-
mogeneity and argues why these two ingredients lead to fragility by resorting to
literature on complex systems and ecology. Further structural factors are ana-
lyzed by Nier et al. (2007) who constitute that higher capitalization levels, lower
interbank liabilities and a less concentrated interbank market reduce the likeli-
hood of direct contagion in the interbank market.
Due to their high liquidity, interbank transactions are amongst the most vital
connections between banks and have thus received special attention in the lit-
erature. Eisenberg and Noe (2001) develop a liabilities matrix for a general in-
terbank system and calculate the full impact of a bank default in the system
using linear algebra. A number of authors follow this work and apply it to dif-
ferent countries. Furfine (1999) examines the likelihood that a failure of one
bank would cause the subsequent collapse of a large number of other banks in
the US using the Federal Reserve’s large-value transfer system Fedwire. Mistrulli
(2007) uses actual interbank exposure data from the Bank of Italy Supervisory
Reports database to analyze the risk of contagion in the Italian interbank market.
Gabrieli (2010) analyzes the functioning of the overnight unsecured euro money
market using data on unsecured Euros-denominated loans executed through the
e-MID platform. Gabrieli finds that monetary policy implementation was af-
fected by the crisis due to “A heightened awareness of counterparty credit risk”.
Cajueiro and Tabak (2007) analyze the topology of the Brazilian interbank mar-
ket by using methods from network theory. Manna and Iazzetta (2009) analyze
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monthly data on deposit exchanged by banks on the Italian interbank market
from 1990 to 2008.
1.1.2 Common Shocks
Another source of systemic risk emerges from indirect linkages between banks
in the form of common shocks. If a number of banks hold identical or simi-
lar assets, this correlation between their portfolios can give rise to a fire-sale
which is typically associated with significant losses for a large number of banks.
Acharya and Yorulmazer (2008) point out how banks are incentivized to increase
the correlation between their investments and thus the risk of an endogenous com-
mon shock in order to prevent costs arising from potential information spillovers.
The banks’ returns of the last period are signals according to which risk-adverse
depositors update priors about future returns. Compared with the situation in
which both banks’ signals are positive, depositors expect lower returns in the
future if one banks signal is negative and, hence, demand higher deposit rates in
order to compensate for potential failures. Accordingly, a bank with a positive
signal is facing higher borrowing costs if the other bank sets a negative signal.
This sets an incentive for both banks to increase the correlation between their
investments to increase the probability of joint success (and joint failure).
Acharya (2009) analyzes how banks are incentivized to induce an endogenous
common shock in order to avoid negative externalities arising from a bank fail-
ure. The driving factor behind this behavior is that a default imposes both
positive and negative effects on the surviving competitor. Negative effects arise
as not all depositors are furthermore able or willing to lend their money to a bank,
so that the surviving bank faces higher refinancing costs. However, the failure
also leads to a reduction of monitoring and information costs by taking over staff
and technology. Depending on which effect prevails the payoffs of the surviving
banks shareholders either increase or decrease in comparison to no bank failure.
Accordingly, if the failure generates negative externalities banks are incentivized
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to increase the correlation of their portfolios ex ante and thus increase the prob-
ability of a joint failure.
Analyzing the impact of central bank activity in a network model with interbank
market Georg and Poschmann (2010) highlight that common shocks constitute
a larger threat on financial stability than contagion effects. Empirical studies
confirm that correlation in the financial sector increased. De Nicolo and Kwast
(2002) illustrate an increase in correlation between large and complex financial
organizations during the 1990s, whereas Lehar (2005) finds that this development
was more severe for North American than for European banks.
1.1.3 Informational Spillovers
According to Acharya and Yorulmazer (2003), as well as Nier et al. (2008), infor-
mational spillovers are another form of systemic risk that have to be taken into
account. This effect is sometimes called informational contagion, but the name
is misleading, since it poses a systemic risk in the broad sense of Bandt et al.
(2009). The main idea of informational spillovers is that the insolvency of a bank
can increase the refinancing costs of the surviving banks, since especially in times
of crises financial markets exhibit a herding behaviour. Acharya and Yorulmazer
(2003) develop a model of bank herding behaviour based on a banks incentives
to mimize the information spillover from bad news about other banks. In their
model, the returns on a banks loans consist of a systematic component (i.e. the
business cycle) and an idiosyncratic component. If there are bad news about
a bank, these news reveal information about an underlying common factor and
thus impact on all banks. The authors show that even the possibility of informa-
tion contagion can induce banks to herd with other banks. Herding behaviour
in this model is a simultaneous ex-ante decision of banks to undertake correlated
investments and gives thus rise to correlations amongst the banks portfolios.
Bandt et al. (2009) give an overview of literature on bank herding as a source of
systemic risk.
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The different forms of systemic risk are not independent of each other and a bank
default does not happen instantaneously. During the build-up of the default,
the bank will start deleveraging and selling assets. This may cause fire-sales in
certain asset classes and exacerbates the roblems of the bank. At the same time,
rumors about the bank and similar banks will spread in the markets, causing
market participants to tighten their liquidity provision. Since the first bank al-
ready is struggling, this tightened liquidity situation can lead to a default of this
bank. This default then triggers contagion effects and possible further defaults
at banks who have issued interbank loans to the first bank. As the recent finan-
cial crisis has shown, financial markets show a herding behaviour as described in
Acharya and Yorulmazer (2003) and are aware of it too. In a situation of high
uncertainty about the fundamental and idiosyncratic risks in the financial sys-
tem, liquidity provision will dry up and market volatility will increase. While
one can distinguish the various forms of systemic risk by their manifestation, it
is impossible to separate them in reality. Contagion effects and common shocks
will inevitably trigger informational contagion and vice versa. Therefore, infor-
mational contagion is a vivid source of systemic risk and has to be taken into
account into macroprudential regulation to enhance financial stability.
1.1.4 Operationalizing Systemic Risk
In order to derive meaningful policy measures for regulating systemic risk, it is
necessary for regulatory authorities to measure and operationalize systemic risks.
It was recently emphasized by e.g. Borio (2010) that the distinction between the
time- and cross-sectional dimensions of aggregate risk is critical. In the time-
dimension leading indicators of financial distress are needed, while in the cross-
sectional dimension a robust quantification of the contribution of each institution
to systemic risk is necessary. There are various aproaches in the literature to
achieve these goals. The European Central Bank (2010a) differentiates between
four types of indicators to measure systemic risk: (i) coincident indicators of fi-
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nancial stability measure the current state of instability in the financial system;
(ii) early-warning signal models to detect the build-up of systemic crises; (iii)
macro stress-tests can assess the resilience of the financial system to aggregate
macro-shocks; (iv) contagion and spillover models are used to analyze the impact
of a crisis on the stability of the financial system. By using a set of such indicators,
central banks and regulatory authorities try to assess the different dimensions of
systemic risk. It is a precondition for a useful measurement concept of systemic
risk that it takes all dimensions of systemic risks into account and will thus be a
combination of at least some of the systemic risk indicators. The main problem to
date is, that there does not exist a reliable indicator to measure the informational
contagion of a fiancial institution’s default. This leads to a significant element of
uncertainty when assessing systemic risks. The time dimension of systemic risk
in the sense of Borio (2010) is addressed in chapter (4), where a dynamic model
of a banking system is analyzed. The Network Systemic Importance Index de-
veloped in chapter (3) captures the cross-sectional dimension of systemic risk, as
it measures the systemic risk individual institutions pose to the rest of the system.
Systemic Importance of Individual Financial Institutions. A number
of approaches assess the systemic importance of individual financial institutions.
Their common goal is to impose additional regulatory requirements and oversight
in accordance with the individual systemic importance of a financial institution.
Zhou (2009) considers three different measures of systemic importance of intercon-
nected financial institutions and correlates them with the size of the institution.
The author finds that there is not always a relationship between the systemic im-
portance of a financial institute and its size. The “too-big-to-fail” argument does
not always hold true and thus alternative measures of systemic importance have
to be considered. The paper follows Segoviano Basurto and Goodhart (2009) and
defines a systemic importance index that resorts to multivariate Extreme Value
Theory. Another approach stems from cooperative game theory. Tarashev et al.
(2009) use the Shapley value to attribute each individual institution’s contribu-
tion to overall systemic risk. They apply their methodology to a sample of 20
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large internationally active financial institutions and derive their contribution to
overall systemic risk as a function of the institution’s size, probability of default
and exposure to a common factor.
Adrian and Brunnermeier (2009) introduce CoVaR which is the Value at Risk of
the financial system conditional on an individual institution being under stress.
The methodology thus focuses on how much an individual institution contributes
to overall systemic risk. International Monetary Fund (2009) uses CoVaR to
assess systemic risk in the US banking sector using CDS spreads. Fong et al.
(2009) applies CoVaR to the Hong Kong financial system. Arias et al. (2010)
apply CoVaR to the Colombian banking system analysing the systemic market
risk contributions of banks, pension funds, and between different types of fi-
nancial institutions. A comparison of different sets of systemic risk measures is
performed by Rodriguez-Moreno and Pea Snchez de Rivera (2010). The authors
argue that simple indicators are better suited for analysing systemic risk and find
that the best indicators are the first Principal Component of the single-name
CDSs and the LIBOR-OIS or LIBOR-TBILL spreads, respectively. According to
Rodriguez-Moreno and Pea Snchez de Rivera (2010), the least reliable indicators
are the Co-Risk measures and the systemic spreads extracted from the CDO in-
dexes and their tranches.
Huang et al. (2009a) propose a framework for measuring and stress testing the
systemic risk of a group of major financial institutions. They construct an hy-
pothetical insurance premium against systemic risk, called the distress insurance
premium (DIP). The DIP is based on on ex ante measures of default probabilities
of individual banks and forecasted asset return correlations. In order to construct
the proability of default of individual banks and asset return correlations are cal-
culated from CDS spread data. Huang et al. (2009a) applys the DIP to 12 major
U.S. banks during a sample period 2001-08 and are able to show a substantial in-
crease in the indicator after the onset of the subprime crisis. Huang et al. (2009b)
25
furthermore applys the DIP methodology to twenty-two major banks in Asia and
the Pacific and illustrate the dynamics of the spillover effects of the financial cri-
sis into the region. Brownlees and Engle (2010) construct the Marginal Expected
Shortfall (MES) as a measure of the systemic risk of an individual financial in-
stitution. The MES of a financial firm is based on market data and describes the
expected loss of an equity investor should the overall market decline substantially.
It depends on the volatility of a firm equity price and is determined by using ad-
vanced econometric models. Acharya et al. (2010b) define the contribution of a
financial institution to overall systemic risk as the institution’s systemic expected
shortfall (SES). The systemic expected shortfall of an institution increases with
the leverage of this institution and with it’s MES. The authors demonstrate how
SES can be used to predict the outcome of stress tests, decline in equity valuations
of large firms during the financial crisis and the increase in their CDS spreads.
Both papers are the building blocks of the NYU Stern systemic risk ranking4 that
measures the systemic risk contributions of the largest U.S. financial institutions.
Integrated Measurements of Systemic Risk. Besides attributing systemic
risk to individual financial institutions, it is also possible to derive measurements
of overall systemic risk in a financial system. These approaches have in com-
mon, that they use more than one indicator of systemic risk, typically based
on market data (i.e. CDS spreads) and network data (i.e. about the interbank
network structure). Gauthier et al. (2010) compare different methods of attribut-
ing systemic importance to individual institutions using data from the Canadian
banking system. The authors find that macroprudential capital requirements can
reduce the risk of a systemic crisis by 25% and that the macroprudential capital
requirements can differ from the observed capital levels by up to 50%. This differ-
ence is furthermore not trivially related to a banks size or it’s default probability.
Schwaab et al. (2010) propose an econometric framework for the measurement of
global financial and credit risk conditions based on state space methods. Fur-
thermore, they propose a coincident indicator for unobserved default stress as a
4http://www.systemicriskranking.stern.nyu.edu/
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measure for overall financial system risk. They find that credit risk conditions
can significantly and persistently decouple from business cycle conditions due to
e.g. unobserved changes in credit supply and that such decoupling can be an
early warning signal for macro-prudential policy.
Chan-Lau (2010) proposes to base additional capital charges for systemically
important financial institutions on their incremental contribution to systemic
risk. The proposed framework to measure a financial institution’s contribution
to systemic risk uses CoRisk, network analysis and one-factor credit risk port-
folio models. Chan-Lau uses the expected societal loss as a proxy for the sys-
temic importance of a financial institution. In contrast to Tarashev et al. (2009)
and Gauthier et al. (2010), Chan-Lau also factors in the increase in default risk
of other institutions triggered by the failure of one institution. Aikman et al.
(2009) develop a model that uses macro-credit risk, income risk, network inter-
actions, feedback effects and funding risk to assess the impact of macroeconomic
and financial shocks on the banking system. Their “Risk Assessment Model for
Systemic Institutions” (RAMSI) is based on detailed balance sheet data and can
be used to assess the impact on shocks on individual financial institutions and the
financial system as a whole. One particular interesting point about the RAMSI
model is, that it incorporates a mechanism to model informational contagion.
Three indicators, solvency concerns, liquidity position and confidence are used to
describe a banks ability to refinance on funding markets.
1.2 Structure of this Thesis
This thesis builds on six consecutive papers that develop a flexible framework
to analyze different aspects of systemic risk with a special focus on interbank
markets and financial networks. The chapters are designed to be self-contained,
even though Chapter (2) goes somewhat beyond the main scope of this thesis
and applies the microfoundations developed in this chapter to a model of endoge-
27
nous money creation. In Chapter (3) various aspects of the network structure
of interbank markets are analyzed and the South African interbank market is
analyzed as a real-world example. This chapter develops an index to measure
the systemic importance of individual financial institutions that can be used as a
tool for macroprudential oversight of the financial system. Chapter (4) draws on
Chapter (2) and uses the simple banking behaviour to develop a dynamic model
of a banking system. One of the key results of this chapter is that systemic
risks in the form of common shocks can be more severe than systemic risk that
emerges in the form of interbank contagion. This result is further analyzed in
Chapter (5), where we develop a general equilibrium model of a banking system
and combine two formerly distinct strands of systemic risk literature in a unified
model. Chapter (6) draws policy conclusions on the recently endorsed Basel III
framework, based on all previous chapters and key results outlined in this thesis.
Chapter (2) develops the microfoundations of bank and non-bank behaviour
in order to study the endogenous process of money creation, which is deter-
mined by the interaction of banks, non-banks, and the central bank on the in-
terdependend markets for reserves, loans, and bonds. It has previously been
published as Georg and Pasche (2008).5 Our model extends the approach of
Bernanke and Blinder (1988) and models the risk and return preferences of banks
by using portfolio theory. We then introduce Value at Risk as a tool for banks to
manage their liquidity preferences. The model of banking behaviour is then com-
bined with the model of Bofinger (2001), who develops a model of the macroeco-
nomic loans market in order to explain the money creation process endogenously.
Bofinger derives the demand for central bank reserves as a function of the inter-
est rate on the loans market, the main refinancing rate, and the required reserve
rate. We use the Bofinger model, where the demand for reserves is explicitely
derived, and combine it with the Bernanke and Blinder approach, which models
the behaviour of a commercial bank using portfolio theory in a richer setting with
5The results in Georg and Pasche (2008) have been presented at the conference “Managing
Financial Instabilities in Capitalist Economies 2009” in Reykjavik.
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loans and bonds markets.
We extend this combined approach and develop a model of banks, non-banks and
the central bank, where money supply is truly endogenous. The endogeneity of
money supply in the model is twofold: The structure of the portfolio, driven by
risk and liquidity preferences, determines the money multiplier, while the portfo-
lio volume determines the demand for reserves and hence the money base. For the
non-banks (households and firms) we apply a similiar logic that makes it possible
to derive their behaviour from portfolio considerations as well. The approach is
related to the structuralist approach in Post Keynesian macroeconomics, but can
also be used as a building block for New Keynesian and other type of models.
We determine the influence of the central bank on the money base in the short-
and long-run.
The model enables us to derive credit multipliers under the assumption that the
interest rate on the loans and bonds market are given exogenously. We derive the
money multiplier for open market operations in the short- and long-run and show
that open market operations are less effective in the long-run due to portfolio re-
structuring of commercial banks. When calculating the money multiplier for a
change in the main refinancing rate, we find that the central banks’ refinancing
policy may fail due to binding liquidity and solvency constraints. We again find
a smaller impact of monetary policy in the long-run, which raises the question
how effective central bank policy can be in a dynamic model of a banking system.
This question will be further analyzed in Chapter (4).
In Chapter (3), which has previously been published as Brink and Georg (2011a).
we introduce network theory as a tool to assess systemic risk in interbank mar-
kets.6 This chapter serves two purposes. First, it analyzes the network structure
6The results of this chapter will also appear as Brink and Georg (2011b) and have been
presented at seminars at the South African Reserve Bank and the University of Pretoria.
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of the South African overnight interbank market with tools from network theory.
A financial network is described by a set of nodes, which represent banks, and a set
of edges, which represent connections between the banks. In our example, these
connections will be overnight interbank loans. Using a unique dataset of inter-
bank transactions from the South African Multiple Options Settlement (SAMOS)
system between Februar 2005 and June 2010, we introduce basic network mea-
sures, such as the shortest average path length, and the clustering coefficient to
analyze the network topology. Like most interbank networks, the South African
overnight interbank market is characterized by a few large, highly interconnected,
money center banks and a large number of small, less interconnected banks at
the periphery of the network. We show that the network was largely stable, both
by the number of banks that participated in the interbank market and their high
level of interconnectedness. Liquidity provision was ensured even during times of
high uncertainty on international capital markets.
The second purpose of this chapter is to introduce a measure for the systemic
importance of individual financial institutions. This measure, the Network Sys-
temic Importance Index (NSII) is based on three quantities that characterize the
relevance of a bank in the interbank network: size, interconnectedness and be-
tweenness. While the first two are easily understood, betweenness is used as a
proxy for a banks’ substitutability. A high betweenness indicates that the bank
is on many shortest paths of liquidity flows and will thus be larger and more
complex to manage and hence harder to substitute. Even though the NSII can
only be one building block of a larger set of macroprudential tools necessary to
assess systemic risk, it captures many features of the impact that the network
structure has on systemic risk. One particular relevant feature of the NSII is that
it is a relative measure in the sense, that it does not attribute absolute values
of systemic importance to individual banks. Rather, it measures the systemic
importance of one bank with respect to all other banks in the network. This is
of particular importance, as measures of systemic importance are prone to gener-
ate moral hazard. Due to implicit and explicit bail-out guarantees, banks might
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try to gain systemic importance in order to benefit from these guarantees. The
NSII circumvents this effect, as it takes the whole network structure into account.
Banks themselves cannot be totally certain about their ranking in terms of sys-
temic importance within the interbank market, as they cannot fully anticipate
the behaviour of the other banks in the system. Hence, the NSII is a useful
tool to measure the systemic importance of individual banks and can be used to
impose additional measures on SIFIs that are commensurate with their systemic
importance.
The recent financial crisis has highlighted the necessity to understand systemic
risk both qualitatively and quantitatively in order to safeguard financial stability.
It became apparent, that the structure and dynamics of interbank markets have
to be taken into account when assessing the resilience of the financial system. In
Chapter (4) we therefore develop a dynamic multi-agent model of systemic risk
in a banking system with interbank linkages. The results of this chapter have
been previously published as Georg and Poschmann (2010) and Georg (2010).7
This chapter extends the static banking behaviour of Chapter (2) into a dynamic
setting and proposes an algorithm for the time-evolution of the system. It draws
on earlier works of Iori et al. (2006) and Nier et al. (2007), but extends those
models in various aspects.
Iori et al. (2006) develop a network model of a banking system, where agents
(banks) can interact with each other via interbank loans. The balance sheet
of banks consits of risk-free investments and interbank loans as assets, and de-
posits, equity and interbank borrowings as liabilities. Banks channel funds from
7I wish to thank Jenny Poschmann, Marcus Guenther, Markus Pasche, Christoph Ohler,
Monika Bucher, Peter Burgold, Virginie Kemter, Natlia Kohtamäki, Esti VanWykdeVries, and
seminar participants at Deutsche Bundesbank, University of Leipzig, University of Halle, Uni-
versity of Pretoria, South African Reserve Bank and ETH Zürich for helpful comments and dis-
cussions. Part of this research was conducted at Deutsche Bundesbank and the South African
Reserve Bank.
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depositors towards productive investment. They receive liquidity shocks via de-
posit fluctuations and pay dividends if possible. Nier et al. (2007) describe the
banking system as a random graph where the network structure is determined
by the number of nodes (banks) and the probability that two nodes are con-
nected. The banks’ balance sheet consists of external assets (investments) and
interbank assets on the asset side and net worth, deposits, and interbank loans
as liabilities. Net worth is assumed to be a fixed fraction of a banks total as-
sets and deposits are a residual, designed to complete the banks liabilities side.
Shocks that hit a bank and lead to its default are distributed equally amongst
the interbank market. Nier et al. (2007) find, that (i) the banking system is more
resilient to contagious defaults if its banks are better capitalized and this effect is
non-linear; (ii) the effect of the degree of connectivity is non-monotonic; (iii) the
size of interbank liabilities tend to increase the risk of a knock-on default; and
(iv) more concentrated banking systems are shown to be prone to larger systemic
risk. More recently, Ladley (2011) analyzes the impact of the interbank network
heterogeneity on systemic risk in a multi-agent setting. The balance sheet of
banks consists of equity, deposits, cash reserves, loans to the non-bank sector and
interbank loans. Ladley considers risky investment opportunities and explicitely
models how banks attract deposits by choosing their offered deposit interest rates.
Banks determine the optimal structure of their portfolio via a genetic algorithm.
He finds that that for small shocks, high interconnectivity helps stabilizing the
system, while for large shocks high interconnectivity amplifies the initial impact.
In this chapter, we develop a dynamic model of a banking system, where banks
optimize a portfolio of risky investments and riskless excess reserves. Risky in-
vestments are long-term investment projects that fund an unmodelled firm sector
while riskless excess reserves are short-term and held at the deposit facility of the
central bank. Banks face a stochastic supply of household deposits and stochas-
tic returns from risky investments. This gives rise to liquidity fluctuations and
initiates the dynamic formation of an interbank loan network. Banks have fur-
thermore access to central bank liquidity if they can provide sufficient collateral.
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This model is used to first analyze the impact that the provision of central bank
liquidity has on financial stability. It is shown that the central bank can stabilize
the financial system in the short-run. This result is in line with the results of
Chapter (2), where the efficiency of central bank policy in the long-run is smaller
than in the short-run. Possible network structures will be given at the begin-
ning of each simulation. They reflect contractual agreements amongst banks and
determine the set of possible interbank loans. The realized network structure
at each point in time is a subset of the possible network structure (i.e. the set
of existing edges at any point in time is a subset of the set of possible edges).
This closely resembles the situation in reality, where the day-to-day topology of
interbank networks also varies from the monthly or quaterly aggregated network
structures that are analyzed in the literature. This chapter thus extends the anal-
ysis of Chapter (3) from static to dynamic interbank networks. Different possible
network structures are compared, and it is shown that in random graphs, the
relationship between the degree of interconnectivity and financial instability is
non-monotonic. Scale-free networks are seen to be more stable than small-world
networks, which in turn tend to be more stable than random networks. Thus,
the effect of contagion is exagerrated in the literature, as most papers assume
random networks and most real-world interbank networks are scale-free. The
model captures key effects of the dynamics of interbank networks and can thus
be used to analyze the impact of different externalities on financial stability. The
counterparty risk externality is compared to the correlation externality and it is
shown that, contrary to their importance in the literature, common shocks are
not subordinate to interbank contagion.
While the mdoel developed in chapter (4) allows for a comparison of different
forms of systemic risk in a multi-agent setting, chapter (5) develops a general
equilibrium model that aims to better understand the interaction effect the dif-
ferent manifestations of systemic risk have. The results of this chapter have been
published as Ahnert and Georg (2011).8 There exists a large and growing liter-
8The results in this chapter have been presented at the New York University and the Federal
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ature on individual forms of systemic risk, starting with the seminal paper on
bank-runs by Diamond and Dybvig (1983). This setup has been extended by i.e.
Allen and Gale (2000) and Freixas et al. (2000) in order to analyze contagion in
interbank markets. Dasgupta (2004) uses the setup of Allen and Gale and cal-
culates the optimal level of interconnectedness. However, as has been argued in
chapter (4), common shocks are not subordinate to interbank contagion and thus
have to be taken into account. A model of common shocks in a banking sys-
tem is developed by Acharya (2009), while Acharya and Yorulmazer (2003) show
that the fear of informational spillovers lead to endogenous portfolio correlation
amongst banks. What is missing, however, is a unified model of systemic risk
that incorporates all relevant forms and analyzes their complex interplay. Such a
model is developed this chapter.
Our model consists of three periods and two regions, each with a representative
bank and a number of depositors that deposit at their regional bank only. Banks
invest into risky securities with long maturity and a riskless storage technology
with short maturity, while households have access to the storage technology only.
Households are either early or late consumers that value consumption in period
one or period two only. The type of the household is private information and
revealed to the households in period one. Early consumers will always withdraw
in period one, while late consumers might misrepresent their type and withdraw
prematurely. The strategic withdrawal decision is based upon signals that the
households receive about the long assets’ return of their own bank and the bank
in the other region. This can lead to the insolvency of the bank. Contagion
through interbank markets arises as banks are unaware of a counter-party ex-
ternality and thus over-insure themselves against regional liquidity shocks. The
default of the borrowing bank can lead to the default of the lending bank in
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. I wish to thank Viral Acharya, Christian Aulepp, Sudipto Bhat-
tacharya, Francesco Caselli, Amil Dasgupta, Elizabeth Foote, Douglas Gale, Marcus Guenther,
Yaron Leitner, Friederieke Niepmann, Cecilia Parlatore Siritto, Markus Pasche, and Elu von
Thadden for fruitful discussions and comments.
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this situation. Common shocks arise from a correlation externality that leads
to banks having strongly correlated portfolios and thus being prone to common
shocks. Informational spillovers are introduced where depositors become aware
of this externality and extract information about the health of their own bank by
receiving signals about the return of the other bank. Examining the probability
of systemic crisis, we find a non-trivial interaction effect between the different
forms of systemic risk. This interaction effect is pro-cyclical and increases with
increasing asset volatility. Thus, our findings not only highlight the importance
of incorporating different forms of systemic risks, but also have strong implica-
tions for capital requirements. In particular, in order to effectively reduce the
probability of a systemic crisis, it is necessary to counterveil all forms of systemic
risk.
While a number of policy conclusions are drawn at the end of each chapter, the
new Basel III framework deserves special attention, as it captures the key policy
lessons from the crisis. Therefore, in chapter (6), the Basel III framework is
reviewed in the light of the results in this thesis and the literature on systemic risk.
This chapter has been previously published as Georg (2011) where also section
(1.1) from this chapter has been included.9 Besides substantial increases in the
requirements for capital quality and quantity, Basel III introduces two liquidity
ratios. A net stable funding ratio targets long-term liquidity requirements, while
the liquidity coverage ratio aims at short-term liquidity. In addition to that,
Basel III proposes the implementation of a leverage ratio on bank debt. These
measures, however, suffer from a number of shortcomings that are outlined in
this chapter. In order to describe a way forward with systemic risk regulation,
the chapter concludes with a proposal of three measures that can enhance the
design of financial regulation. Counter-cyclical risk-weights can alleviate the time-
dimension of systemic risk while a dynamic asset value correlation can counteract
the cross-sectional dimension of systemic risk. Most importantly, however, is the
9The results in this chapter have been presented at the University of Erfurt. I wish to thank
Christian Fahrholz, Markus Pasche and Sebastian Voll for helpful discussions and comments.
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conclusion that financial regulation should emphasize the third pillar of Basel III
and enhance transparency requirements in order to counteract systemic risk that
emerges via common shocks and informational spillovers.
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Chapter 2
Microfoundations of Bank and
Non-Bank Behaviour
This chapter develops the microfoundations of banking and non-bank behaviour
that will be used in the multi-agent simulation in chapter (4). The motivation for
the model stems from New and Post Keynesian macroeconomics, where money
supply is assumed to be endogenous. In this chapter, we explicitly derive the be-
haviour of the banking sector regarding the loan supply, bonds demand, and de-
mand for reserves from portfolio and liquidity considerations. The microeconomic
foundations have an impact on the process of money creation, which is determined
by the interaction of banks, non-banks, and the central bank on the interde-
pendent markets for reserves, loans, and bonds. Although the microeconomics
of bank behaviour is modelled quite simply, interest rates as well as monetary
aggregates depend on policy variables in a non-linear and non-monotonous way.
The contents of this chapter have been previously published as Georg and Pasche
(2008).
2.1 Introduction
The endogeneity of money supply is a widely discussed topic, especially in New
and Post Keynesian macroeconomics. It can be taken as a common conviction
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that individual behaviour regarding credit demand and supply as well as holding
currency and deposits has an impact on the money creation process. These is-
sues are often neglected in Neoclassical and Monetarist type models. There are,
however, very different approaches how endogeneity of money originates (for an
extensive review see e.g. Palley (2002), Palley (2008a)). New Keynesian eco-
nomics (see e.g. Mankiw and Romer (1991), Romer (2000), Woodford (2003)) is
dominated by the ”New Consensus” where the exogenously determined money
supply of the central bank (LM curve) is replaced by the Taylor rule (Taylor
(1993)). The monetary policy targets inflation and output gap by controlling the
real interest rate, while there is no explicit theory about the creation of credit
and money.
In Post Keynesian economics money is endogenous by its nature (Lavoie (1992),
Lavoie (2006), Rochon (1999)). There have been two distinct approaches de-
veloped which are usually denoted as the ”accomodationist” (or horizontalist)
and the ”structuralist” (or verticalist) approach (see Moore (1988), Pollin (1991),
Fontana (2004), Wray (2007), Palley (2008b)). Both schools have in common
that the money creation process is determined by the behaviour of commercial
banks and non-banks on the credit market. The process starts with credit de-
mand, and credit creates deposits. The accomodationist approach argues that
an increase in credit demand leads to a need for additional reserves. In order to
ensure the liquidity of the banking sector, the central bank has to respond by
increasing the money base and hence to accomodate the credit demand. In this
view the microeconomic considerations of the commercial banking sector play a
minor role. In contrast, the structuralist approach argues that commercial banks
respond to an increase in credit demand with structural changes of their portfolio
on the asset and the liability side. This may lead to a change in the demand for
reserves and hence in the interaction with the central bank. However, there is
no monotone relationship between credit demand and the response of the central
bank, but complex structural effects on the interest rates and portfolio compo-
sition. While the accomodationists see the central bank’s behaviour as a reflex
38
to the non-bank public (which hence determines solely the money supply), the
structuralists see a certain degree of autonomous central banking policy. Hence,
money is endogenously generated by the interaction of the public, the central
bank, and the commercial banks.
We argue that it is important to investigate these complex interactions to under-
stand how monetary policy impulses are transmitted to the real sphere via the
credit and bonds market. We further argue that it is important to understand
how the real sphere affects the money creation process. Therefore, our approach
is related to the structuralist view. We will not consider any strategic policy
implications like the Taylor rule since such rules make sense only in the context
of a full-fledged macroeconomic model. It is important to understand how com-
mercial banks behave on credit, bond and reserve markets, and how they respond
to changes on these markets, as well as to changes in the central bank policy. As
we will see, open market operations and changes in interest rates for borrowed
reserves have – depending on the parametrization – complex and sometimes coun-
tervailing effects on variables like credit supply or bonds demand. Therefore, it
is more reasonable to combine such a building block of the financial sector, as
outlined in this chapter, with a complete macroeconomic model, and then – if
possible – to derive a rationale for monetary policy rules.
In contrast to most Post Keynesians who assume simple markup pricing for de-
termining the loans interest rate, we develop a model of banking behaviour which
is in some sense neoclassical: the (representative) bank has preferences regarding
risk, return, and liquidity, and it manages its assets and liabilities via portfolio
and Value at Risk techniques. A single commercial bank operates in competitive
markets and responds to changes in market conditions as well as to changes in
central bank policy. This allows for a detailed analysis of some spillover effects
between credit and bonds market, the market for reserves, and the real sector
(via income). Although the microeconomics of banking are portrayed in a very
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simplified way the results are not trivial.
This chapter is organized as follows: Before developing our model, we briefly dis-
cuss two sources of endogeneity by means of two approaches in the literature. In
section (2.2) we review the model of Bernanke and Blinder (1988) who introduce
the idea how portfolio considerations of the commercial bank affect the money
multiplier. Section (2.3) discusses the less common approach of Bofinger (2001)
where changes on the credit market affects the bank’s demand for central bank
loans. This establishes a close relation between the interest rates on the market
for credit and the market for central bank money via an optimization calculus
of the commercial bank. Section (2.4) incorporates both ideas in a consistent
framework and extends them with liquidity considerations. These liquidity is-
sues are twofold: When the bank’s capital is fixed, the volume of risky assets
has to be restricted. On the liability side there is a risk of unperceived outflows
of deposits which requires to hold a sufficient volume of liquid assets like excess
reserves. All portfolio- and Value at Risk decisions are calculated explicitly and
exhibit nonlinear relationships between the central variables (e.g. loans (bonds)
demand (supply)) and the interest rates. The money creation process is analysed
in section (2.5). It starts with some multiplier considerations, then develops a
model of the financial sector which includes also non-bank behavior, and discusses
the interdependency with the real sector of the economy. Finally, section (2.6)
concludes.
2.2 The Approach by Bernanke and Blinder
In the approach by Bernanke and Blinder (1988), the commercial bank’s simpli-
fied balance sheet contains reserves (R), loans (Ls), and bonds (Bb) as assets,
while deposits (D) are the unique liability. There are no currencies and no cen-
tral bank loans to commercial banks. The reserve requirements are rD, hence the
balance sheet can be written as E +Ls +Bb = (1− r)D, where E are the excess
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reserves at the central bank with a zero interest rate. Since loans and bonds have
both expected returns and a certain risk (credit failure and bonds price volatility)
the commercial bank has portfolio considerations about its assets. The structure
of the portfolio is given by:
E(i) = λE(i)(1− r)D (2.1)
Ls(i, ρ) = λL(i, ρ)(1− r)D
Bb(i, ρ) = (1− λE(i)− λL(i, ρ))(1− r)D
where i is the interest rate of the bonds, and ρ is the interest rate of loans.
Obviously λL depends positively on ρ, negatively on i, and vice versa for λB.
For simplicity, Bernanke and Blinder assume that variations in ρ only affect the
shares of Ls and Bb in the portolio. The balance sheet of the central bank is
given by
R = rD + E = rD + λE(i)(1− r)D = (r + λE(i)(1− r))D (2.2)
Hence the money multiplier is m(i) = [r + λE(i)(1 − r)]−1. In contrast to the
exogenous multipliers in common textbook models there is now a dependency
of the multiplier on the behaviour of the commercial bank, i.e. the multiplier
depends on the endogenously determined bonds interest rate i.
The equilibrium in the loans market is determined by Ld(i, ρ, y) = Ls = λL(ρ, i)(1−
r)D. The demand for loans depends positively on i and income y, and negatively
on ρ. The bonds market is not explicitely modelled in the Bernanke/Blinder
approach. While the loans and the bonds market determine the money supply
Ds = m(i)R, the money demand Dd = Dd(i, y) follows the standard assumptions
(positive dependency on y and negative dependency on the bonds interest rate
i). Money market equilibrium is given by Dd(i, y) = m(i)R which is the conven-
tional LM curve. From these results Bernanke and Blinder construct a so-called
CC curve as a substitute for the IS curve where the goods and credit markets are
in equilibrium. Together with the LM curve they study the impact of monetary
impulses on the real sector.
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For the purpose of this chapter we are not interested into the CC-LM macro
model but we pick up the idea that the commercial bank’s behaviour is driven by
portfolio considerations, which have important implications for the loans market
and the money market. The mechanistic exogenous money multiplier is modified
to an endogenous money multiplier, based on the behaviour in the loans market
and on portfolio considerations of the commercial bank. There are, however, some
shortcomings which deserve an extension of the framework (for further critical
remarks see Bajec and Graf Lambsdorff (2006)).
First, there are no central bank loans to the commercial bank, even though the
interest rate policy plays a prominent role in central banking. Changes in the
central banks interest rate ρc for refinancing commercial banks is an important
component of monetary policy. If we allow central bank credits Lc with interest
rate ρc, the commercial bank has not only to decide on the portfolio structure of
a given volume, but also on the volume itself.
Second, the bonds market is not modelled explicitely. Bernanke and Blinder im-
plicitly assume that the non-bank’s demand for bonds is a residual from net finan-
cial wealth plus loans demand minus desired deposits (Bajec and Graf Lambsdorff
(2006), p.10). Since firms and households face budget constraints it is more rea-
sonable to argue that they decide on the desired structure of financial assets like
deposits and bonds, and then decide on the volume of the assets, financed also
by loans. Thus, the loans demand Ld is not properly derived. Furthermore, if we
assume that open market operations are conducted by buying or selling bonds,
this also affects the bonds interest rate i and henceforth the portfolio decisions
of non-banks.
Third, the bank’s portfolio considerations are reduced to risk and return deci-
sions. However, banking management also addresses solvency and liquidity is-
sues. These shape the loan supply, bonds demand, and the extent of refinancing
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the operations with central bank loans.
Fourth, there are neither domestic nor foreign currencies, and there is no market
for equities and derivative financial contracts. It is clear that a model cannot in-
clude too many items without losing the ability to derive clear analytical results.
For the sake of simplicity it is admissible to neglect these things. However, the
market for financial contracts apart from loans and bonds becomes of growing
importance as the recent financial crisis indicates. Since the observed fragility of
the inter-related markets challenges monetary policy, it may be worth to include
them in the framework.
Fifth, all markets are assumed to be perfect. Starting from Stiglitz and Weiss
(1981) there is a broad literature on credit rationing based on asymmetric infor-
mation which plays a role also in equity markets (see e.g. Hellmann and Stiglitz
(2000)). From Neo Keynesian theory we know that rationing changes the agent’s
calculus. They will adapt their plans so that e.g. rationing on the loans market
probably has spillovers to other financial markets as well as to the real sphere.
As a result, the macroeconomic effective demand may depend on rationing effects.
It is not possible, of course, to address all mentioned shortcomings. This chapter
concentrates on the first three mentioned issues. Regarding the central bank loans
for commercial banks we first summarize a model by Bofinger (2001).
2.3 The Approach by Bofinger
In Bofinger (2001) (pp. 53) a model of the macroeconomic loans market is pre-
sented, where commercial banks are able to refinance their credit supply by central
bank loans Lc, i.e. by the demand for reserves. The aim of the model is to ex-
plain the money creation process endogenously by the interaction of the market
for loans and the market for reserves. There are no bonds, no excess reserves,
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and we neglect currency in this model. Hence, the simplified commercial bank’s




π = ρLs − ρcLc − β(Ls)2 (2.3)
where the term β(Ls)2 describes the increasing risk of debt failures. This can be
justified by assuming that with an expanding loan volume, the bank finances more
and more risky projects, or more debitors have limited soundness. However, it is
more reasonable to assume that the debt failure probability depends on ρ rather
than L. Since a central bank loan Lc extends the balance sheet of the bank and
increases the reserves, the credit expansion follows the multiplier process. When
R = rD is subtracted from the balance sheet we have:
Ls = Lc + (1− r)D = Lc + (1− r)mLc (2.4)
Because for the money multiplier m = 1/r holds true in absence of currency
and excess reserves, a simple rearrangement leads to Ls = mLc. Substituting
Lc = m
−1Ls into the profit function the first order condition yields the supply
function:




which is increasing in ρ. The demand for loans is given by Ld(ρ, y). From the
market equilibrium condition Ld = Ls we obtain an equilibrium interest rate
ρ∗(ρc, ·). Of course ρ∗ also depends on demand parameters. The loans market
equilibrium implies a profit maximizing demand for reserves, i.e. central bank
loans. Substituting Ls = mLc into the profit function and maximizing with
respect to Lc yields the reserve demand function:




On the market for reserves the central bank acts as a monopolist. The central
bank chooses a point on the demand function Ldc according to monetary policy
goals instead of profit maximization. A change in the interest rate ρc for reserves








Figure 2.1: The Bofinger model as described in Bofinger (2001).
has therefore an impact on the loan interest rate ρ∗(ρc, ·).
Assuming a linear loan demand Ld = γy − αρ it is an easy task to derive the
resulting equilibrium interest rates. Figure 2.1 shows the complete model for the
linear case. The upper right quadrant depicts the loans market, the lower right
quadrant shows the money multiplier. The loans market equilibrium hence de-
termines the demand for reserves (lower left quadrant) via the multiplier. The
relation between the interest rates for loans and reserves (ρ∗(ρc, ·)) is depicted
in the upper left quadrant. The interest rate based transmission of monetary
impulses works as usual: An increasing ρc shifts the loan supply curve upwards.
This results in a raise of the market intrerest rate ρ (depending on supply and
demand elasticities), and a decrease of the demand for central bank money Lc.
However, the money supply is no longer a policy variable, the money (credit)
creation process is also determined by the loans demand.
Obviously, the Bofinger model has some shortcomings. As in the Bernanke/Blinder
approach, there are no equity markets, no currencies, and no rationing effects due
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to market imperfections. Moreover, there is neither a bonds market nor excess
reserves. So the commercial bank has no asset portfolio and therefore no portfolio
considerations (which implies risk aversion while the profit function in the Bofin-
ger model implies risk neutrality). As a consequence, the multiplier is constant.
Nevertheless, the money creation process is determined by the behaviour of the
commercial banks and the debitors.
Our aim is now to combine Bofinger’s idea of an analytically derived demand
for reserves, depending on the interest rate policy of the central bank with the
Bernanke/Blinder approach which includes a bonds market and portfolio consid-
erations of a (risk averse) commercial bank. Furthermore we extend the frame-
work by liquidity and solvency considerations.
2.4 An Aggregated Model of Banking Behaviour
Starting from the balance sheet of the aggregated banking sector, we derive the
decision of a single representative commercial bank regarding the structure and
volume of its portfolio. These decisions are driven by considerations about risk,
return and liquidity.
2.4.1 The Balance Sheet of the Aggregated Banking Sec-
tor
The balance sheet of a commercial bank contains three liabilities: deposits D,
central bank loans Lc, and bank capital BC, and the three assets: loans L, bonds
B and excess reserves E. The required reserves rD are subtracted from both
sides of the sheet. The balance sheet of the commercial bank thus reads:
L+ B + E = (1− r)D + Lc +BC (2.7)
where the bank capital is assumed to be fixed for simplicity. Since we look at
the aggregated banking sector, all inter-bank loans are subtracted from the sheet.
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Therefore, the market for reserves consists of the aggregated banking sector on
the demand side and the central bank on the supply side. All types of reserves
demanded by commercial banks which have to pay interest rates to the central
bank are subsumed to Lc.
The portfolio considerations of the commercial bank are now twofold. First, the
bank has to decide about the portfolio structure, which is determined by the
shares λL, λB and λE which give the fractions of L, B and E in the full portfolio
(with λL + λB + λE = 1). The second decision a commercial bank has to make is
about the volume of the portfolio. The portfolio volume is defined by:
V = (1− r)D + Lc +BC. (2.8)
A single bank is seen as not being able to determine the outcome of the macroeco-
nomic deposit creation process. Although an additional credit creates additional
deposits, the volume of deposits of a single bank is determined by a process of
inflows and outflows of deposits due to the payment behavior of non-banks which
cannot be controlled by the beank’s behavior. Hence, in a competitive market
the single bank will take D as given. Therefore the volume of the portfolio is
determined solely by Lc which hence is a policy variable of the bank.
2.4.2 Management of Risk and Return
From the three assets L, B and E, there is one riskless asset E with expected
return µE = 0, and two risky assets L and B. For L, the expected return per
unit and the variance are
µL = pρ− (1− p) (2.9)
σ2L = p(ρ− µL)2 + (1− p)(−1− µL)2
where p is the probability for a successfully returned credit and ρ is the loans
interest rate, collaterals have been neglected. As Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) argue,
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the probability (1 − p) of a complete credit failure may be assumed to be a
positive function of ρ. In this section, however, we take p as exogenously given.
The expected return and variance for bonds is
µB = i (2.10)
σ2B = const
For the sake of simplicity we assume that covariances are not present.
The optimal portfolio structure for one riskless and two risky assets is determined
in two steps (for details see Huang and Litzenberger (1988)). In the first step,
the efficient portfolio frontier for a mix of the two risky assets has to be derived.
The risky portfolio R is given by the shares λ̃L and λ̃B = (1− λ̃L) which implies:












2(ρ− µL)2 + (1− p)2(−1− µL)2) + (1− λ̃L)2σ2B
Hence, λ̃L determines all possible (µR, σR)-combinations, which define the portfo-
lio frontier. In order to find the optimal risky portfolio, which is then mixed with
the riskless asset E, we have to determine the tangential point of the efficient
portfolio frontier with the capital allocation line (CAL) being defined as:



















as there is no covariance present. As µL may become negative due to total debt
failure, λ̃L has to be truncated at zero. In the second step, the bank decides how to
mix the riskless asset E with the risky portfolio R according to its preferences. To
determine the optimal proportion λR, the bank maximizes its utility function. We
assume a Power function with constant relative risk aversion since this function
allows for a separate determination of optimal portfolio structure and optimal
portfolio volume, i.e. λR is independent from V . The realized value of the
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portfolio after the investment period is Ṽ = V (1 + λRr) with r as the realized
return and E[r] = µR, V ar[r] = σ
2
R. The agent subjectively expects a mean
wealth E[Ṽ ] = V (1 + µP ) and a variance V ar[Ṽ ] = V
2σ2P . The Power utility
function is u(Ṽ ) = Ṽ (1−θ)/(1 − θ) where θ > 0 is the constant Arrow-Pratt
measure for relative risk aversion. Maximizing E[u(Ṽ )] with respect to λR leads








Note, that λR changes as soon as additional constraints from Value at Risk are
introduced. Now the bank’s optimal portfolio structure is completely determined
by:
λL = λ̃LλR, λB = (1− λ̃L)λR, λE = 1− λR (2.15)
where the explicit form is not further revealing and thus have been omitted here.
The next task is to determine the optimal portfolio volume V which is given by
(2.8). By assumption V could be adapted solely by changing reserve demand
Lc. Optimality requires that the portfolio volume is expanded by Lc until the
expected marginal utility equals the marginal cost ρc. In this case it is nec-
cessary to interpret u(·) as a cardinal utility function. To obtain numerically
reasonable results, the marginal utility has to be scaled with a scaling parameter
ξ > 0. For our purposes we set ξ = 1, i.e. the scaling is omitted. The calculus
maxLc≥0 E[u(Ṽ )]− ρcLc leads to:
Lc =
(
(1 + λRµR − 12θλ2Rσ2R)(1−θ)
ρc
)1/θ
− (1− r)D −BC (2.16)
Observe, that the effect of an increasing portfolio performance µR on Lc is negative
(positive) for θ > 1 (θ < 1) as it can seen by differentiating (2.16) with respect
to µR. Increasing portfolio performance leads to higher total expected utility,
accelerated by an increase of λR, but this implies a lower marginal utility due to
the concavity of u(·). Hence the portfolio will be sized down. Only in case of low
risk aversion (θ < 1) the marginal utility of the last portfolio unit and therefore
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borrowed reserves increase. Inserting (2.14) for λR and (2.11) for µR and σ
2
R into
(2.16), the demand for central bank loans Lc is given by:





which determines the volume V .
With the optimal shares λL, λB and λE and the optimal portfolio volume V , we
obtain the demand for bonds B, the excess reserves E, and the supply of loans
L:
L = λLV, B = λBV, E = λEV (2.18)
Again, the explicit form is omitted here. For two reasons the dependencies on
ρ and i may be not clear: First, since σ2L depends on ρ, an increase in ρ may
have ambiguous effects on λR, the share of the risky assets. Second, the marginal
utility of the portfolio changes with increasing i or ρ which may have a negative
effect on Lc and hence L and B (depending on θ). Then the shares λL, λB and
Lc may have different signs in their derivatives with respect to i and ρ. The
structural and the volume effects may be countervailing, thus the total effect
depends on the parametrization.
2.4.3 Mangement of Liquidity by Value at Risk
In the last section the commercial bank’s goal was to balance risk and expected
returns. But banks are also interested to keep a certain level of capital in order
to stay solvent. Loans may fail and the bonds position in the portfolio is also
volatile. Only the excess reserves E are risk-free. Depending on the probability
distributions of µL, µB and the optimal shares λL, λB it is possible to derive a
probability distribution for the losses of the portfolio. With a certain probability









Figure 2.2: Loss distribution with Value at Risk.
We assume that the bank’s management addresses this problem with the Value
at Risk (VaR) approach (for details see e.g. Wahl and Broll (2003)). Let α be
the probability that the losses exceed the bank’s capital, then
VaRα = qαV (2.19)
determines the capital requirement to ensure solvency with probability 1 − α in
a given period. Here V is the portfolio volume and −qα is α-fractile of the prob-
ability distribution (see Figure (2.2)).
The VaR approach requires that the capital BC covers at least the VaR at the
level α, i.e. BC ≥ VaRα = qαV . The more risky the portfolio and the higher the
desired probability (1 − α) of staying solvent – either determined by the bank’s
management or by bank regulation policy – the more capital BC is required. It
can be shown that, for a given VaRα, the bank chooses an optimal structure of
V and BC. In our approach, however, we take BC as a given constant. Hence,
VaRα is a constraint for the portfolio volume V , leading to:




BC − (1− r)D
This is an additional restriction for determining the optimal portfolio volume via
Lc as discussed in the previous section. In case that the restriction is binding, the
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equality sign holds true in (2.20) and the marginal utility of the portfolio exceeds
the marginal cost ρc. As a consequence, the money creation process is eventually
limited by the bank’s solvency policy.
The liquidity management also affects the portfolio structure. If we consider the
deposits D not to be a given deterministic value, but a stochastic variable with
a given distribution (with D as the expected value), the bank faces the risk of
deposit volatility and sudden deposit outflows (bank runs). If depositors wish to
draw their deposits, the bank needs immediately liquid assets. We assume that
only excess reserves E have the required liquidity (see e.g. Mishkin (2006), pp.
208). Then the VaR approach also applies to the probability to be a victim of
bank runs, i.e. to become illiquid. Let β be the probability that sudden outflows
of deposists exceed the excess reserves E. Then the bank avoids illiquidity with
probability 1− β if for excess reserves
E ≥ VaRβ = qβD (2.21)
⇒ λE ≥ qβ
D
(1− r)D + Lc + BC
≡ λE
holds true. Again, we have an additional constraint for the portfolio calculus as
discussed in the previous section. The structure of the risky portfolio λ̃L, λ̃B is
obviously not affected by the VaR approach. But if (2.21) is binding then we
have λR = 1− λE which determines λL and λB.
Summing up, the VaR approach can be used on the one hand to ensure solvency
by balancing V and BC. This eventually has an impact on the chosen portfolio
volume. On the other hand the approach is used to avoid illiquidity in case of
deposit outflows by balancing E and D. This eventually has an impact on the
chosen portfolio structure. In this chapter we do not investigate these effects
analytically.
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2.5 Endogenous Money Supply
2.5.1 Some multiplier considerations
Up to now, this chapter addresses only the behavior of commercial banks. There-
fore we could only analyse their influence on the endogenous money creation
process. It is clear, however, that the behavior of non-banks regarding the credit
demand Ld, the bonds demand, and the demand for money (deposits D) play a
crucial role because this directly or indirectly affects the bank’s decisions about
portfolio structure and reserve demand. As we will take D as well as the inter-
est rates on credit and bonds market as given, the analysis must be incomplete.
Nevertheless, we are able to highlight the behavior of banks as a hinge between
central bank policy and the financial markets. In a framework of endogenous
money, monetary policy is about how the central bank influences the interac-
tions on the credit and bonds market rather than determining their outcome (see
also Chick and Dow (2002)).
The multiplier analysis treats D as an outcome of a mechanistic process. In a
first step, we derive a money multiplier under the assumption that i and ρ are
given exogenous variables. Let e = E/D = λE((1− r)D+Lc +BC)/D, then the
central bank’s balance sheet can be expressed as:
(MB =) S + Lc = (r + e)D (2.22)
with MB as the money base and S as the securities held by the central bank (e.g.
bonds). It is assumed that S is determined by purchases and sales of the central
bank on the market for securities. Note again, that in this chapter we neglect
any currency. The ratio e depends on D and on endogenously determined values
of λE and Lc. Inserting e into (2.22) and solving for D we obtain:
D =
S + (1− λE)Lc − λEBC
r + (1− r)λE
(2.23)
The central bank could conduct open market operations on the market for secu-
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r + (1− r)λE
> 0 (2.24)
where λE is endogenously determined but is assumed to have a given value
throughout the multiplier process. The result is essentially the same as the mul-
tiplier derived by Bernanke and Blinder (1988). This is a conventional view of
the multiplier process which is slightly enriched by the assumption that the frac-
tion of excess reserves is endogenously determined by portfolio considerations.
The multiplier is very sensitive to changes in λE. In the 2008 financial crisis
most central banks decided for a very expansive policy, but with very modest
effects on monetary aggregates. This is partly due to the fact that excess reserves
have increased drastically (von Hagen (2009)) as a result of the interbank market
failure. Also the Fed’s decision to pay interest on excess and required reserves
increased the incentives for banks to hold more excess reserves.
Commercial banks will manage the portfolio volume by adjusting borrowed re-
serves Lc. As eq. (2.16) shows, a change in D leads to an adjustment of Lc which
also determines the money base. The multiplier (2.24) is therefore valid only in
case of a fixed Lc. Otherwise an expansion of the money base by dS > 0 induces
a decrease of Lc because the bank attempts to keep its portfolio volume on an
optimal level. In an equilibrium (“long run”) perspective the values of D and Lc

















for Llongc > 0
S−λEBC
r+(1−r)λE
for Llongc = 0
(2.25)
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When the commercial bank is able to keep the portfolio volume at the chosen
optimal level, the required reserve rate r does not play a role anymore. The
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central bank is then able to enforce an increasing money supply D but it is not




The conventional multiplier (2.24) holds true only if the banks are not willing or
able to adjust Lc. If Lc is determined endogenously by optimal banking behavior,
then outright purchases of securities seem to be an ineffective way for initiating
a money multiplier process and should therefore be considered for finetuning op-
erations only.
The second policy variable of the central bank are the refinancing conditions ρc.
A change in ρc affects the demand for Lc and therefore the money base. We
do not distinguish different types of borrowed reserves like standing facilities and
open market operations on the market for reserves – all reserves where commercial
banks have to pay interest rates to the central bank are subsumed to central bank
loans Lc. It is easy to derive money multipliers for changes in the rate ρc in the
same mechanistic way as before. In the short run Lc is assumed to respond only
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In the long run, ρc affects the equilibrium values D












in case of Llongc > 0 in the long run and, of course, dD
long/dρc = 0 otherwise. Note,
that also in case of a fixed Lc due to VaR restrictions the multiplier becomes zero.
Comparing (2.27) and (2.28), it can be seen that in the long run the impact of
monetary policy is lower than in the short run.
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2.5.2 The Impact of the Non-Banking Sector
The previous analysis has shown that the impact of monetary policy on mone-
tary aggregates is strongly influenced by bank’s decision on portfolio structure
and reserve demand. A severe shortcoming of a mechanistic multiplier analysis is
that interest artes i, ρ are taken as given. However, they will change as a result of
changed loans supply L and bonds demand B. Therefore the analysis is incom-
plete. Furthermore, multiplier analysis presumes that deposits are automaticcally
created by loans rather than being an autonomous decision of non-banks. Since
holdung deposits D and demanding loans L are driven by different micro-motives
of households and firms, a mechanistic multiplier analysis is not very informative.
We will now consider the behavior of non-banks, following the same logic as in
section (2.4). To obtain a consistent framework of balance sheets we assume that
central bank’s securities are bonds: S = Bcb. The upper index denotes the sector
or institution which holds the bonds. Hence, the balance sheets of the central
bank, the commercial bank, and their aggregated balance sheets reads:
central bank Bcb + Lc = E + rD
commercial banks Bb + L+ E = (1− r)D + Lc +BC
aggregated Bcb + Bb + L = D + BC
The non-bank sector consist of firms and households. We assume that firms hold
physical capital PC and money Df as assets, and loans Lf , bonds B̄, and capital
C̄ as liabilities. Households hold bonds Bh, firm and bank capital, and money
Dh. On the liability side we have the net financial wealth NFW and loans Lh.
Thus we have:
firms PC +Df = B̄ + C̄ + Lf
households C̄ + BC + Bh +Dh = NFW + Lh
aggregated PC +D + BC = NFW + (B̄ − Bh) + L
with D = Dh+Df and L = Ld = Lf+Lh (loans demand) and B̄ = Bcb+Bb+Bh.
Therefore, adding all balance sheets of the bank and non-bank sector leads to the
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identity of physical capital goods and net financial wealth, implying that invest-
ments equals savings. Observe, that in case of subtracting PC = NFW from
the aggregated non-bank balance sheet, L is not neccessarily equal to D since
banks and non-banks are connected also by equity and bonds contracts. Holding
deposits D and demanding loans L are based on different motives. It is then not
reasonable anymore to consider a “money market”. The focus has to be on the
credit and bonds market (see Palley (2008a)).





















which is in line with standard economic literature.
Note, that all plans of banks, firms, and households about their asset and liability
side could be consistently realized only in case of equilibrium interest rates. On
the loans market we have in a partial equilibrium
L(ρ∗, i, ρc) = L
d(ρ∗, i, y)
and therefore ρ∗(i, ρc, y). On the bonds market we have in partial equilibrium
B̄ = Bcb + Bb(ρ, i∗, ρc) + B
h(ρ, i∗)
and therefore i∗(ρ, ρc, B
cb). Due to this interdependency of the two markets,
both interest rates are positively related and the total equilibrium values are
ρ∗∗(ρc, y, B
cb), i∗∗(ρc, y, B
cb). The partial derivatives for ρc and y are positive,
and negative for Bcb. Observe, that i∗∗(·, y) is a kind of LM curve which is
parametrized by central bank policy variables.
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Instead of relying on a mechanistic multiplier process, the central bank is only
able to influence credit and deposit volume by affecting the interest rates. Con-
trary to some Post Keynesian views where money is endogenous but the interest
rate is exogenously determined by the central bank, we take money and interest
rates as endogenous. Interest rates determine the decisions about holding bonds
or deposits, and the supply and demand of loans. If the real sector is taken into
account, things become more complicated: Assume a negative relationship be-
tween income y and the interest rate i according to the IS curve. Then monetary
policy has a direct influence on money demand D(y, i) via the changed interest
rates, but also an induirect influence via real effects on y. An appropriate analysis

































where the first terms on the r.h.s. include all direct effects within the fiancial
sector as discussed in this section, while the second terms denote indirect effects
from the real sector. It is a priori not clear which of both effects dominates the
results.
The influence of the real sector on the monetary aggregate D runs as follows:
Increasing income y leads to an increased loans demand. This affects the loans
interest rate and via portfolio adaptations also the bonds interest rate which
dampens money demand. A change in deposits as well as changed interest rates
have an effect on the reserve demand. It is a matter of the monetary policy strat-
egy how the central bank responds to such a shock (e.g. by accomodation). This
will not be analysed in this chapter since the purpose has been to demonstrate
how the monetary aggregate is determined endogenously be the behavior of banks




From simple optimization considerations we obtain functions which depend in
a non-linear and partially non-monotonous way on the variables. The explicit
form of the behavioral equations for optimal loans supply L, bonds demand Bb,
and demand for borrowed reserves Lc are too complicated to show them here.
They consist of optimal structural variables λ̃L, λR (determining λL, λB, λE) and
optimal reserve demand Lc which determines the volume.
Figure (2.3) shows the relevant structural variables which have slopes that could
be expected intuitively. The underlying values are p = 0.95, σ2B = 0.2, r =
0.05, θ = 1.5, D = 5, BC = 1, ρc = 0.02. They are truncated to the interval
[0, 1], neglecting any VaR constraints. Note that for very small interest rates ρ
the expected return could be negative due to the possibility of total debt failure.
Therefore λ̃L may have a zero border value. Such truncations also affect λL, λB
and hence Lc, L, B,E, causing the kinks in the 3D-plots.
Figure (2.4) shows Lc and the resulting functions for L,B,E. Observe, that the
bonds demand depends non-monotonously on ρ. For low loans interest rates the
portfolio will consist only of bonds. When ρ increases, the portfolio will be re-
structured in favor of loans. But also the fraction λR will increase because the
risky part of the portfolio becomes more attractive. Therefore the bonds de-
mand increases. With high values of ρ we have λR = 1 so that the restructuring
effect within the risky part of the portfolio dominates and the bonds demand
will decrease again, causing a non-monotonicity. Another non-monotonous de-
pendency is possible, though not observed with these parameter values: If i (ρ)
increases, bonds (loans) become more attractive, but we may have countervailing
effects because the marginal utility of the portfolio and hence the portfolio vol-
ume decreases. If the latter effect dominates, bonds demand (loans supply) could
decrease although interest rates increase.
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2.6 Discussion
In this chapter we presented a simple model of the aggregated commercial bank-
ing sector. The bank is assumed to manage its assets and liabilities according to
risk, return, and liquidity considerations. This is done by the portfolio as well as
by the Value at Risk methodology. Although each loan creates deposits by the
initial accounting record, the non-bank sector decides due to different motives
about demanding loans and holding deposits. The existence of other financial
contracts than loans (here: bonds and equity) allows for distinct decisions about
loans demand and holding deposits and a inequality of L and D.
From the banking side the endogeneity of money supply is hence twofold: The
structure of the portfolio, driven by risk and liquidity preferences, determines the
money multiplier, while the acchieved portfolio volume determines the demand for
reserves and hence the money base. Nevertheless we made clear that multiplier
analysis is of very limited use because it neglects the behavior of the non-bank
sector. An analysis of money endogeneity has to abandon the multiplier view.
The commercial banking sector is a hinge between the central bank policy and
the non-banking sector. As we have outlined in section (2.4.2) the demand for
money D and for loans L is determined by the dispositions of non-banks, not by a
multiplier. This part of the endogenous money creation process will be studied in
more detail in a subsequent paper. We haven’t made any assumptions about cen-
tral bank behavior. The central bank has to respond to shocks from the banking
and non-bank sector in some way, e.g. by accomodating positive credit demand
shocks. It is also possible to incorporate fixed policy rules like the Taylor rule into
this framework. However, it has to be clarified that the central bank’s decision
variable is not the interest rate, but ρc which has an influence on ρ and i in a
non-linear way. Such a monetary policy analysis deserves further investigation.
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As an extension of the framework different types of liabilities may be considered.
Deposits D have been assumed to have no interest rate and a high risk of out-
flows and (therefore) a requirement for holding excess reserves. However, there
are other types of liabilities where the bank has to pay interest rates but has no
reserve requirements. This enriches the strategic possibilities to attrract deposits
in order to enhance the portfolio volume and is hence a substitute for the central
bank loans demand Lc. Since these liabilities have no reserve requirement, this
may have substantial effects on the money multiplier – the abilities of the cen-
tral bank to manage the expansion process are much more restricted as they are
anyway.
A further extension would be to endogenize the bonds supply since bonds are
an imperfect substitute to loans. For a more dynamic perspective it would be
desirable to include expectations explicitely into the calculus and to consider the
different maturities of the liabilities and assets. Thus the banks are prevented































































































Figure 2.3: Structural variables: structure of the risky portfolio λ̃L and share of the















































































Figure 2.4: Behavioral functions: Reserve demand Lc, credit supply L, bonds demand
B, excess reserve demand E (with fixed deposits D)
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Chapter 3
Financial Networks and Systemic
Risk
3.1 Introduction
The financial crisis of 2007/08 highlighted, among other things, the necessity of
macroprudential oversight of the financial system in addition to the existing mi-
croprudential supervision. To ensure the stability of the financial system, it is
important to not only monitor the strength of individual financial institutions
themselves, but also to analyse the network structure that they form due to their
various interlinkages. Because of the banks dependency on access to liquidity,
interbank loans are amongst the most vital interconnections between banks. In
normal times, banks with excess liquidity provide loans to banks with a liquidity
shortage, usually on a short-term basis and without underlying collateral. These
interconnections between banks can enhance liquidity allocation and risk sharing
in the banking system.
There is, however, a downside to the interconnectedness of the banking system.
As was seen in September 2008, interbank markets display a “robust-yet-fragile
behaviour” - the very same interconnections that lead to an enhanced liquidity
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allocation in normal times, can amplify shocks in times of a crisis. Central banks
around the world were forced to undertake unprecedented non-standard measures
to reduce money-market spreads and ensure liquidity provision to and distribu-
tion within the banking system. Even though the direct effects of the crisis on the
South African financial system were very modest and the South African interbank
market escaped the problems experienced in some other countries, systemic risk
and contagion in interbank markets are a continuous concern for central banks.
The urgency of addressing systemic risk and the soundness of systemically impor-
tant financial institutions was emphasized by the Group of Twenty (G20) leaders
at the Pittsburgh Summit, where it was agreed that “the prudential standards for
systemically important institutions should be commensurate with their systemic
importance”.
The purpose of this chapter is twofold. Firstly, it analyses the interbank net-
work structure of the South African banking system from April 2005 until June
2010 with measures from network theory and thereby provides a useful tool for
macroprudential oversight. The analysis shows that the South African interbank
market was stable both according to the number of participants and according to
the level of their interconnectedness. This result is confirmed by the high clus-
tering coefficient that has been observed and the low average path length, both
indicating the high availability of liquidity in the period under investigation.
Secondly, an index to measure the systemic importance of South African banks
from a network perspective is proposed. This index can be used as a building
block to impose prudential requirements on firms commensurate with their sys-
temic risk. Such prudential requirements would help to further strengthen the
trust in the stability of the South African interbank market. The proposed index
is a relative measure in the sense that the systemic importance of one bank de-
pends not only on the properties of that bank, but also on properties of the whole
network. This makes a particular banks systemic significance less predictable and
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less constant. Banks themselves cannot be totally certain at any given point in
time about their ranking in terms of systemic significance within the interbank
market. As a result, the index is less prone to moral hazard, which is a major
concern in the discussion of systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs).
This chapter is organized as follows: After a short introduction, section (3.2)
gives an overview of attempts to define systemic risk in the international context.
Section (3.3) motivates the use of network theory to assess systemic risk in in-
terbank markets while section (3.4) shows the results of various measures from
network theory in the South African interbank market. Section (3.5) introduces
the Network Systemic Importance Index (NSII) and shows the result for three
groups of South African banks. In section (3.6) it is argued that the NSII is less
prone to moral hazard, while section (3.7) concludes.
3.2 Systemic Risk
In the literature there are a large number of definitions of systemic risk, each em-
phasizing a certain aspect of it. The International Monetary Fund et al. (2009)
states that most G20 countries do not have a formal definition of systemic risk
either. Most commonly accepted, however, is the distinction between a broad
and a narrow sense of systemic risk, as described by Bandt et al. (2009). In this
classification, contagion effects on interbank markets pose a systemic risk in the
narrow sense, whereas in the broad sense it is characterised as a common shock
to many institutions or markets. This distinction is followed by the Financial
Stability Board (FSB) who defines systemic risk as “a risk of disruption to finan-
cial services that is (i) caused by an impairment of all or parts of the financial
system and (ii) has the potential to have serious negative consequences for the
real economy”. The European Central Bank (ECB) suggests that systemic risk
can be described as the risk of experiencing a strong systemic event that ad-
versely affects a number of systemically important intermediaries or markets (see
66
European Central Bank (2009)). The trigger of the event could either be a shock
from outside or from within the financial system. The systemic event is strong
when the intermediaries concerned fail or when the markets concerned become
dysfunctional. Since all these different dimensions of a systemic event interact
with each other, it is clear that systemic risk is a highly complex phenomenon.
In its analysis, the ECB focuses on three main forms of systemic risk namely
contagion risk, the risk of macroeconomic shocks causing simultaneous problems
at many financial institutions or markets and the risk of an abrupt unravelling of
imbalances that have built up over time.
According to Acharya and Yorulmazer (2003) as well as Nier et al. (2008), infor-
mational contagion is another form of systemic risk that has to be taken into
account. Especially in times of crises financial markets exhibit a herding be-
haviour. The insolvency of a bank can increase the cost of borrowing for the
remaining banks quite drastically in these situations. The insolvency of the US
investment bank Lehman Brothers in September 2008 led to a breakdown of in-
terbank markets not only because of the direct losses that were associated with
it, but mainly because it was a signal to financial market participants that their
own risk perceptions were incorrect. This led to a surge in riskawareness and risk-
aversion and ultimately to the breakdown of interbank money markets. While
informational contagion clearly deserves more attention, currently there exists no
model to properly assess it.
Following the approach of the European Central Bank (2010a), it is possible to
distinguish between four broad analytical approaches to assess the different di-
mensions of systemic risk. Firstly, financial stability indicators can measure the
current state of instability in the financial system. Secondly, early warning mod-
els can help assess the likelihood and severity of systemic crises. Thirdly, stress-
tests of the financial system can be used to analyze the impact of macro-shocks.
Lastly, contagion and spillover models can be employed to analyze how initial
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shocks spread throughout the financial system. While central banks today have
to employ all four types of models to properly assess systemic risk, the academic
literature is at different stages in the development of those tools.
It was recently emphasized by e.g. Borio (2010) that the distinction between
the time- and cross-sectional dimensions of aggregate risk is critical. In the
time-dimension leading indicators of financial distress are needed, while in the
cross-sectional dimension a robust quantification of the contribution of each in-
stitution to systemic risk is necessary. There exists a growing literature on
cross-sectional measures to assess systemic risk (see e.g. Tarashev et al. (2009),
Huang et al. (2009a), Acharya et al. (2010b), Adrian and Brunnermeier (2009),
or Segoviano Basurto and Goodhart (2009)). The NSII proposed in this chapter
falls into the second strand of models as it contributes the systemic risk in the
interbank to individual institutions.
3.3 Network Theory
A new approach to assess systemic risk in financial markets originates from net-
work theory and has been widely applied to ecology, neuroscience, biochemistry,
epidemology, social sciences and computer science. The neural network of the
worm C-Elegans, the structure of the world-wide-web, the power grid of the
United States and the spreading of the HI virus have all been analysed using net-
work theory. The increase in computing power in recent years has led to a vast
increase in the research of large and complex systems and some of the results,
especially from Epidemology, can be applied to the analysis of financial networks.
A financial network consists of a set of banks (nodes) and a set of relationships
(edges) between the banks. Even though many relationships exist between banks,
this chapter focuses on relationships that stem from interbank lending. For the
originating (lending) bank the loan will be on the asset side of its balance sheet,
while the receiving (borrowing) bank will hold the loan as a liability.
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3.3.1 Financial Networks and Systemic Risk
As for example Allen and Babus (2008) argue, linkages between financial institu-
tions can stem from both the asset side (through holding similiar portfolios) and
the liabilities side (by sharing the same mass of depositors). These linkages can
be direct (as in the case of interbank loans) and indirect (as in the case of similiar
portfolios). The authors investigate the resilience of financial networks to shocks
and the formation of financial networks. Network theory has also been success-
fully applied in the analysis of payment systems (see e.g. Soramäki and Galbiati
(2008) or Markose et al. (2010)). Castrén and Kavonius (2009) apply network
theory to study accounting-based balance sheet interlinkages at a sectoral level.
Canedo and Jaramillo (2009) propose a network model to analyse systemic risk
in the banking system and seek to obtain the probability distribution of losses for
the financial system resulting both from the shock/contagion process. Nier et al.
(2007) construct a network model of banking systems and find that (i) the bank-
ing system is more resilient to contagious defaults if its banks are better capital-
ized and this effect is non-linear; (ii) the effect of the degree of connectivity is
non-monotonic; (iii) the size of interbank liabilities tend to increase the risk of a
knock-on default; and (iv) more concentrated banking systems are shown to be
prone to larger systemic risk. In Gai and Kapadia (2009) the authors investigate
systemic crises with a network model and show that on the one hand the risk of
systemic crises is reduced with increasing connectivity on the interbank market.
On the other hand, however, the magnitude of systemic crises increases at the
same time. Georg and Poschmann (2010) employ network theory to analyze con-
tagion and common shock effects in a model of interbank markets with central
bank activity. They show that common shocks are not subordinate to contagion,
but pose instead a greater threat to systemic stability.
Contagion in interbank markets emerges if, for example, Bank A, which has an
interbank loan from Bank B, is hit by a shock and goes into insolvency. Bank
B then suffers a loss on its assets and might itself become insolvent if it does
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not have enough bank capital. If Bank C now has an exposure to Bank B, this
could also cause solvency problems for Bank C. Now Bank C faces problems, even
though it had no immediate interconnection with Bank A, which was the root of
the shock. Even from this very simple example one can see that microprudential
supervision and regulation is inadequate on its own to identify potential routes
of contagion and assess the stability of a financial system.
The situation is even more complex when other interlinkages between banks are
taken into account, caused for example by investing into a similar class of assets.
To illustrate this form of systemic risk Whelan (2009) considers three banks -
Bank A, B and C whose balance sheets are shown in Table (3.1). Now assume
that Bank A makes an initial loss of 5 on its loan book. This will reduce its eq-
uity capital to 5 and increase its leverage ratio from 200/10 = 20 to 195/5 = 39,
putting it close to, or below, the capital adequacy ratio. This very modest initial
loss then forces A to sell some of its securities. Originally its securities were worth
40 but since Bank A has to do away with them in a fire-sale, the bank sells half
of them and recoups only 18 instead of their original value of 20. The reduced
value of Bank As securities will reduce its equity capital to 1, as it suffers a loss
of 2 on the securities it sold and a mark-to-market loss of 2 on the remaining
securities. Now Banks B and C are hit with two problems: since Bank A has
been selling its securities in a fire-sale, the securities of Bank B and Bank C are
now worth only 36. This reduces their equity capital from 10 to 6. Needing to
shrink their balance sheets and worried about Bank As solvency, they decide to
not roll-over their loans to A. Bank A now has to repay the loans to Bank B and
Bank C but with almost no equity and the value of its securities falling, it fails
to do so. Banks B and C now suffer losses on their own loan book as well as on
their securities and are then just as vulnerable as Bank A, even without directly
suffering the initial loss.
There are various attempts to assess systemic risk in a broad context. Lehar
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Assets Liabilities
Loans to Customers 100 Retail Deposits 130
Loans to B 30 Borrowing from B 30
Loans to C 30 Borrowing from C 30
Other Securities 40 Equity Capital 10
Total 200 Total 200
Table 3.1: Example balance sheet of bank A. Banks B and C analogous. Source:
Whelan (2009).
(2005) estimates the risk of a common shock by the correlation between institu-
tions asset portfolios. Brunnermeier et al. (2009) propose to apply leverage, ma-
turity mismatch or the rate of expansion to measure systemic risk. Acharya et al.
(2009) recommend to measure an institution’s contribution to aggregate risk
based on its marginal VaR and its marginal expected shortfall. Acharya et al.
(2010b) proposes to assess the systemic expected shortfall, which indicates how
much an institution is prone to undercapitalize when the financial system is also
undercapitalized. Haldane (2009) suggests to measure contagion based on the in-
terconnectedness of each institution within the financial system, whereas Adrian
and Adrian and Brunnermeier (2009) focus on CoVaR, which is the value at risk
of the whole financial sector in times of crisis. They argue to interpret the differ-
ence between CoVar and the institution’s specific value at risk as the institution’s
contribution to systemic risk. Tarashev et al. (2009) propose to apply the Shap-
ley value methodology to asses this contribution. Thomson (2009) provides a
scoring model to categorize each institution according to its contribution to sys-




Despite the importance of macroeconomic shocks to financial stability, policy
makers and academia are faced with huge information and data gaps. A number
of suggestions on how to close these gaps have been made in the past two years
Financial Stability Board et al. (2009a), but the issue is far from resolved. The
unavailability of data makes it impossible, for all practical purposes, to properly
measure the systemic risk that is associated with cross-correlations amongst banks
portfolios. Yet, it is clear that structured finance and derivatives have increased
the number of cross-correlations between different portfolios. In South Africa, the
fraction of derivative financial instruments to the total balance sheet volume is
much smaller than in the United States, the United Kindom or the Euro-area, for
example. This is not to say that there are no cross-correlations amongst the port-
folios of the South African banks. Especially the large banks all depend heavily
on short-term wholesale funding, which effectively introduces cross-correlations
between their portfolios that have to be taken into account when assessing the
vulnerability of the South African banking system to macroeconomic shocks.
3.3.3 The Structure of Interbank Networks
Even with the aforementioned limitations, network theory can provide valu-
able information about the health and stability of the banking system. This
is underlined by the large number of countries that have employed network
theory to assess systemic risk. Basically there are two strands of literature.
One strand follows Eisenberg and Noe (2001) who develop a liabilities matrix
for a financial system and show that it has a unique clearing payment vector.
Sheldon and Maurer (1998) construct a matrix of interbank loans for Switzer-
land based on known marginal loan distributions and the principle of entropy
maximisation. Bl̊avarg and Nimander (2002) construct the matrix of interbank
exposures from the reports of Swedish banks to the Riksbank. Upper and Worms
(2004) analyze the risk of contagion in the German interbank market using data
from banks submitted to the Bundesbank. They apply the principle of entropy
72
maximisation to construct the matrix of interbank exposures. Wells (2004) con-
structs the matrix of bilateral exposures by using data on UK banks money
market loans and deposits with other UK-resident banks. Degryse and Nguyen
(2007) use detailed information on aggregate interbank exposures of individual
banks and on large bilateral interbank exposures of the Belgian banking system to
construct the matrix of interbank exposures. They analyse the years 1993 - 2002
and find that the structure of the Belgian banking system has changed from a com-
plete structure to a “multiple-money-centre” structure. van Lelyveld and Liedorp
(2004) use several data sources, including monthly balance sheet data, large expo-
sures and survey data from an ad hoc survey obtained from the largest ten banks
in the Netherlands to construct the matrix of interbank exposures. Boss et al.
(2004) study the Austrian interbank market with a combination of actual inter-
bank exposures (for large loans) and an estimation technique, and were able to
show that the degree distribution of the interbank network shows two different
power law exponents, relating to two different sub-network structures, differing
in the degree of hierarchical organization. They identified the Austrian interbank
network to be a small-world network.
Another strand of literature uses payment system data and actual interbank ex-
posures to analyze systemic risk. Furfine (1999) examines the likelihood that
a failure of one bank would cause the subsequent collapse of a large number of
other banks in the US using the Federal Reserve’s large-value transfer system
Fedwire. Mistrulli (2007) uses actual interbank exposure data from the Bank of
Italy Supervisory Reports database to analyze the risk of contagion in the Italian
interbank market. The results are compared to the analysis of contagion in the
Italian interbank market if the maximum entropy method is used. It is shown
that the maximum entropy method leads to an overvaluation of the severity of
contagion, which is in contrast with the common view that complete markets are
more resilient to financial contagion. Memmel and Stein (2008) use data from the
German credit register and of the regulatory reports filled in by the banks, to ana-
lyze contagion risk in the German interbank market. Gabrieli (2010) and Gabrieli
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(2011) analyzes the functioning of the overnight unsecured euro money market
during the ongoing crisis in terms of operational efficiency of monetary policy im-
plementation, efficient reallocation of banking systems reserves and developments
in the pricing of interbank loans using data on unsecured euro-denominated loans
executed through the e-MID platform (which represents roughly 17% of the total
turnover of the overnight segment). The results suggest that monetary policy
implementation has been hampered by the crisis, particularly after the end of
September 2008. Becher et al. (2008) examine the broad network topology of in-
terbank payments in the United Kingdom and show that the UK financial system
exhibits a tiered structure, making it distinctly different from the United States’
financial system. They use data from the Clearing House Automated Payment
System (CHAPS) 2003 data survey, which includes intraday data for 5 days in
February 2003.
Chang et al. (2008) analyze the market structure and degree of completeness and
heterogeneity in order to assess the financial fragility of the Brazilian financial
system. They apply the Hirschman-Herfindahl index (HHI) which was used by
Nissan (2004) and Geldos and Roldós (2004) to evaluate the concentration of
banking systems in developing countries, as well as the dual HHI that was an-
alyzed by Tabak et al. (2009). They analyze the concentration, heterogeneity
and completeness of the Brazilian banking system. Cajueiro and Tabak (2007)
analyze the topology of the Brazilian interbank market. They introduce different
measures, such as (weighted) degree, (weighted) efficiency, domination and the
minimal spanning tree to analyze the topology of the interbank network. They
could show that the Brazilian interbank market employs a scale-free toplogy and
is characterized by money-center banks. Manna and Iazzetta (2009) use network
theory to analyze monthly data on deposit exchanged by banks on the Italian
interbank market from 1990 to 2008. They find that there is no direct connection
between interconnectedness and volume of banks, leading to the question which
of the three by International Monetary Fund et al. (2009) proposed criteria (vol-
ume, interconnectedness, and substitutability) gives the largest contribution to
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systemic risk.
We follow the second strand of literature and use actual exposures of banks ob-
tained from the South African Multiple Option Settlement (SAMOS) system. Un-
like Europe and the United States, the majority of interbank payments in South
Africa are made via the SAMOS system, giving a uniquely accurate overview
of the actual payments between banks. In total, there were nearly 13 million
transactions taken into account over the period March 2005 to June 2010. Inter-
bank loans were identified by the matching algorithm of Furfine (1999) where for
each transaction from Bank A to BankB, the algorithm searches for a matching
transaction in the opposite direction. We focussed on interbank loans that are
overnight, as these loans are the most prominent type of interbank loans and
also represent the most rapid contagion channel for interbank systemic risk. We
further required the loans to be larger than 10 Million Rand in order to enhance
the probability that a transaction is indeed an interbank loan and not a retail
transaction. The data set used in this analysis is one of the most extensive ones
ever used to assess the stability of an interbank system on the basis of actual
exposures. The analysis therefore can contribute to strengthening the trust in
the long-term stability of the South African interbank system.
3.3.4 Network Measures
To analyze the structure of the South African interbank system, we make ex-
tensive use of tools and notions from network theory. We therefore give a brief
overview of network and graph theory to introduce the necessary measures. We
follow the notation by Manna and Iazzetta (2009) and start by defining what a
graph is:
Definition 1 A (un)directed graph G(V,E) consists of a nonempty set V of ver-
tices and a set of (un)ordered pairs of vertices E called edges. If i and j are
vertices of G, then the pair ij is said to join i and j.
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One sometimes speaks of graphs as networks and the two terms are often used
interchangably. Since the focus of this chapter is on interbank markets, the nodes
of a network are (commercial) banks and the edges are interbank loans between
two banks. For every graph a matrix of bilateral exposures which describes the
exposure of bank i to bank j can be constructed.
Definition 2 The matrix of bilateral exposures W (G) = [wij] of an interbank
market G with n banks is the n × n matrix whose entries wij denote bank i’s
exposure to bank j. The assets ai and liabilities li of bank i are given by ai =
∑n
j=1wij and lj =
∑n
j=1 wji.
Closely related to the matrix of bilateral exposures is the adjacency matrix that
describes the structure of the network without referring to the details of the
exposures.
Definition 3 The entries aij of the adjacency matrix A(G) are one if there is
an exposure between i and j and zero otherwise.
One can define the interconnectedness of a node as the in- and out-degree of the
node.









and give a measure for the interconnectedness of the node i in a directed graph
G(V,E). The two degrees are equal for directed graphs.
One can define the size of a node i analogously to its interconnectedness in terms
of the value in- and out-degree.














∈ [0, 1] (3.3)
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and give a measure for the size of the node. The value in-degree is a measure for
the liabilities of a node while the value out-degree is a measure for its assets.
A quantity that can be used to characterise a network is its average path length.
The average path length of a network is defined as the average length of short-
est paths for all pairs of nodes i, j ∈ V . Another commonly used quantity to
describe the topology of a network is the clustering coefficient, introduced by
Watts and Strogatz (1998) in their seminal work on small-world networks. Given
three nodes i, j and k, with i lending to j and j lending to k, then the clustering
coefficient can be interpreted as the probability that i lends to k as well. For
i ∈ V , one define the number of opposite edges of i as:
m(i) := |{j, k} ∈ E : {i, j} ∈ E and {i, k} ∈ E| (3.4)
and the number of potential opposite edges of i as:
t(i) := d(i)(d(i)− 1) (3.5)
where d(i) = din(i)+dout(i) is the degree of the vertex i. The clustering coefficient












where V ′ is the set of nodes i with d(i) ≥ 2. The average path length of the
whole network can be defined for individual nodes. The single source shortest
path length of a given node i is defined as the average distance of this node to
every other node in the network.
It is possible to distinguish between a number of networks by looking at their
average path length and clustering coefficient. One extreme type of networks are
regular networks which exhibit a large clustering coefficient and a large average
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path length. The other extreme are random networks which exhibit a small clus-
tering coefficient and a small average path length. Watts and Strogatz (1998)
define an algorithm that generates a network which is between these two ex-
tremes. They could show that the so-called “small-world networks” exhibit both,
a large clustering coefficient and small average path length. A large number of
real networks like the neural network of the worm Caenorhabditis elegans, the
power grid of the western United States, and the collaboration graph of film
actors are small-world networks. From a systemic risk perspective, small-world
networks are interesting, as it is reasonable to assume that the short average path
length and high clustering of small-world networks make them more vulnerable
to contagion effects than random or regular networks. Small-world networks can
be created by using the algorithm defined in Watts and Strogatz (1998). Starting
point is a regular networks of N nodes where each node is connected to its m
neighbours. The algorithm now loops over all links in the network and rewires
each link with a probability β. For small values of β (about 0.01 to 0.2) the
average path length drops much faster than the clustering coefficient so one can
have a situation of short average path length and high clustering. On the left
side of Figure 3.1 is a small-world network with N = 100, m = 4 and p = 0.05
shown.
Another interesting class of networks are scale-free networks. They are char-
acterized by a logarithmically growing average path length and approximately
algebraically decaying distribution of node-degree (in the case of an undirected
network). They were originally introduced by Barabási and Albert (1999) to de-
scribe a large number of real-life networks as e.g. social networks, computer
networks and the world wide web. To generate a scale-free network one starts
with an initial node and continues to add further nodes to the network until the
total number of nodes is reached. Each new node is connected to k other nodes
in the network with a probability that is proportional to the degree of the exist-
ing node. When thinking about financial networks, this preferential attachment
resembles the fact that larger and more interconnected banks are generally more
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Figure 3.1: On the left: a small-world network that was created using the algorithm of
Watts and Strogatz (1998) with N = 50, k = 4 and β = 0.05. On the right: a scale-free
network that was created using the methodology introduced in Barabási and Albert
(1999) with N = 50 and m = 2. The colour is an indication for the single source
shortest path length of the node and ranges from white (large) to red (short).
trusted by other market participants and therefore form central hubs in the net-
work. On the right side of Figure 3.1 a scale-free network with N = 50 and k = 2
is shown.
A typical feature of scale-free networks is their degree-distribution, as it typically
follows a power-law. The exponent of the power-law can be measured and char-
acterises the network topology for different networks. Boss et al. (2004) show
that the degree distribution of the Austrian interbank market follows a power
law with an exponent of γ = −1.87. Cajueiro and Tabak (2007) analyze the
topology of the Brazilian interbank market. They show that the Brazilian inter-
bank market employs a scale-free toplogy and is characterized by money-center
banks. Iori et al. (2008) and Manna and Iazzetta (2009) report that the Italian
interbank market shows a similiar scale-free behaviour. Cont and Moussa (2009)
show that a scale-free interbank network will behave like a small-world network
when Credit Default Swaps (CDS) are introduced. In this sense a CDS acts as
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a “short-cut” from one part of the network to another. This chapter therefore
focuses on these three classes of networks (random, scale-free and small-world)
to analyze their effect on systemic risk through contagion effects.
3.4 Network Measures of the South African In-
terbank System
In order to describe the network topology of the South African interbank system,
one can resort to measures from network theory. Four properties were used to
describe a network in this note. The first one is the size of the network, given
by the number of nodes in the network and shown in Figure 1 on the left axis.
The second measure is the connectivity of the interbank market. This is defined
as the fraction of actual edges to possible edges between nodes and called the
connection level. It can range from 0 (no interconnections) to 1 (every bank is
connected to every other bank) and shown in Figure (3.2) on the right axis. In
normal times a high connection level will lead to a more stable system as banks
can access liquidity from more sources.
In the South African system, the number of banks (nodes) that participate in
interbank lending varied between 15 and 18, while the connection level varied
between 0,33 and 0,50. It can be seen that the system is largely stable both by
looking at the fairly stable number of banks that participate in interbank lending
and the relatively high level of connections between the banks. The large number
of banks actively participating in the interbank market also indicates the avail-
ability and reliability of the SAMOS system.
The third quantity that is used to determine the structure of the interbank system
is the average path length, which is defined as the average number of connections
that is needed to transfer liquidity from one bank to another. In normal times
a small average path length indicates a well connected system, where liquidity
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Figure 3.2: Network properties of the South African interbank market. Source: South
African Reserve Bank, SAMOS Data.
can easily be transferred from one bank to another. In times of crises, however, a
short average path length also implies that contagion can spread faster through
the system. Note that the average path length does not give any indication of
the probability of an initial knock-on default but rather describes how such an
exogenous event can spread in the system.
The fourth measure of the network topology is the clustering coefficient, which
is defined as the probability of two banks being exposed to each other, if both of
them are exposed to a common third bank. A high clustering coefficient, similar
to the average path length, indicates a well connected interbank system where
banks distribute liquidity widely in the system. In times of crises, however, a
high clustering coefficient increases the risk of joint failure of banks. In Figure
(3.3) the results for average path length (left axis) and clustering coefficient (right
axis) are shown.
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Figure 3.3: Clustering and Average Path Length of the South African Overnight
Interbank market. Source: South African Reserve Bank, SAMOS Data.
The short average path length and high clustering coefficient of the South African
interbank system vary little over time, indicating a stable network structure even
in times of distress such as the crisis on the international financial markets in
September and October 2008. These results are in line with the findings of Brink
(2009) stating that the direct impact of the financial crisis of 2007/08 on the
South African interbank market were modest.
3.5 The Systemic Importance Index for South
African Banks
While the results above are measures of the global network topology, a more
detailed view of individual banks is needed in order to assess their individual
systemic importance. The FSB proposes three key criteria to determine the sys-
temic importance of markets and institutions namely size (the volume of financial
82
services provided by the individual component of the financial system), substi-
tutability (the extent to which other components of the system can provide the
same services in the event of a failure) and interconnectedness (linkages with
other components of the system).
These measures can be translated into measures from network theory. To assess
the systemic risk that is associated with a given bank, one has to look at the
impact that a default of this bank would have on the rest of the system. In case
of insolvency it will be the banks liabilities that determine its size for the purpose
of this note. The impact of a shock that originates from this bank will increase
the larger its interbank liabilities. The second variable to assess the systemic
risk associated with a given bank is its interconnectedness. As in the case for
interbank liabilities, the impact of a shock will be larger if the bank is more con-
nected to the rest of the system. In terms of a network measure it is therefore
the number of edges that originate from somewhere in the system and end at the
given bank that depict its systemic importance. In network theory this is referred
to as the node in-degree of the bank. The third and most complicated measure
is a banks substitutability. A bank will be difficult to substitute if it receives and
originates a lot of interbank funding. It will therefore be harder to substitute if
it is in the middle of many interbank payment flows and its systemic importance
will increase the harder it is to substitute. The network measure that can be
associated with this property is a nodes betweenness. It measures the number of
shortest paths between any other two nodes in the network, which pass through
the node in question. The higher the number of shortest paths that pass through
a given node, the more interbank funding flows through this bank and the harder
it will be to substitute.
In order to construct the systemic importance index from these three measures,
every measure was normalized to be between zero and one. This normalisation
was done by taking each variable and dividing it by the maximal variable in the
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Figure 3.4: Network Systemic Importance Index (NSII) for South African banks.
Source: South African Reserve Bank, SAMOS Data.
network. The network systemic importance index (NSII) of any given bank is
then the sum of the three submeasures. To account for the fact that the total
interbank volume changes over time, the NSII was multiplied with the actual
volume of interbank exposures and normalized by the total exposures for the first
measurement point, which is March 2005. The NSII will thus measure the sys-
temic importance of individual banks for every month from March 2005 to June
2010. Note, however, that it is a relative measure and will only give the systemic
importance of one bank in comparision to other banks in the system.
The results for the NSII of three groups of South African banks are shown in
Figure (3.4). The first group consists of “large” banks, comprising all banks that
had a network systemic importance index of NSII≥ 2 in June 2010. The groups
of “medium” banks consists of all banks with 0.5 ≤ NSII < 2. All other banks
are defined to be “small”. The NSII shown in Figure (3.4) is normalized by the
number of banks in each of the three groups.
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Figure 3.5: Structural component of the NSII for South African banks. Source: South
African Reserve Bank, SAMOS Data.
As can be seen in Figure (3.4), the main contribution to systemic importance
comes from large banks, while almost no contribution comes from small banks.
It is illustrative to look at the structural component of the network systemic
importance index, as an increase in the total NSII of a group of banks can also
stem from an increase in total market volume. In Figure (3.5) this structural
component of the NSII for the South African banks is shown.
It can be seen, that the structural NSII has remained approximately constant
over the period under investigation. This indicates a stable network structure
during the whole period where the large banks contribute about two third to
overall network systemic importance.
In order to properly assess systemic risk of the three groups of banks, one has to
analyse which of the three criteria (size, interconnectedness and substitutability)
contributes most to the overall NSII of each group. In Figures (3.6)-(3.8) the
results for the individual measures are shown for all three groups. They all range
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Figure 3.6: Size of South African Banks in the interbank market by bank groups.
Source: South African Reserve Bank, SAMOS Data.
from 0 to 1 as they were normalized by first calculating each measure for every
individual bank, then dividing them by the maximum value and finally adding
them and dividing them by the number of banks in the respective group.
It can be seen from Figure (3.6) that the contribution of size to overall net-
work systemic importance is the largest for large banks, while there is almost
no contribution for small banks. The results also indicate that size is a key fac-
tor that accounts for the large difference in the systemic importance of large and
medium banks and that size is a key difference between medium and small banks.
In Figure (3.7) the connectedness of South African banks in the interbank market
is plotted for the three groups of banks. One can see that for all banks a large
part of their overall systemic importance stems from their interconnectedness.
This holds true for small banks, as their interconnectedness is the only quantity
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Figure 3.7: Connectedness of South African banks in the interbank market by bank
groups. Source: South African Reserve Bank, SAMOS Data.
that contributes to their systemic importance on a relevant level. The medium
banks have a contribution from interconnectedness which is significantly larger
than for the small banks. The results show that the high interbank transaction
volume of large banks goes hand in hand with a large interconnectedness, making
them the central hubs of funding flows.
In Figure (3.8) the betweenness of the three groups of banks is shown and it can be
seen that the small banks have virtually no betweenness. The betweenness is the
quantity that ultimately distinguishes medium from large banks. While the large
banks are high in size, interconnectedness and betweenness, the medium banks
are moderate in size, moderate in interconnectedness and low in betweenness.
Small banks are low in size and betweenness and moderate in interconnected-
ness. These structural differences between large, medium and small banks should
be taken into account when prudential requirements are proposed.
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Figure 3.8: Betweenness of South African banks in the interbank market by bank
groups. Source: South African Reserve Bank, SAMOS Data.
The overall network systemic importance index is a very volatile quantity that
changes on a real-time basis. To interpret this index, one has to look at how the
interbank network changes over time. The network structure for overnight and
longer-term interbank loans is a structure that is fixed every morning and varies
from day to day. This volatile nature of the interbank system does not in itself
threaten the stability of the financial system as it indicates a well-functioning
interbank system where liquidity is readily distributed amongst its participants.
It is illustrative to display the interbank network structure in order to get a better
understanding what a low/high network systemic importance means. The struc-
ture of the interbank market is displayed for the period of August 2008 (top left)
to January 2009 (bottom right) when the turmoil on the international financial
markets was at its highest. The size of each node in the network corresponds to
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the size of the node in terms of interbank exposure. In the centre of the graph
are the largest node (in terms of interbank exposure) and all nodes that are at
least half its size, while all other nodes are grouped on the outside. The colour
of the nodes is an indication for their interconnectedness and ranges from blue
(little interconnectedness) to red (highly interconnected). The size of the edges
is a measure for the exposure between two banks, a thicker line indicates higher
exposure. The thick end of an edge is an indicator for the direction of the edge.
Edges go from the small end to the thick end.
It can be seen that during the whole period there was one bank that had a
significantly high systemic importance in terms of size, interconnectedness and
betweenness. However, during the whole crisis period there was a well connected
interbank system with large liquidity flows inside the system are a signal of trust
amongst the South African banks as well as a signal of mistrust of South African
banks to foreign banks. This situation is not alarming since the systemic impor-
tance of a bank itself is not related to the default probability of this bank. It is
nonetheless desirable to have a situation with a low network systemic importance
index since this situation will be even more resilient should a shock hit the South
African interbank market.
3.6 Moral Hazard
One of the main concerns of attributing systemic importance to individual banks
is related to moral hazard and implicit bail-out guarantees. A bank that knows
that it will be bailed out, should it default, will be more likely to take on excess
risks. The issuance of implicit or explicit bail-out guarantees therefore might
increase the risk that the guarantees could actually be needed. While insolven-
cies are an important part of any healthy market economy, the insolvency of a
bank might lead to a breakdown of the financial system as a whole and can have
devastating effects on the real economy. These effects can be even more severe in
89
a developing country with a relatively concentrated banking system, like South
Africa. It is therefore necessary to keep moral hazard issues in mind when con-
structing measures for the systemic importance of a bank.
The network NSII is an index that does not solely depend on the properties of an
individual bank. It rather depends on the properties of all banks in the interbank
system. Even if a bank knows its network systemic importance index at a given
point in time, its importance could change very quickly due to the interactions of
the other banks. Every bank knows that it can increase its systemic importance
by taking on larger risks and more connections in the interbank market. Banks
can, however, not be sure that other banks are not doing the same. Since the
network systemic importance index is a relative index, there are no guarantees
for a bank that increasing exposures will lead to higher systemic importance. It
is precisely that relative nature of the NSII that makes it less vulnerable to moral
hazard.
In some countries the systemic importance of financial institutions is assessed in
a discretionary manner by the central bank, the banking supervision authority
and the government. Such a discretionary assessment, however, fails to take
the volatile nature of systemic risk into account. And even worse, it creates
major moral hazard problems. Banks that are deemed to be systemically relevant
according to the discretionary assessment might correctly guess that they are and
are therefore directly affected by moral hazard. The implicit bail-out guarantee
that has been issued for systemically relevant banks by bailing them out in the
financial crisis of 2007/2008 creates incentives for those banks to take on excessive
risk. The situation is even worse for banks that are not deemed to be systemically
important but assume they are. Those banks also have the incentive to take on
excessive risks, but are not covered by a bail-out guarantee. Their insolvency
might lead to informational contagion and an increase in the refinancing cost of
the remaining banks, which in turn can trigger further defaults. To prevent such
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a situation, it is strongly desirable to have a transparent measure for the systemic
importance of individual financial institutions and markets.
3.7 Conclusion
The NSII defined in this chapter gives valuable insight into the structure of the
South African interbank system, thereby representing one of the measures with
which to assess systemic significance. With the index it is possible to measure
the systemic importance of individual banks on an ongoing, day-to-day, month-
to-month or even longer basis. In combination with other measures of systemic
significance, this information could be used to impose prudential requirements on
firms commensurate with their systemic importance. However, one has to take
into account that systemic importance of the different groups of banks is driven
by different criteria. Banks in the group of large banks are usually high in size,
interconnectedness and betweenness, while medium banks are moderate in size,
moderate in interconnectedness and low in betweenness. Small banks are low in
size and betweenness and moderate in interconnectedness. It is argued that these
structural changes have to be taken into account when further prudential require-
ments for firms are discussed. The South African banking system has been shown
to be stable in terms of structure and number of participants, even in times of
high transactional volumes and great distress in the international financial mar-
kets.
It is argued that moral hazard is less pressing when the network systemic impor-
tance index is taken into account and therefore preferable in this regard to having
a secret list of banks that are considered to be systemically important. Moral
hazard is less pressing, since the systemic importance of each bank depends not
only on its own behaviour, but also on the behaviour and structure of the rest of
the banking system.
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While the South African interbank system has been proven to be resilient to
shocks in the international financial markets, a continuous monitoring of the
interbank network structure can help alleviate future stress and provide a tool
for cross-section analysis of systemic risk. The network systemic importance index
can therefore contribute to further strengthen the stability of the South African
financial system.
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Figure 3.9: Network topology of the South African interbank system from July 2008




A Dynamic Network Model of
Systemic Risk
As the recent financial crisis has shown, the structure and dynamics of inter-
bank markets have to be taken into account when assessing the resilience of the
financial system. Network- and multi-agent models of banking systems are par-
ticularly useful for this task. This chapter proposes a dynamic multi-agent model
of a banking system where banks optimize a portfolio of risky investments and
riskless excess reserves according to their risk and liquidity preferences. They are
endogenously linked via interbank loans and face a stochastic supply of house-
hold deposits. The banking behaviour was developed in chapter (2), but is now
extended to a dynamic setting. The goal of this chapter is to use this model
to answer three key questions about the impact of the network structure on fi-
nancial stability. First, how efficient is the central bank in stabilizing interbank
markets with different network structures during a crisis? Second, which network
structures are most resilient to financial distress and thus most desirable from a
financial stability point of view? And third, given a specific network structure,
what form of systemic risk poses a greater threat to financial stability: interbank
contagion or common shocks?
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4.1 Introduction
The recent financial crisis has highlighted the necessity to understand systemic
risk both qualitatively and quantitatively in order to safeguard financial stabil-
ity. Bandt et al. (2009) provide a categorization of systemic risks, distinguishing
between a broad and a narrow sense. In their nomenclature, contagion effects on
interbank markets pose a systemic risk in the narrow sense, whereas the broad
sense of systemic risk is characterized as a common shock that affects many in-
stitutions at once. The crisis has shown that systemic risk not only can take
many forms, but is also highly dynamic: slowly building up in normal times, but
rapidly emerging during times of distress. The insolvency of the US investment
bank Lehman Brothers in September 2008 marked the tipping point between
the build up and rapid manifestation of systemic risks and lead to a freeze in
interbank markets. As a consequence, the risk premia for unsecured interbank
loans increased drastically, which resulted in a massive impairment of banks’
liquidity provision. Governments and central banks were forced to undertake un-
precedented non-standard measures to reduce money market spreads and ensure
liquidity provision to the banking system.1 This shows that central banks are
key actors for the functioning of interbank markets, even though they do not
directly participate in them. To motivate central bank interventions, already
Goodfriend and King (1988) could show that open market operations enhance
the liquidity provision in the financial system. More recently, Allen et al. (2009)
and Freixas et al. (2010) show that central bank intervention can increase the
efficiency of interbank markets. Lenza et al. (2010) argue that quantitative and
qualitative easing acted mainly through their effect on money market spreads,
effectively reducing them. It is thus clear, that every realistic model of interbank
markets has to feature the central bank as one key actor.
1For an overview of the immediate crisis reaction of governments and central banks, see i.e.
Cecchetti (2009) for the United States and Petrovic and Tutsch (2009) for the European Union.
See also Heider et al. (2009), and Brunnermeier (2008) for an analysis of the liquidity crunch
of 2007/2008.
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Interbank markets exhibit what Haldane (2009) denotes as a knife-edge, or robust-
yet-fragile property. In normal times, the connections between banks lead to an
enhanced liquidity allocation and increased risk sharing amongst financial in-
stitutions. This was shown by Allen and Gale (2000) who extend the classical
bank-run model by Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and show that highly intercon-
nected banking systems are less prone to bank-runs. Dasgupta (2004) confirms
this result and determines the optimal level of interconnectedness in a banking
system. In times of crisis, however, the same interconnections can amplify shocks
that spread through the system. This was shown i.e. by Gai and Kapadia (2008),
who investigate systemic crises with a network model and show that on the one
hand, the risk of systemic crises is reduced with increasing connectivity on the
interbank market. On the other hand, however, the magnitude of systemic crises
increases at the same time.2 This knife-edge property of interbank markets can be
attributed to a counterparty risk externality.3 Acharya and Bisin (2010) compare
over-the-counter (OTC) and centralized clearing markets in a general equilibrium
model. They show that the intransparency of OTC markets is ex-ante inefficient
and attribute this to a counterparty risk externality.4 This externality can best
be illustrated in a small example. Assume a simple banking network that consists
of three banks (A,B, and C) where bank A has issued uncollateralized interbank
loans to banks B and C. The interest rate on the interbank loans will include
a risk premium to capture counterparty risk. Now assume that B has issued
another interbank loan to C. This will increase the counterparty risk of bank B,
as B is now vulnerable to a default of bank C. However, bank A is not aware of
this increase and will thus underprice the counterparty risk. Thus, the structure
of financial networks and especially interbank networks is relevant for the anal-
ysis of systemic risk. Taking this into account, the question arises, if there exist
network structures that are less prone to the counterparty externality and hence
2See also Fernando (2003), and Cifuentes et al. (2005).
3Furthermore, Rochet and Tirole (1996), Furfine (2001), or Freixas and Holthausen (2005)
argue that interbank markets are characterized by asymmetric information, which poses another
form of market incompleteness.
4The importance of transparency in contracting has also been analyzed in Leitner (2009).
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more resilient to financial distress.
The counterparty risk externality makes it clear that the network structure of fi-
nancial system plays an important role when assessing systemic risk. An overview
of the existing literature on financial networks can be found i.e. in Allen et al.
(2010) and European Central Bank (2010b). The network structure of interbank
markets can be best captured in an exposure matrix where the issuance of a loan
from bank i to bank j is denoted as the loan size in row i and column j. Using
such a matrix, Eisenberg and Noe (2001) show that a unique clearing payment
vector exists and analyze the spreading of contagious defaults in general network
topologies. The difference to this chapter is that we develop a dynamic model
of cascading bank defaults, while Eisenberg and Noe (2001) calculate the impact
of a default in a static network structure. Empirical analyses of the interbank
network structure exist for for a number of countries.5 It is shown that interbank
networks often exhibit a scale-free topology, i.e. they are characterized by few
money center banks with many interconnections and many small banks with few
connections. Sachs (2010) follows the static approach of Eisenberg and Noe, but
also compares contagion effects in scale-free networks and random networks and
finds that contagion is more pressing in scale-free networks. What is missing in
the literature, however, is a dynamic analysis of the financial stability properties
of different network topologies.
The crisis revealed that there also exist other externalities besides the counter-
party risk externality. One of them being a correlation externality between banks’
5The topology of the interbank has been analyzed i.e. in the United States (Furfine
(1999)), the Euroarea (Gabrieli (2010), Gabrieli (2011)), the United Kingdom (Wells (2004),
Becher et al. (2008)), Brazil (Cajueiro and Tabak (2007), Chang et al. (2008)), Italy (Mistrulli
(2007), Iori et al. (2008), Manna and Iazzetta (2009)), Switzerland (Sheldon and Maurer
(1998)), Sweden (Bl̊avarg and Nimander (2002)), Belgium (Degryse and Nguyen (2007)), the
Netherlands (van Lelyveld and Liedorp (2004)), Austria (Boss et al. (2004)) and South Africa
(Brink and Georg (2011a)).
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portfolios. Securitization was designed to distribute risks from within the banking
system to investors outside the banking system. A thorough analysis, however,
shows that a significant part of the securitized risk was still residing within the
banking system at the peak of the crisis (see i.e. Krishnamurthy (2008)). As
a consequence, a strong correlation between banks’ assets arised. As banks are
unaware of the portfolio of competing banks, they cannot assess this correlation
and choose non-optimal levels of correlation for their portfolios. This externality
could thus be best described as a correlation externality. A large extend of the
literature on systemic risk in interbank markets has focused on the analysis of
contagion effects (i.e. studying the counterparty risk externality). Recently, more
attention has been given to the correlation externality and the analysis of com-
mon shocks as sources of systemic risk. Acharya and Yorulmazer (2008) point
out how banks are incentivized to increase the correlation between their invest-
ments and thus the risk of an endogenous common shock in order to prevent costs
arising from potential information spillovers. The increasing correlation in the
financial sector is also verified empirically. De Nicolo and Kwast (2002) analyze
the increase in the correlation between large and complex financial organizations
during the 1990s, a development that was further fueled by securitization. The
new insights on common shocks give rise to the question which form of systemic
risk poses the greater threat to financial stability: interbank contagion caused by
the counterparty externality, or common shocks caused by the correlation exter-
nality. Thus far, no comparison of the different systemic risk manifestations in
a single model has been conducted in the literature. This chapter aims to close
this gap by explicitely comparing the impact of different shocks resulting from
the two externalities.
One particularly useful class of models to analyze the above mentioned questions
are multi-agent simulations. Iori et al. (2006) develop a network model of a bank-
ing system, where agents (banks) can interact with each other via interbank loans.
The balance sheet of banks consits of risk-free investments and interbank loans as
assets, and deposits, equity and interbank borrowings as liabilities. Banks chan-
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nel funds from depositors towards productive investment. They receive liquidity
shocks via deposit fluctuations and pay dividends if possible. Nier et al. (2007)
describe the banking system as a random graph where the network structure is
determined by the number of nodes (banks) and the probability that two nodes
are connected. The banks’ balance sheet consists of external assets (investments)
and interbank assets on the asset side and net worth, deposits, and interbank
loans as liabilities. Net worth is assumed to be a fixed fraction of a bank’s total
assets and deposits are a residual, designed to complete the bank’s liabilities side.
Shocks that hit a bank and lead to its default are distributed equally amongst
the interbank market. The authors find, that (i) the banking system is more
resilient to contagious defaults if its banks are better capitalized and this effect is
non-linear; (ii) the effect of the degree of connectivity is non-monotonic; (iii) the
size of interbank liabilities tend to increase the risk of a knock-on default; and
(iv) more concentrated banking systems are shown to be prone to larger systemic
risk. More recently, Ladley (2011) analyzes the impact of the interbank network
heterogeneity on systemic risk in a multi-agent setting. The balance sheet of
banks consists of equity, deposits, cash reserves, loans to the non-bank sector and
interbank loans. Ladley considers risky investment opportunities and explicitely
models how banks attract deposits by choosing their offered deposit interest rates.
Banks determine the optimal structure of their portfolio via a genetic algorithm.
He finds that that for small shocks, high interconnectivity helps stabilizing the
system, while for large shocks high interconnectivity amplifies the initial impact.
This chapter wants to answer the aforementioned questions about the impact
of the network structure on financial stability by developing a dynamic model
of a banking system. Banks optimize a portfolio of risky investments and risk-
less excess reserves. Risky investments are long-term investment projects that
fund an unmodelled firm sector while riskless excess reserves are short-term and
held at the deposit facility of the central bank. Banks face a stochastic supply
of household deposits and stochastic returns from risky investments. This gives
rise to liquidity fluctuations and initiates the dynamic formation of an interbank
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loan network. Banks have furthermore access to central bank liquidity if they
can provide sufficient collateral. This model is used to first analyze the impact
that the provision of central bank liquidity has on financial stability. It is shown
that the central bank can stabilize the financial system in the short-run. In the
long-run, however, the system always converges to the equilibrium state. This
result is in line with the results of chapter (2) on the effectiveness of monetary
policy and its impact on money multipliers. Possible network structures will be
given at the beginning of each simulation. They reflect contractual agreements
amongst banks and determine the set of possible interbank loans. The realized
network structure at each point in time is a subset of the possible network struc-
ture (i.e. the set of existing edges at any point in time is a subset of the set of
possible edges). This closely resembles the situation in reality, where the day-
to-day topology of interbank networks also varies from the monthly or quaterly
aggregated network structures that are analyzed in the literature. Different possi-
ble network structures are compared, and it is shown that in random graphs, the
relationship between the degree of interconnectivity and financial instability is
non-monotonic. Scale-free networks are seen to be more stable than small-world
networks, which in turn tend to be more stable than random networks. Thus,
the effect of contagion is exagerrated in the literature, as most papers assume
random networks and most real-world interbank networks are scale-free. The
model captures key effects of the dynamics of interbank networks and can thus
be used to analyze the impact of different externalities on financial stability. The
counterparty risk externality is compared to the correlation externality and it is
shown that, contrary to their importance in the literature, common shocks are
not subordinate to interbank contagion. Finally, a number of policy conclusions
for the optimal reaction to financial crises, as well as for the monitoring and reg-
ulation of systemic risk are drawn from the model.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. After this introduction,
section (4.2) describes the dynamic model that has been used to analyze the afore-
mentioned questions. Section (4.3) will present the main results, while section
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(4.4) derives some policy implications and concludes. In the appendix section
(4.5), additional results that were obtained from the model are discussed. As
these results do not fall within the main scope of this chapter, they were put
into a separate appendix that is concluded by a brief discussion of the additional
results.
4.2 The Model
This section wants to outline some key features that all models of systemic risk
should incorporate and develop a dynamic model of a banking system that can
be used to analyze the impact of the interbank network structure on financial
stability. Firstly, deposit fluctuations have to be included for two reasons: (i)
Because of the maturity transformation that banks perform and since deposits
usually have a short maturity, deposit fluctuations can lead to illiquidity. Banks
that become illiquid will have to liquidate their long-term investments at steep
discounts (for a model that describes this mechanism, see i.e. Uhlig (2010)). Due
to marked-to-market accounting, these steep discounts will lead to losses in banks’
trading books and have to be compensated by banking capital. Thus, illiquidity
can lead to insolvency. (ii) As deposit fluctuations are generally considered to be
one of the reasons why banks engage in interbank lending (see i.e. Allen and Gale
(2000), Dasgupta (2004)), they have to be included into all models of systemic
risk. Without deposit flucutations as a driving force for the formation of inter-
bank networks, it is impossible to describe the counterparty risk externality in
a dynamic setting. Secondly, as fluctuations in investment returns have to be
compensated by banking capital, risky investments are a major cause of bank
insolvencies. Without risky investments, it is impossible to model the correlation
externality as it arises precisely in a situation when the returns of risky assets of
a number of banks have negative realizations at the same time. In order to model
common shocks, risky investments have thus to be taken into account.
101
Iori et al. (2006) and Nier et al. (2007) develop multi-agent models of a banking
system, but assume a risk-free investment opportunity. Nier et al. (2007) further
assume deposits to be residual. We follow both papers in some aspects and
develop a network model of interbank markets. However, we explicitely allow the
possibility of risky investments and deposit fluctuations. We furthermore include
a central bank in the model, since it is evident from the literature that monetary
policy has a large influence on the stability of interbank markets. This model
allows the investigation of direct contagion effects as well as common shocks.
This is another difference to the existing literature, which exclusively focuses on
individual forms of systemic risk.
4.2.1 Balance Sheets
The balance sheet of a bank k holds risky investments Ik and riskless excess
reserves Ek as assets at every point in (simulation-) time t = 1 . . . τ . The in-
vestments of bank k have a random maturity6 τ kI > 0 and we assume that each
bank finds enough investment opportunities according to its preferences. The
bank refinances this portfolio by deposits Dk (which are stochastic and have a
maturity of zero), from which it has to hold a certain fraction rDk of required
reserves at the central bank, fixed banking capital BCk, interbank loans Lk and
central bank loans LCk. Interbank loans and central bank loans are assumed to
have a maturity of τ kL = τ
k
LC = 0. The maturity mismatch between investments
and deposits is the standard maturity transformation of commercial banks. In-
terbank loans can be positive (bank has excess liquidity) or negative (bank has
demand for liquidity), depending on the liquidity situation of the bank at time t.
The same holds for central bank loans, where the bank can use either the main
refinancing operations to obtain loans, or the deposit facility to loan liquidity to
the central bank. The balance sheet of the commercial bank therefore reads as:
Ikt + E
k
t = (1− r)Dkt + BCkt + Lkt + LCkt (4.1)
6Maturity τ implies that the asset matures in τ + 1 update steps.
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The interest rate for deposits at a bank is rd and the interest rate for central
bank loans is rb. Note that there is no distinction between an interest rate for
the lending and deposit facility and therefore the interest rate on the interbank
market will be equal to the interest rate for central bank loans.
The banks decide about their portfolio structure and portfolio volume. A constant











where λk is the fraction of the risky part of the portfolio, µk is the expected





denotes the bank’s portfolio volume. The risky part of the portfolio follows from







∈ [0, 1] (4.3)











where rb denotes the refinancing cost of the portfolio. Since banks obtain financ-
ing on the interbank market and at the central bank at the same interest rate,
this refinancing cost is equal to the main refinancing rate. It is possible to in-
troduce a spread between the lending and deposit facility and therefore allowing
the interest rate on the interbank market to stochastically vary around the main
refinancing rate. If a bank now plans its optimal portfolio volume, it calculates
with a planned refinancing rate. This refinancing rate follows from the banks plan
about how much interbank loans it wants to obtain on the interbank market at a
planned refinancing rate and how much central bank loans it plans to obtain at
the main refinancing rate. If this plan cannot be realized (e.g. if a bank’s liquid-










Figure 4.1: Interaction dynamics of the model. The private sector (household/firms),
the banking sector (commercial banks) and the central bank interact via the exchange
of deposits, investments, loans, excess- and required reserves and central bank loans.
Arrows indicate the direction of fund flows.
portfolio choice. This possibility is excluded for the sake of simplicity. Note, that
a market for central bank money is not explicitely modelled. The central bank
rather accomodates all liquidity demands of commercial banks, as long as they
can provide the necessary securities. This assumption is not unrealistic in times
of crises, as for example the full allotment policy of the ECB shows.
4.2.2 Update Algorithm
In the simulation, we have implemented an update algorithm that determines
how the system evolves from one state to another. The algorithm is divided up
into three phases that are briefly described here. Every update step is done for
all banks for a given number of sweeps. At the beginning of phase 1 the bank
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where an underline denotes realized quantities. In period 0 all banks are endowed
with initial values. The update step starts with banks getting the required re-
serves rDkt−1 and excess reserves E
k
t−1 plus interest payment from the central
bank (it is assumed that for both required and excess reserves an interest of rb
is paid). The banks obtain a stochastic return for all investments Ikt−1 which
might be either positive or negative. The firms furthermore pay back all invest-
ments Ikf that were made in a previous period and have a maturity of τ
k
I = 0.
The banks then pay interest for all deposits that were deposited in the previ-
ous period. After that, the banks can either receive further deposits from the
households, or suffer deposit withdrawings ∆Dkt . At the end of the first period,
all interbank and central bank loans plus interests are paid either to, or by bank k.
At the beginning of phase 2, the bank’s liquidity Q̂k is therefore given as:







+ µkIkt−1 + I
k








All banks with Q̂kt < 0 are marked as illiquid and removed from the system.
Banks that pass the liquidity check now have to pay required reserves rDkt to the
central bank.
In phase 3 the bank k determines it’s planned level of investment Ikt = (λ
k)∗(V k)∗
and excess reserves Ekt = (1− (λk)∗)(V k)∗ according to equations (4.3) and (4.4).
From this planned level and the current level of investments (all investments that
were done in earlier periods and have a maturity τ kI > 0), as well as the current
liquidity (4.6) the bank determines its liquidity demand (or supply). If a bank
has a liquidity demand, it will go first to the interbank market, where it asks all
banks i that are connected to k (denoted as i : k), if they have a liquidity surplus.
In this case the two banks will interchange liquidity via an interbank loan. The
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convention is adpotet that a negative value of L denotes a demand for liquidity
and therefore the interbank loan demand of bank k is given by:
Lkt = Q̂
k
t − Ikt (4.7)




















Now there are three cases, depending on the bank’s liquidity situation. If a bank
has neither a liquidity demand nor excess liquidity, it will not interact with the
central bank and this step is skipped. However, if the bank still has a liquidity
demand, it will ask for a central bank loan:
LCkt = L
k
t − Lkt (4.9)
The central bank then checks if the bank has the neccessary securities and if so,






where αk ∈ [0, 1] denotes the fraction of investments of bank k that are accepted
as securities by the central bank. If a bank has insufficient securities, the central
bank will not provide the full liquidity demand and the bank has to reduce the
planned investment and excess reserve level. If the bank has no securities (no
investments Ikt−1), it cannot borrow from the central bank. This rationing mech-
anism maps planned investment levels to realized ones.
The second case is that a bank has a large liquidity surplus even if all planned
investments can be realized. In this case, the bank is able to pay dividends Akt








where βk ∈ [0, 1] is the dividend level of bank k. The dividend level will typically
be close to 1 as shareholders will push the bank to rather pay dividends than use
the money to deposit it at the central bank at low interest rates. The remaining:
LCkt = LC
k
t − Akt (4.12)
is transferred to the central bank’s deposit facility. Finally the realized invest-
ments are transferred to the firm sector and the realized excess reserves are trans-
ferred to the central bank.
These steps are done for all k = 1 . . . N banks in the system for t = 1 . . . τ
time steps. As there are two stochastic elements in the simulation (the return
of investments and the deposit level) two channels for a banks insolvency are
modelled. The first channel is via large deposit withdrawals. As deposits are
highly liquid and investments are illiquid for a fixed, but random investment time,
this maturity transformation might lead to illiquidity and therefore to insolvency.
The second channel for insolvency is via losses on investments. If the banks
banking capital is insufficient to cover losses from a failing investment, this bank
will be insolvent. If a bank fails, all the banks that have loaned to this bank will
suffer losses, which they have to compensate by their own banking capital. This
is a possible contagion mechanism, where the insolvency of one bank leads to the
insolvency of other banks, that would have survived if it was not for the first
bank’s insolvency. The impact of the contagion effect will depend on the precise
network structure of the interbank market at the time of the insolvency.
4.2.3 Model Parameters
There are eighteen model parameters that control the numerical simulation. If
not stated otherwise, numerical simulations were performed with the parameters
given in this section. The simulations were perfomred with N = 100 banks and
τ = 1000 update steps each. Every simulation was repeated numSimulations=100
times to average out stochastic effects. The interest rate on the interbank market
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was chosen to be rd = 0.02 and the main refinancing rate as rb = 0.04. The
required reserve rate is r = 0.02. The interbank connection level for random
graphs is denoted as connLevel∈ [0, 1]. At a connLevel=0 there is no interbank
market and at connLevel=1 every bank is connected to every other bank. For
scale-free networks the parameters m = 1, 2, 4, 10 and for small-world networks
the parameters β ∈ [0.001, 0.1] were used.
Two sets of parameters are used to describe the influence of the real economy on
the model. The first set is the probability that a credit is returned successful,
pf = 0.97. The return for a successful returned credit is ρ
+
f = 0.09 and in case
a credit defaults, the negative return on the investment is ρ−f = −0.05. This set
of parameters will sometimes be referred to as “normal” parameters. As “crisis”
parameters ρ+f = 0.97 and ρ
−
f = −0.08 were used. To plan their optimal portfo-
lio, the banks have an expected credit success probability pb and expected credit
return ρ+b . It is assumed that these expected values correspond to the true values
from the real economy. The optimal portfolio structure and volume of a bank
depends also on its risk aversion parameter θ. For each bank, θ ∈ [1.67, 2.0] was
chosen randomly to account for heterogeneity in the banking sector.
Deposit fluctuations ∆Dkt were modelled as:
∆Dkt = (1− γk + 2γkx)Dkt−1 (4.13)
with γk = 0.02 (in “normal” times) and γk = 0.1 (during a “crisis” period) can
be interpreted as a scaling parameter for the level of deposit fluctuations and x
being a random variable with x ∈ [0, 1]. The fraction of a banks investments that
the central bank accepts as securities is set to αk = 0.8, assuming that banks
invest only in assets which have a good rating. The level of dividends βk that a
bank pays to its shareholders was chosen as βk = 0.99.
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Figure 4.2: The effect of central bank activity for different scenarios. Top: crisis
scenario. Bottom: normal scenario. Left: number of active banks over simulation time.
Right: interbank loan volume over simulation time. The central bank activity αk varied
between αk ∈ [0.0, 1.0].
4.3 Results
To answer the question which impact central bank activity has on financial sta-
bility, we first varied the level of collateral αk that is accepted by the central
bank in order to provide liquidity to banks. For αk = 1 the central bank will
accept all assets of commercial banks as collateral, while for αk = 0, no assets
will be accepted. Thus, αk is used as a parameter to determine the fraction of
assets that are of high enough quality to be accepted as collateral. Banks will
obtain liquidity for the amount of collateral that they can deposit at the central
bank. In Figure (4.2) it can be seen, that a significant stabilizing effect from the
liquidity provision by the central bank is obtained from αk ∼ 0.45. However, this
effect is non-linear in αk which implies that, on the one hand, even slight changes
in the collateral requirements can have significant stabilizing effects if performed
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Figure 4.3: The effect of different network topologies on financial stability. Left top:
crisis scenario and random topology. Right top: normal scenario and random topology.
Connection levels of connLevel= 0.0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.45, 0.5, 1.0 were used. Bottom left:
crisis scenario and small-world network with β = 0.001, 0.005, 0.01, 0.05, 0.1. Bottom
right: crisis scenario and scale-free network with m = 1, 2, 4, 10.
around the critical value. On the other hand, even large changes can have very
little effect, if performed away from the critical value. The effect on the number
of active banks is similar for both, the normal and the crisis scenario. On the
right hand side of Figure (4.2) the impact of the collateral requirements on the
volume of interbank loans is displayed. It can be seen, that in both scenarios an
abundant provision of central bank liquidity will lead to a crowding-out effect on
interbank liquidity. It can further be seen, that a high amount of interbank liq-
uidity is correlated with high financial instability. This is precisely the knife-edge
property of interbank markets: if the exposures amongst banks are too large, an
initial knock-on effect will be amplified in the system.
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In Figure (4.3) the impact of different network topologies on financial stability
in times of crisis and normal times is shown. When comparing the results for
random networks, it can be seen that the difference in network topology is not
significant during normal times.7 In times of crisis, however, the different lev-
els of interconnectedness come into play. Figure (4.3) also confirms the result
of Nier et al. (2007), who show that the relationship between the level of inter-
connectedness on interbank markets and financial contagion is non-monotonic.
It can furthermore be seen, that contagion effects tend to be larger in random
networks than in small-world networks, where in turn contagion effects tend to be
larger than in scale-free networks. This implies that analyses that are conducted
with static random networks can overestimate contagion effects when a dynamic
model of systemic risk is used.
For increasing levels of interconnectedness in random networks, it can be seen
from Figure (4.3) that there exists a “tipping” point, where the networks become
endogenously instable. To better understand this, the interbank loan volume is
depicted in Figure (4.4). As Ladley (2011) argues, the knife-edge property of
interbank markets requires shocks to be small, in order to exihibt a stabilizing
effect. Figure (4.4) shows an increase in interbank market volume until a tipping
point, where the amount of interbank loans becomes large and contagion effects
dominate. This in turn leads to an increasing number of insolvencies that spread
easier in the system if the level of interconnectedness increases. It can also be
seen from Figure (4.4) that the volume of interbank markets in normal times is
significantly smaller than the volume in times of distress. This is easily under-
stood in the model setup, as times of distress imply larger liquidity fluctuations
and therefore larger amounts of interbank loans issued between agents. However,
this implies that interbank markets will be more prone to contagion effects in
times of high deposit and asset return volatility. It also implies that interbank
markets are more susceptible to systemic risk when the volume of the interbank
market is larger.
7And similarly for small-world and scale-free networks.
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Figure 4.4: The effect of different network topologies on interbank loan volume. Left
top: crisis scenario and random topology. Right top: normal scenario and random
topology. Connection levels of connLevel= 0.0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.45, 0.5, 1.0 were used. Bot-
tom left: crisis scenario and small-world network with β = 0.001, 0.005, 0.01, 0.05, 0.1.
Bottom right: crisis scenario and scale-free network with m = 1, 2, 4, 10.
To understand the impact of different forms of systemic risk on financial stability,
Figure (4.5) compares two different types of shocks. In the case of pure interbank
contagion, the largest bank in the system is selected and exogenously sent into
default. The impact of this default on the remaining number of active banks in
the system is depicted in Figure (4.5) at the top. Again, it can be seen that
the impact is larger in times of distress than in normal times. To analyze the
impact such a default has on the liquidity provision in interbank markets, Figure
(4.5) shows the interbank market volume at the bottom. When a common shock
hits the system, banks with insufficient equity will go into insolvency. While
this might only be a small number of banks, a larger number of banks become
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Figure 4.5: The impact of different forms of systemic risk on financial stability and
interbank loan volume. Left: normal scenario. Right: crisis scenario. Top: number of
active banks over time. Bottom: interbank loan volume voer time. Interbank contagion:
the largest bank in the system at time t = 400 was sent into insolvency. Common shock
A: all banks suffer a common shock of 10% on all their assets. Common shock B: all
banks suffer a common shock of 20% on all their assets.
more vulnerable to deposit and asset return fluctuations. As was seen in Figure
(4.4), shocks that exceed a certain threshold will lead to an increased number of
insolvencies in the system. When banks become more vulnerable, this threshold
is reached easier and the whole system remains unstable as long as the volume on
the interbank market (and hence the magnitude of possible shocks) will lead to
increased insolvencies. When the crisis hits, the volume of interbank transactions
drops until it has reached a level where the endogenous deposit and asset return
fluctuations will not lead to an increased number of insolvencies. Comparing
the case of common shocks to the case of interbank contagion, it can be seen
that, while the impact of a common shock on the number of active banks is
more severe than in the contagion case, the opposite holds true for interbank
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market liquidity. The pure contagion case has a substantial impact on interbank
market liquidity, which on the other hand implies a smaller size of shocks due to
endogenous fluctuations.
4.4 Conclusion and Policy Implications
This chapter develops a dynamic model of a banking system with banks optimiz-
ing a portfolio of risky investments and riskless reserves. Banks face stochastic
household deposit demand and stochastic asset returns. In order to exchange liq-
uidity, banks engage in interbank lending. In addition to the existing literature,
this model incorporates the central bank, whose actions have substantial impact
on interbank markets. The model allows for the analysis of the dynamic evolution
of systemic risk in interbank markets. Both, the time-varying nature of interbank
markets, as well as the impact of different forms of systemic risk have been taken
into account. Different network topologies have been studied and their impact
on financial stability has been analyzed. Therefore, the model presented in this
chapter provides a unique starting point for the analysis of systemic risk on in-
terbank markets.
This chapter provides further evidence that central bank intervention can indeed
alleviate financial distress and liquidity shortages on interbank markets in the
short run. On the one hand, even small changes in the collateral requirements
of central banks can lead to a significant enhancement of liquidity provision on
interbank markets. On the other hand, there is a large range of required collat-
eral quality, where even a significant change in the collateral requirements will
not lead to a significant enhancement of liquidity provision. The simulation re-
sults also show that an abundant provision of central bank liquidity can lead to a
crowding-out of interbank liquidity. The desired impact of central bank activity
on liquidity provision will thus be smaller in the long run. This is confirmed
by the fact that, while the central bank has a stabilizing effect on the financial
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system in the short-run, the long run equilibrium will always be the equilibrium
that would have been reached without central bank activity.
The model developed in this chapter allows for a deeper understanding of the
knife-edge property of interbank markets. The results indicate that there is an
upper limit of interbank loan volume for different network topologies, where en-
dogenous deposit and asset return fluctuations will lead to an increased number
of bank insolvencies. The limit itself depends on the topology of the interbank
markets and will be larger for higher interconnected banking systems. This im-
plies that the knife-edge property of interbank markets depends on the precise
market structure and level of interconnectedness. For higher connectivity on the
interbank market, larger amounts of interbank liquidity can be tolerated by the
system without a substantial increase in financial fragility. However, even for
complete networks, where every bank is connected to every other bank, such an
upper limit exists. In fact, for higher interconnected networks, shocks will spread
more rapid, which implies a higher fragility of the system once the tipping point
is reached.
Already the correlation of higher interconnectedness and increasing system fragility
makes it clear, that the topology of the interbank network is relevant for the as-
sessment of financial stability. This chapter also shows that the topology of the
interbank network impacts the assessment of the long-run stability of the bank-
ing system. This “topology effect” is more accentuated in times of crisis, while
in normal times, the topology has little impact. This result is of particular rel-
evance for the question which interbank network structure is most resilient to
financial distress. It turns out that networks with large average path length are
more resilient to financial distress and that it is precisely during a crisis where
the network topology matters.
Even though contagion effects are far better studied in the literature, it turns out
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that common shocks pose a greater threat to financial stability. This is also due to
the knife-edge property of interbank markets. When a common shock strikes the
entire banking system, banks become more vulnerable to endogenous fluctuations
and occasional idiosyncractic insolvencies. This leads to a drastic vulnerability of
the entire system and a large number of bank insolvencies. However, contagion
affects interbank market liquidity more severely than common shocks. Again, the
impact of the shocks is larger during times of distress, which holds especially true
for the impact of contagious defaults on interbank liquidity provision.
The results presented in this chapter have significant implications for central
banks and supervisory authorities. First, from the perspective of monitoring sys-
temic risk, it has become apparent that the topology of the interbank network has
to be taken into account. The recently endorsed Basel III framework sets strong
incentives to move from intransparent over-the-counter trading of interbank loans
to centralized counterparty clearing. One of the advantages of centralized clear-
ing is that policy makers are now able to determine and measure the interbank
network structure. The interbank network topology, however, is highly dynamic
and varies from day to day. This implies that further analyses of this dynamic
behaviour are necessary in order to understand the full impact of the network
topology on the propagation of shocks. Second, the results in this chapter have
implications for the optimal reaction of central banks to financial crises, as dif-
ferent forms of systemic risk have a different impact on the financial system. In
the case where systemic risk is mainly manifesting in the form of contagion, cen-
tral banks should resort to providing short-term liquidity to the financial system.
Because of to the crowding-out of interbank liquidity by abundant central bank
liquidity, however, this liquidity provision should be short- or medium-term only.
In the case where systemic risk is mainly manifesting in the form of a common
shock, the optimal policy reaction is to re-capitalize the financial system. Only a
strengthening of the banks’ equity will make them more resilient to endogenous
fluctuations. This is especially relevant, as the reduction in interbank lending is
smaller in the case of a common shock and the simulation results indicate a direct
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relation between high interbank lending (with respect to the resilience of each in-
dividual bank, i.e. the banks’ capital buffer) and financial fragility. Thus, a better
understanding of all forms of systemic risk is required in order for policy mak-
ers to find appropriate crisis reactions. Third, the results in this chapter have
implications for the regulation of systemic risk. According to Basel III, banks
have to hold capital for all risky assets they hold. This capital is determined by
a required capital ratio (that has been raised substantially with respect to Basel
II) and the risk-weights for individual asset classes. Historic experience suggested
that interbank loans are less risky than loans to the real economy. Therefore, the
risk-weights for interbank and financial assets were substantially smaller than
the risk-weights for other assets. The simulation results, however, indicate that
higher amounts of interbank lending lead to larger financial fragility. In addition
to calibrating risk-weights to historic default experience, it is thus necessary to
add a “systemic risk weight” on different asset classes in order to counterveil the
default risk externality that is at the core of contagious defaults.8 Even more
pressing is the need for regulatory tools to counterveil the correlation externality.
One such possible tool would be the asset value correlation factor in Basel III.
This factor is currently implemented as a static factor, which is slightly higher for
large banks. This ignores the correlation externality that is at the root of com-
mon shocks. Supervisory authorities should require more detailed information
about banks’ trading and bank books and determine the correlation of different
asset classes from this data in a macroprudential approach. These “dynamic
asset value correlation” factors can then be disseminated to banks who in turn
calculate their individual asset value correlation factors in accordance with their
portfolio, which will effectively reduce portfolio correlations.
4.5 Appendix
Besides the aforementioned results, a number of other results are worth mention-
ing, even though they do not directly fit into the main scope of this chapter. This












































































































Figure 4.6: The effects of credit lumpiness on financial stability. Top left: number
of active banks over simulation time for different expectations. Bottom left: volume of
interbank loans L over simulation time for different expectations. Top right: volume
of central bank loans LC over simulation time for different expectations. Bottom
right: volume of investments to the real economy over simulation time for different
expectations. We have used the parameters from section (4.2.3) but with different
values for p, ρ+ and ρ− as described in the text below.
appendix is therefore a collection of these results with a brief discussion at the
end. Throughout this section we have used ρ+f = 0.09, ρ
−
f = −0.05, β = 0.01,
m = 1, connLevel= 1.0 and γk = 0.1 as parameters.
One factor that determines a bank’s default probability is the lumpiness of it’s
investments. To clarify this, assume two banks A and B with equal investment
volume and expected return of the investment. Bank A has loaned a lot of small
credits, while B has issued fewer, but larger credits. The success probability of

























































Figure 4.7: Left: Interbank lending over simulation time for different network topolo-
gies. Right: normalized number of insolvencies over the fraction L/I of interbank
loans over investment level at which the insolvencies occured. We used the parameters
defined in section 4.2.3.
banks will audit larger credits with more scrutiny. Since the expected portfolio
return µR of both banks should be equal and smaller credits have a lower success
probability, from the equation:
µR = pρ
+ + (1− p)ρ− (4.14)
one can determine the “return” ρ− of a defaulting credit, if the return of a suc-
cessfull credit ρ+ remains the same. For ρ+ = 0.09, p = 0.97 and ρ− = 0.05 one
obtains µR = 0.0858 for small credits. We now assume a slightly larger success
probability for credits of p = 0.98. Then one obtains with fixed µR a negative
return ρ− = −0.12. Now it is not 5% of the invested portfolio volume that de-
faults if an investment defaults, but 12%. This resembles the greater lumpiness
of bank B’s portfolio. For p = 0.99 one obtains ρ− = −0.33. Those three cases
are shown in figure (4.6). It is clear from our simulations, that a larger credit
lumpiness leads to larger systemic instability and higher interbank loan volume.
On the left hand side of Figure 4.7 the interbank volume for the three topologies
BA, WS and random is shown. Irrespective of the actual network topology, all
three simulations exhibit a similar behaviour. Until time τ ≈ 400 one can see an
increase in interbank lending up to a point, where the volume of interbank lending
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exceeds a certain fraction of the investment volume. After this point the level of
interbank lending decreases, which is due to a drastic decrease in the number of
active banks. This result gives rise to the conclusion that there is a negative rela-
tionship between the amount of interbank loans and financial stability (measured
as the number of active banks over time).9 On the left hand side of Figure 4.7
the interbank volume for the three topologies is shown. Irrespective of the actual
network topology, all three simulations exhibit a similar behaviour. Until time
τ ≈ 400 one can see an increase in interbank lending up to a point, where the
volume of interbank lending exceeds a certain fraction of the investment volume.
After this point the level of interbank lending decreases, which is due to a drastic
decrease in the number of active banks.
To quantify this effect, the number of insolvencies (normalized by the number of
active banks in the system) as well as the fraction L/I at each point in time were
measured. The results of this measurement are shown in form of a histogram
for the three cases of a BA, WS and random network on the right hand side
of figure 4.7. One can see that the distributions of insolvencies peak around a
certain amount of L/I. It is possible to fit a normal distribution to the histogram
data in order to obtain the value of L/I where the most insolvencies occur. In
the Watts-Strogatz case this mean of the distribution is at about L/I = 0.179,
while in the Barabási-Albert case it is at L/I = 0.249 and in the random case
at L/I = 0.355. The results indicate that there is an “upper limit” to interbank
lending in the sense that larger values of interbank lending endogenously lead to
financial instability. As long as interbank lending is low, insolvencies cause no
problem for systemic stability since their impact is limited. As the amount of in-
terbank lending increases, possible contagion effects increase as well, until finally
there are only the most resilient banks (e.g. those with the most banking capital)
9In a recent paper Boissay (2010) comes to the same conclusion using a general equilibrium
model.The model financial market becomes fragile when the liquidity available exceeds the










































Figure 4.8: The effect of network heterogeneity (i). The effect of banks investment
screening. Left: number of active banks over simulation time. Right: The amount of
interbank loan volume over simulation time. We have used rafluct = 0.01, 0.02, 0.03
and the parameters from section 4.2.3 otherwise.
left. The results in this chapter indicate that different networks are differently
resilient to large amounts of interbank loans. While the WS case is the least
resilient to large values of L/I, its short average path length and high clustering
makes it easier for banks to obtain funds or lend excess liquidity. In this sense WS
networks will on the one hand lead to a more enhanced liquidity allocation than
BA and random networks. On the other hand, however, WS networks are more
prone to contagion at large interbank loan volumes. Note that this result is not in
conflict with the results on the financial stability properties of different network
types in section (4.3). While random networks are more resilient to higher L/I
values, they also exhibit higher L values such that the overall effect is unclear.
However, the analysis in section (4.3) shows that the increase in L dominates and
that random networks are thus less stable than BA or WS networks.
In Georg and Poschmann (2010) we analysed the effect of network heterogeneity
on financial stability. We assumed that banks could differ only in the risk aver-
sion parameter and that all banks faced the same investment opportunities. In












































Figure 4.9: The effect of network heterogeneity (ii). The effect of a differing mass
of depositors. Left: number of active banks over simulation time. Right: The amount
of interbank loan volume over simulation time. We have used sffluct = 0.0, 0.1, 0.5, 1.0
and the parameters from section 4.2.3 otherwise.
This chapter now wants to allow for the possibility that some banks have a better
screening mechanism for investments than others. The rationale behind this is,
that some banks have better ways to ex-ante assess the default probability of an
investment (that ultimately is defined only after it defaulted or not) than others.
Therefore, the parameter rafluct that determines the fluctuations in bank’s risk
assessment is introduced. The larger this parameter is, the larger is the number of
banks that are too optimistic about their investments. The results10 are shown in
Figure 4.8 for a Watts-Strogatz network and are in line with our previous results.
In Figure 4.9 the effect of banks having a different mass of depositors are analysed
for a Watts-Strogatz topology. This is done by allowing the possibility of different
banks face different scale factors γ′k = sffluctγ
k of household deposits. As it can
be seen from Figure 4.9 the effect of this type of heterogeneity is negligible.
The third way heterogeneity can arrive in the presented model is through a larger
10See Figure 4 in Georg and Poschmann (2010) and the discussion about the role of expec-
















































Figure 4.10: The effect of network heterogeneity (iii). The effect of heterogenous size.
Left: number of active banks over simulation time. Right: The amount of interbank
loan volume over simulation time. We have used ξfluct = 0.0, 4.0, 9.0, 99.0 and the
parameters from section 4.2.3 otherwise.
variation in the size of the banks. This is done by allowing the scaling parameter
ξ in the utility function to vary over a wider range ξ := ξ + ξfluct. The results of
this analysis are shown in Figure 4.10 and indicate that financial stability in very
heterogenous systems (in terms of bank size) does not differ considerably from
more homogenous systems. To interpret this result in the context of the discus-
sion about institutions that are too-big-to-fail (TBTF), one has to note that this
result does not mean there is no problem with TBTF. It is merely shown that
banking systems with heterogenous size of banks are not necessarily more prone
to contagion. At the core of the TBTF discussion, however, is the observation
that banks that are deemed “too-big-to-fail” have an incentive for taking excess
risk by implicitely assuming that they will be bailed out should they default.
This chapter analyses only systemic risk that arises through contagion and ne-
glects the possibility of informational contagion11 which will effectively lead to a
larger systemic importance for larger banks.
Finally,this chapter analyses the effect of a different clustering coefficient and a
different average path length on financial stability. Therefore, various simulations

































































































Insolvencies at simulation end
Clustering coefficient
Average path length
Figure 4.11: The relationship between clustering coefficient and average path length
and financial stability. Left: clustering coefficient (left scale) and average path length
(right scale) versus the impact of the insolvency of the largest bank in the sys-
tem. Right: clustering coefficient (left scale) and average path length (right scale)
versus the total number of insolvencies at the end of the simulation. We used
βWS = 0.005, 0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7 and the parameters from section
4.2.3 otherwise.
of WS networks with varying β parameter are performed and the clustering co-
efficient, average path length and the impact of a shock (where the largest bank
goes into insolvency) is measured. The results of these simulations are depicted
in Figure 4.11. Note that there is a correlation between the clustering coefficient
and the average path length which makes it impossible to isolate the influence of
a variation in clustering or average path length on financial stability. As shown
by Watts and Strogatz (1998) in the region where βWS = 0.005, . . . , 0.1 the clus-
tering coefficient stays approximately constant, while average path length drops
drastically. In the region where βWS = 0.2, . . . , 0.7 the average path length does
not change much, while the clustering coefficient drops drastically.
As can be seen in Figure 4.11 there is a tendency for shocks to be more severe in
situations where clustering and average path length are low. The same tendency
is observable when analyzing the total number of insolvencies instead of the im-
pact of a shock to the system. It is intuitively clear that the average path length
is negatively correlated with financial instability, since shocks can spread easier
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in networks with short average path lengths. The role of the clustering coefficient
is less clear, however. By definition the clustering coefficient gives the probability
that two banks A and B are connected with each other if they are both connected
to a third bank, bank C. In the presented model each bank is at every point in
time either a provider or a receipient of liquidity. This is a simplification of re-
ality where banks can and will be provider and receipient of interbank liquidity
at the same time. One consequence of this behaviour is that in the case of high
clustering, a bank with a liquidity deficit will have more sources of funding than
in the case of low clustering. This in turn will lead to an effective reduction of
the average size of interbank exposures as the total liquidity demand is driven
by either deposit outflows or losses on investment. This behaviour is depicted
in Figure 4.12 where two simple networks consisting of four banks with different
clustering coefficient are shown. During the initialization of the network, con-
tractual agreements between the banks about their relationships and the possible
direction of interbank flows are generated. These agreements define the structure
of the interbank network.
At a given point in the simulation, each bank in the network has either a liquid-
ity surplus or a deficit (or none, but that situation is very rare). The banks will
then check their contracts with other banks to find possible partners for inter-
bank transactions. This situation is depicted in the second column in Figure 4.12
where banks 1 and 4 have a liquidity surplus, while banks 2 and 3 are in need of
liquidity. The solid lines denote actual interbank loans amongst the banks. Now
assume that bank 2 goes into insolvency. In the case of high clustering it had
two contractual partners, bank 1 and bank 3 (in the simulation these contractual
partners are chosen upon initialization), each suffering losses on their loan books.
In the case of low clustering, it is bank 1 that suffers the entire loss, which most
likely is larger than in the case of high clustering. This will force bank 1 into a
position where it is in need of liquidity itself. In the case of high clustering it can
ask bank 4 for additional liquidity and maybe aquire the necessary funds. In the


































Network initialization During the update step After 2’s insolvency
Figure 4.12: Comparison of high versus low clustering in interbank networks. Top:
network with high clustering. Bottom: network with lower clustering. Left: the net-
work at initialization stage where a dashed line indicates that the one bank is able to
lend to the other. Middle: a realized network configuration where ± denotes liquid-
ity surplus/shortage and solid lines denote interbank loans. Right: realized network
configuration after bank 2 has gone into insolvency.
insolvency as well. The results hold true even in the presence of a central bank,
as the central bank does not provide infinite liquidity, but only the amount that
a bank can provide collateral for.
Note that this logic will change if banks have interbank assets and liabilities at
the same time. The structure of the contractual relationships between banks can
still remain the same, but for example bank 1 can be provider and receipient of




The financial crisis emphasized the importance of systemic risks for financial
stability. While the existing literature studies different forms of systemic risk in
isolation only, we develop a banking model that features all relevant forms in a
unified framework.
5.1 Introduction
Systemic risk and systemic crises, in which a large part of the financial system
fails, have gained much attention in recent years. The literature typically con-
siders three different forms of systemic risk that contribute to the probability of
a systemic crisis. First, interbank contagion refers to a situation in which banks
lend funds among themselves to insure against liquidity shocks. This makes the
banking system susceptible to the default of one bank, triggering default of other
banks due to existing interbank loan default. Second, a correlated or common
shocks materializes when the banks’ asset returns are positively correlated and a
negative realization hits several banks. Third, informational spillovers take place
when news about one bank are useful for the prediction of another bank’s health.
Then, a bad news about one bank affects all related banks.
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While there exists a large body of theoretical work on the individual forms of
systemic risk, a unified framework is still missing. The present paper closes this
gap. We develop a model of a banking system that features interbank contagion,
common shocks, and informational spillovers and analyse their individual contri-
bution to financial (in-)stability. We also analyze the interplay of these forms of
systemic risk and call the interaction effect the systemic interaction risk.
While there is an independent role for each form of systemic risk, the systemic
interaction risk is large. Notably, the systemic interaction risk increases with
measures of a financial crisis, such as volatility of asset returns. In the baseline
calibration systemic interaction risk constitutes about 30% of the total systemic
risk. Our results therefore demonstrate the importance of the unified systemic
risk framework in the analysis of financial stability.
The proposed framework has strong implications for capital adequacy require-
ments. Given the large interaction effect between forms of systemic risk, capital
adequacy requirements may need to be adjusted substantially. Especially, since
the interaction effect becomes more prominent in times of crises, capital require-
ments based on an assessment in tranquil times may be misleading. This questions
the role of capital adequacy requirements as a countercyclial tool.
5.1.1 Model Features and Results
We consider an economy that extends over three time periods and has two re-
gions. In each region there exists one bank and a large number of ex-ante identical
households endowed with one unit of an all-purpose consumption and investment
good. While both households and banks have access to a risk-free storage tech-
nology that matures after one period, only banks may access a risky asset. This
asset matures after two periods and pays a risky return in period two superior
in expectation to the risk-free return, but only an inferior return if prematurely
liquidated in period one. We allow the regions’ asset returns to be (positively)
128
correlated, thereby introducing common shocks.
Households differ in their liquidity preferences. They either value consumption
in period one only (early consumers), or value consumption in period two only
(late consumers). Households privately learn their type at the beginning of period
one. By assuming regional differences in the fraction of early consumers, from
which idiosyncratic household liquidity preferences are drawn, regional liquidity
demand shocks are introduced. This gives rise to interbank loans as an insurance
mechanism and therefore potential interbank contagion.
The timing of the model is summarized in figure (5.10). Banks offer deposit con-
tracts to households that specify withdrawals in periods one and two. Motivated
by free entry, banks make zero profits on contract offered. Provided the expected
return from the risky asset is sufficiently high relative to the consumers risk pref-
erence (and the model’s parameters), households will deposit in full. Banks then
make an investment decision about the risky asset and agree on an amount of
interbank loans, which is to be transferred after the observation of the regional
liquidity shock in period one.
How do households determine their optimal point of withdrawal? Early con-
sumers simply always withdraw in period one, while late consumers might have
an incentive to misrepresent their type and withdraw prematurely. Before mak-
ing their strategical withdrawal decision, households receive a signal about the
risky asset return. Each bank observes its liquidity demand and pays out de-
mand deposits in period one if sufficient liquidity is available. If not, it declares
bankruptcy, prematurely liquidates its assets (risky asset holdings and potentially
interbank claims), and pays an equal share to all depositors.
We consider a sequential timing of the withdrawal decisions. Households in the
region with a high fraction of early consumers receive their signal first. After
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they have made their withdrawal decision, households in the other region receive
their signal and decide about withdrawal. Although the sequentiality of with-
drawal decisions enhances the model’s tractability, its attractiveness is to allow
the study of informational spillovers. In particular, signals about the first region’s
risky asset return help households in the second region predict their own risky
asset return.
Our focus is on systemic crises, defined as the joint default of both banks. We
therefore use the ex-ante probability of joint bank default as our measure of
systemic risk, which enables us to compare different scenarios in terms of their
”systemic crisis content”. The primary goal of this paper is to understand the
contributions from each form of systemic risk as well as from the interaction be-
tween them (interaction effect). Hence, our exposition consists of four cases: (i)
A baseline case without interbank lending, correlated portfolios or informational
spillovers. In this case, no systemic risk is present. (ii) The case of pure in-
terbank contagion. Banks insure themselves against regional liquidity shocks by
exchanging interbank deposits. However, as banks are unaware of a counterparty
externality, i.e. they do not take a possible default of their counterparty into
consideration, there is overinsurance and contagion through the interbank chan-
nel. (iii) The case of informational spillovers and common shocks. The portfolio
of banks are correlated, even though banks are not aware of it. This gives rise
to a correlation externality where households in one region extract information
about their own banks’ returns by receiving a signal about the returns of the
bank in the other region. (iv) The principal case of simultanous presence of all
three forms of systemic risk: interbank contagion, common shocks, and informa-
tional spillovers. Such a situation occurs whenever bank defaults occur during
times of high uncertainty as i.e. during the peak of the last financial crisis. It is
precisely these situations where systemic risks have the most devastating impact
on financial stability.
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Technically, we solve for symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibria in threshold strate-
gies. The baseline case features no interbank linkages. Therefore, the individual
bank default probabilities are identical. Moving on to pure interbank contagion
leaves the joint probability density and the conditional expectation unchanged,
while the signal thresholds are affected by the change in payoffs. As there are
more resources to keep by defaulting in period one, bank runs in the high liquid-
ity demand region are more likely compared to the baseline case. Likewise, bank
runs are less likely in the low liquidity demand region. However, the interbank
linkages in the form of interbank loans drive a wedge between default probabil-
ities in the low liquidity demand region in the two scenarios. Default is more
likely if the bank in the high-liquidity bank has defaulted already, illustrating the
well-known effect of interbank contagion. This is sometimes referred to as the
knife-edge property of interbank contagion. Regarding systemic risk, the effect
on the probability of a systemic crisis is ambiguous in general. Under a mild
sufficient condition, however, a systemic crisis becomes more likely.
Turning to the case of informational contagion and common shocks, we obtain
strong results. First, the chance of default is much reduced when the first bank
did not default. Second, default in the low liquidity demand region has a higher
probability if the first bank defaulted. While the severity of these results par-
tially hinges on the strong common shock component, it nonetheless illustrates
the power of information contagion. In addtion, information contagion also pos-
sesses a knife-edge property similar to interbank contagion, with a stabilizing
effect after non-default and a destabilizing one after default.
Finally, we consider the presence of all forms of systemic risk. We define the
systemic interaction effect as the contribution to systemic risk stemming from
the unified model less the sums of the individual contributions from information
contagion and interbank contagion. (As before, we economize on notation and
use ”systemic risk” as a short-hand for the probability of a systemic crisis.) We
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establish the importance of the interaction effect that accounts for a substantial
part of the total systemic risk in the baseline calibration. Notably, the size of
the interaction effect increases with measures of crisis, such as volatility of asset
returns.
Therefore, we demonstrate the importance of the unified systemic risk framework
in the analysis of financial stability. The size of the interaction effect also sug-
gests strong implications for capital adequacy requirements and the regulation of
systemic risk. In particular, the counterparty and correlation externalities call
for regulation that will counterveil both effects. We briefly discuss the current
Basel III framework in the light of our results and argue that, while it makes some
progress on regulating counterparty externalities, it is insufficient to regulate the
correlation externalities. Finally, we suggest measures that would enhance the
current framework and give rise to a more thorough regulation of systemic risk.
5.1.2 Related Literature
Our paper is related to a growing literature on systemic risk and financial con-
tagion. The interbank contagion literature builds on the seminal contribution
of Diamond and Dybvig (1983), who study a demand deposits contract in a
world of non-verifiable idiosyncratic liquidity demand. This setup gives rise to
strategic complementarity between depositors and therefore multiplicity of equi-
libria. One equilibrium improves upon the competitive equilibrium allocation
because of improved risk-sharing, whereas the second equilibrium features an in-
efficient bank-run, thus highlighting the importance of confidence. The authors
also demonstrate that deposit insurance and a suspension of convertibility ex-
clude the bank-run equilibrium. Morris and Shin (1998) revisit the multiplicity
of equilibria in setups like Diamond and Dybvig (1983). They show that mul-
tiple equilibria rest on the assumption of perfect common knowledge about the
economy’s fundamentals, such as the second period’s asset return in the Diamond-
Dybvig model. Unique equilibria, by contrast, result from a small adjustment to
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the information structure. The authors demonstrate that any sufficiently small
idiosyncratic uncertainty, which the agent will then primarily use, eliminates
multiplicity of equilibria. They further demonstrate the desirability of unique
equilibria since they put comparative statics and policy analysis on a stronger
footing. Reexamining coordination games with imperfect and asymmetric infor-
mation, Angeletos and Werning (2006) demonstrate that the uniqueness result
stems from making the private or idiosyncratic signal arbitrarily precise relative
to the public signal. While this is possible in the setup of exogenous information
studied by Morris and Shin (1998), the authors introduce an asset market prioir
to the coordination game. The asset price will then aggregate private information
into a endogenous public signal. This ensures that greater precision of the private
signal entails greater precision of the public signal as well, reestablishing multiple
equilibria.
The model of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) is extended by Allen and Gale (2000)
who study the role of interbank connections and obtain financial contagion as
an equilibrium outcome. Faced with idiosyncratic liquidity shocks, banks insure
themselves fully by holding loans on each other, thus reaching the first-best al-
location. While achieving efficiency, this arrangement is financially fragile as a
positive liquidity demand shock may travel through the entire financial system.
The authors demonstrate that the size and the interconnectedness of the banking
system matter, with complete loan structures being more robust than incomplete
ones. Hence, systemic risk is modelled via the valuation of inter-bank loans on
the asset side and contagion arises when one bank’s bankruptcy affects other
banks negatively. A similar approach is taken by Freixas et al. (2000) who ana-
lyze interbank networks and possible contagion effects. They consider a banking
system with three periods and one investment and consumption good. This good
that can be stored from one period to the next or invested into a risky asset
which matures after two periods. There are N regions with one bank each and
a continuum of risk-neutral investors that will consume in period two only. To
motivate interbank transactions, some of the depositors consume in period two at
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locations different from those where they deposited in period zero. The authors
find that interbank loans can reduce the cost of holding a liquid asset. This is
similar to Allen and Gale (2000) who argue that interbank loans serve as insur-
ance against liquidity shocks. Freixas et al. (2000) also show that the interbank
market enhances the resilience of the banking system to the insolvency of a single
bank. Our paper deviates from this literature insofar as we consider interbank
contagion only as one possible form of systemic risk.
Extending the model of Allen and Gale, Dasgupta (2004) introduces imperfect
information about the fundamentals in each region. Depositors now face a coordi-
nation problem and wish to strategically withdraw, if they believe that other de-
positors will do the same. This setup removes the typical multiplicity of equilibria
in the Diamond/Dybvig type models and follows the coordination games outlined
in Morris and Shin (1998). Dasgupta calculates the optimal level of interconnect-
edness in the banking system and shows that contagion can arise in equilibrium.
It is precisely in stable banking systems with rare defaults that the impact of such
a default is most severe. This result is confirmed by Gai and Kapadia (2009) who
use a network model of a banking system and show that with increasing connec-
tivity the risk of systemic crisis is reduced, while the crisis’ impact increases.
While our paper follows the aforementioned literature to some extend, it is clos-
est in spirit with the model of Dasgupta (2004). The main difference, however,
is that we explicitely consider correlations of regional fundamentals and thus the
possibility of informational spillovers and common shocks as another form of sys-
temic risk.
The distinction of different equally important forms of systemic risk has emerged
in recent years. Bandt et al. (2009) distinguish between a broad and a nar-
row sense of systemic risk. While interbank contagion, as described i.e. by
Allen and Gale (2000), Freixas et al. (2000) and Dasgupta (2004), poses a sys-
temic risk in the narrow sense, the broad sense of systemic risk is characterized by
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a common shock to multiple banks and informational spillovers. Such a common
shock can be caused by a fire-sale, where all banks that have invested into a given
asset are affected simultaneously. In Acharya (2009), systemic risk is modelled
as the endogenously chosen correlation of returns on assets held by banks. Be-
cause of limited liability and the negative externality of one bank’s failure on the
health of other banks, all banks undertake correlated investments, thereby in-
creasing economy-wide aggregate risk (a so-called a ”systemic risk-shifting incen-
tive”). The author demonstrates the inefficiency of standard regulation policies,
such as bank closure policy and capital adequacy requirements, as these policies
are based on a banks own risk only. Even worse, such policies may accentuate
systemic risk. Optimal regulation, by contrast, is shown to take into account a
bank’s joint (correlated) risk with other banks as well as its individual (bank-
specific) risk. Acharya (2009) argues that common shocks are not subordinate
to contagion effects. This result is confirmed by Georg and Poschmann (2010)
who develop a dynamic multi-agent simulation to compare systemic risk that
arises through contagion effects with the systemic risk that is posed by common
shocks. Cifuentes et al. (2005) present a model of systemic risk where financial
institutions are connected via portfolio holdings. Adrian and Shin (2010) address
the issue of financial contagion through fire-sales and mark-to-market accounting.
They argue that this can amplify the potential impact of a shock and therefore
pose a systemic risk. Wagner (2010) states that one key reason behind the sever-
ity of the financial crisis of 2007/2008 was that many financial institutions had
invested in the same assets (e.g. subprime mortgages), therefore exposing them
to a common shock. Our model combines the results from these distinct strands
of literature into a unified model of systemic risk that takes interbank contagion,
common shocks and informational spillovers into account. We are thus able to
calculate the interaction effect that is associated with the simultaneous occurance
of different forms of systemic risk. One situation where our model is particularly
relevant is the insolvency of the US investment bank Lehman Brothers in Septem-
ber 2008. The insolvency itself was modest in terms of contagion effects, the only
reported insolvency due to the Lehman default was Reserve Primary Fund break-
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ing the buck. This however was considered to be a signal that triggered a run
of institutional investors on money market funds that were originally unaffected
by the Lehman insolvency. Thus, it is precisely a situation where different forms
of systemic risk act simultaenously and that cannot be explained in full by the
existing literature.
5.2 The Model
This section outlines the model structure and derives the bank’s default proba-
bilities in the baseline case of no interbank linkages (no interbank lending and no
informational spillovers).
5.2.1 The Model Setup
The economy consists of two regions k ∈ {A,B} and extends over three periods
t = 0, 1, 2. There exists an all-purpose consumption and investment good. In
each region, there is one bank and a large number of ex-ante identical house-
holds, i ∈ [0, 1]. Households are endowed with one unit in t = 0 only. There
are two types of households, early and late consumers, denoted by θ ∈ {1, 2},
respectively. Early consumers value consumption in t = 1 only, while late con-
sumers value consumption in t = 2 only. Early consumers will always consume
in t = 1, while late consumers may have an incentive to misrepresent their type
by withdrawing prematurely as the household’s type is observed privately. The
region-wide probability of being an early consumer is identical across consumers:
λk = Pr{θi,k = 1} ∀i. Therefore, by the law of large numbers, the fraction of
households in region k that wishes to consume early is given by λk.
There are perfectly negatively correlated regional liquidity shocks that motivate
interbank insurance. In particular, excess regional liquidity in region A is associ-
ated with regional liquidity shortage of identical size in region B and vice versa,
with equal probability for simplicity. Since we do not consider situations in which
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(i) bank runs that are merely driven by aggregate liquidity shortage or (ii) the
possibility of bank runs is excluded due to excess aggregate liquidity, we focus on
perfectly negatively correlated regional shocks of equal size. In short:
Probability Region
A B
p λA = λ+ η ≡ λH λB = λ− η
1− p λA = λ− η ≡ λL λB = λ+ η
Table 5.1: Liquidity shocks in different regions.
There are two assets. First, a risk-free short asset matures after one period and
yields a return of one, interpreted as a storage technology. Second, a risky long
asset matures after two periods. It yields a uniformly distributed gross return
R ∼ U [µ − σ, µ + σ] if held to maturity, where µ > 1 is the expected return
and σ > 0 a volatility measure. Premature liquidation after one period yields an
inferior return β ∈ [0, 1) only. Note that R denotes a random variable as opposed
to its realization R.1 The payoffs are summarized as follows:
Asset t = 0 t = 1 t = 2
Short (0 → 1) −1 1 0
Short (1 → 2) 0 −1 1
Long (0 → 2) −1 β ∈ [0, 1) R ∼ U [µ+ σ, µ− σ]
Table 5.2: Summary of payoffs.
Banks have a comparative advantage in managing funds because of greater access
to assets. That is, households have only access to the short asset, such as sav-
ing in a piggy-bank, whereas banks may invest in either the short or the long asset.
1Note that we use Fraktur for random variables, their corresponding capital latin letters for
their realizations, Latin for variables, and Greek for parameters throughout.
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5.2.2 The Model Timeline
Period Zero: The complete timeline of the model is depicted in Figure (5.10)
and the payoff structure in Figure (5.11). First, all households in both regions
receive their endowment. Next, regional banks offer a deposit contract to the
households in their region that specifies withdrawals c1, c2 in t = 1, 2.
2 More pre-
cisely, banks pay out deposits c1 in t = 1 if there is sufficient liquidity available.
If not, it declares insolvency. A bankrupt bank neither pays interbank claims
nor deposits in t = 2. Note that insolvent banks may receive repayment from
interbank loans. In the case of insufficient liquidity, the long asset and interbank
claims are liquidated. All depositors receive an equal share of total resources.
We therefore abstract from a sunspot induced bank run implied by a first-come
first-serve allotment rule.
If the bank survives, it settles its liabilities in the interbank market and pays out
its remaining resources to depositors in t = 2. Following Dasgupta (2004), c1 ≡ 1
for simplicity.3 Note that c2 is contingent on the realization of the investment
return Rk, the regional liquidity shock λk, and both bank’s default probabilities,
defined as ak. We assume that banks make zero profits motivated by free entry.
4
Third, the households decide whether to deposit or to store their endowment,
giving rise to a participation constraint:
E[U ] = E [λu(c1) + (1− λ)u(c2)] ≥ u(1) , (5.1)
where E is the expectation operator that takes into account regional liquidity
2The non-observability of the idiosyncratic liquidity shock prevents the deposit contract
between the bank and the household to be contingent on the household’s liquidity shock.
3This corresponds to the first-best allocation for log-utility.
4This implies that the number of banks operating in a region is indeterminate. Without
loss of generality it is taken to be one for expositional clarity. To inactivity of a given bank in
another region is motivated as an equilibrium outcome in a game in which banks face a positive
but arbitrary small fixed cost of operating (i.e. the cost of setting up a branch in the other
region, obtaining regional knowledge) in the other region.
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shocks, investment risk, and the joint probability distribution of banks’ default.
The participation constraint specifies a joint constraint on the model parameters
that can be interpreted as a constraint on the lower bound of the average return
µ. The maintained assumption is that the households’ participation constraints
are satisfied. Each household will therefore deposit in full.
Finally, each risk-neutral bank maximizes its expected valuation by (i) choos-
ing the investments in the short and long asset (y, 1 − y), where defaults from
insufficient liquidity are taken into account; and (ii) agreeing upon the amount
of interbank insurance b at price φ > 1. The interbank interest rate φ can be
thought of being set by a central bank and banks take it as given.5 The interbank
loan b will be transferred from the liquidity surplus region to the liquidity short-
age region at the beginning of t = 1 and repaid at the beginning of t = 2. Banks
are identical in t = 0 and will therefore choose the same level of investment and
interbank insurance y, b.
Period One: First, the short asset matures and pays off. Next, the regional
liquidity shocks λk are drawn and publicly observed. As a consequence, the ex-
change of interbank deposits is initiated. Households in both regions draw their
individual liquidity demands and observe them privately.6
Third, households sequentially receive a signal of the the long asset’s return.
There are two cases: (a) households in the low liquidity demand region (L) re-
ceive the signal first and (b) households in the high liquidity demand region (H)
receive the signal first. In case (a), households in region H observe whether or
not the other region’s bank defaults. However, payoffs in region H are unaffected
5We abstract from variation of the interbank rate around the main refinancing rate for
simplicity.
6In practice, the timing of individual and regional liquidity shocks is likely to be reversed:
many individual shocks add up to a regional shock. Exclusively to ease exposition, we derive
the individual shocks after the realization of regional shocks.
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by this (see Figure 5.11). In case (b), the default in region H implies a repay-
ment failure of its interbank liabilities, resulting in contagious effects in region
L.7 Without loss of generality, we focus on case (b). Then, the high liquid-
ity demand region’s households strategically decide whether or not to withdraw.
Subsequently, all households in the low liquidity region receive a signal and decide
on whether to withdraw.
Signals have the following form:
Sk = Rk + Ek (5.2)
E[Ek] = 0 , E[EA EB] = 0 , E[Ek Rk′ ] = 0 ∀(k, k′) (5.3)
where Ek ∼ U [−χ, χ] is a uniformly distributed noise with realization E that is
identically and independently distributed across regions and uncorrelated with
any region’s fundamental, Rk. For tractability we assume that signals are public:
households in region L not only observe whether there was a bank run in region
H, but also the underlying signal SH . To ensure symmetric equilibrium actions,
all households in region k ∈ {A,B} receive the same signal Sk from the random
variable S.
Finally, banks use their liquidity to pay out the depositors. If withdrawals exceed
the bank’s liquidity, the bank declares bankruptcy, liquidates its long assets and
interbank claims to pay an equal share to all depositors. There will be no activity
of bankrupt banks in t = 2.
Period Two: First, the long asset matures and pays the return as realized in
t = 1. Then, a surviving bank settles its interbank position, including repayment
to an insolvent counterpart. Finally, all surviving banks pay out deposits.
7In general, a fraction ξ ∈ [0, 1) is repaid. Effectively, we focus on ξ = 0 to highlight the
impact of the contagion channel. While ξ ∈ (0, 1) yields qualitatively identical results, a low
value of ξ appears to be corroborated by the observation that debtors receive a tiny share of
the insolvency assets.
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5.2.3 Strict Pro-Rata and Uniqueness of Equilibria
The seminal contribution of Diamond and Dybvig (1983)considers a demand de-
posits contract in a world of non-verifiable idiosyncratic liquidity demand. This
setup gives rise to strategic complementarity between depositors implying multi-
plicity of equilibria. One equilibrium improves upon the competitive equilibrium
allocation because of improved risk-sharing, whereas the second equilibrium fea-
tures an inefficient bank-run. Multiplicity arises from weak pro-rata, that is the
resources of a bank run are distributed among those depositors who run only.
Hence, any depositor’s incentive to run increases with the number of depositors
running. Maintaining weak pro-rata, Morris and Shin (2000) demonstrate the
uniqueness of equilibrium can be restored when some sufficiently precise idiosyn-
cratic information about the economy’s fundamentals, such as the second period’s
asset return, is introduced (global games). See also Angeletos and Werning (2006)
for a recent critique.
By contrast we consider a strict pro-rata allotment. That is, all depositors, not
only those who ran the bank, receive an equal share upon default of a bank.
This appears to be an appropriate description of the legal arrangement in many
countries, including the US8 and Germany.9 Strict pro-rata excludes strategic
complementarities between late consumers. Inspecting the payoff structure in
figure (5.11), we observe that late consumers now have a weakly dominant strat-
egy in the Bayesian Nash threshold equilibrium - irrespective of the other late
consumers. Then, the uniquesness of equilibria is guaranteed even with region-
specific non-idiosyncratic signals. Hence, we do not need to resort to global games
techniques.
8See US Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Act and article 11(d)(11) in particular.
Also: http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode11/usc_sup_01_11.html.
9See for the legal arrangement: http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/inso/.
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5.3 The Baseline Case
The baseline case abstracts from interbank links. There are no liquidity demand
shocks, η = 0, and the long asset’s returns are uncorrelated across regions, ρ = 0.
This case is useful to illustrate the techniques used to solve for the equilibrium
and to determine default probabilities as well as probabilities of systemic crisis.
Equilibrium is solved by backward induction. First, households in the high liquid-
ity demand region H receive their signal SH , update their expectations E[RH |SH ]
about the long asset’s return, and decide strategically whether or not to withdraw
at the end of t = 1. All early consumers will withdraw and consume, whereas
late consumers will withdraw and store for t = 2 if and only if the expected asset
return conditional on the signal falls short of a threshold level R̂H , implying a
signal threshold ŜH . These thresholds are determined by the (late) households’
indifference between withdrawing in t = 1 and waiting for repayment in t = 2.
If the signal falls short of the threshold SH < ŜH , all households in region H
withdraw and the bank defaults. Then, households in L receive their signal SL,
update their expectations E[R|SL] and decide whether or not to withdraw at the
end of t = 1. The threshold level is denoted by R̂L, implying a threshold ŜL for
the signal.
5.3.1 Probability Distribution of the Signal
We start by deriving the signal’s distribution. Let Emin = −χ, Emax = +χ,
Rmin = µ− σ, and Rmax = µ+ σ be the lower and upper bounds of the noise and
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Figure 5.1: The signal’s probability density (σ > χ).
σ > χ, we partition the support of S:
Smin ≡ Rmin + Emin = µ− σ − χ (5.4)
S ≡ Rmin + Emax = µ− σ + χ (5.5)
S ≡ Rmax + Emin = µ+ σ − χ (5.6)
Smax ≡ Rmax + Emax = µ+ σ + χ (5.7)








for S ∈ [Smin, S]
1
2σ
for S ∈ [S, S]
Smax−S
4χσ
for S ∈ [S, Smax]
(5.8)
which is depicted in Figure (5.1).
5.3.2 Conditional Expectation
The update of the expectations about asset return is identical across regions
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Figure 5.2: Conditional expectation E[R|S] as a function of S.







(S + S) for S ∈ [Smin, S]
S for S ∈ [S, S]
1
2
(S + S) for S ∈ [S, Smax]
(5.9)
The joint probability density g(SH , SL) is given as g(SH , SL) = f(SH) f(SL) and
partitioned as shown in Figure (5.3). Statistical independence of long asset re-
turns implies a symmetry in terms of withdrawal decisions, denoted as d ∈ {0, 1},
and therefore identical thresholds in regions H and L, R̂H = R̂L ≡ R̂. Thus, de-
fault d = 1 takes place if and only if S ≤ Ŝ. Withdrawing yields y + β(1− y) for
the late consumer, whereas not withdrawing yields 1
1−λ
[E[R|S](1− y) + (y − λ)].
Hence, the threshold of the long asset’s conditional expectation is given by:
R̂ = λ+ β(1− λ) (5.10)
We assume that households will always default if they receive the lowest possible













Figure 5.3: The support of the signals’ joint density g(SH , SL) in the absence of any
form of contagion.
implying a parameter constraint Rmin ≤ R̂ ≤ Rmax. In order to capture the low
relative frequency of bank defaults in reality, we focus on default for low signal
levels, that is S ∈ [Smin, S]. The signal’s threshold is:
Ŝ = 2R̂− S (5.11)
5.3.3 Default Probabilities and Systemic Crises
This signal leads to the probability of a bank default in any region:










































We define a systemic crisis as the default of both banks.10 The probability of a
systemic crisis is then the ex-ante probability of joint default, denoted as aD. In
the baseline case, indexed as scenario (1), the probability of a systemic crisis is:
a
(1)
D ≡ Pr{dH = 1, dL = 1} = a(1) a(1) . (5.18)
Also, the joint probability of default in region L and survival in region H, useful




N ≡ Pr{dH = 0, dL = 1} = (1− a(1)) a(1) . (5.19)
5.4 Interbank Contagion
We now consider interbank linkages in the form of interbank loans, caused by
liquidity fluctuations η > 0. We proceed with backward induction as before.
First, households in the high liquidity demand region H receive their signal SH ,
update their expectations E[RH |SH ] about the long asset’s return, and decide
strategically whether or not to withdraw at the end of t = 1. All early consumers
will withdraw and consume, whereas late consumers will withdraw and store for
t = 2 if and only if the expected asset return conditional on the signal falls short
of a threshold level R̂H , determined by the indifference between withdrawing in
t = 1 and waiting for repayment in t = 2. Note that the threshold differs from the
baseline case because of the presence of interbank loans. Withdrawal of house-
holds and bank default are synonymous and will take place if and only if SH < ŜH .
Second, households in region L observe whether or not the bank in H has de-
faulted and receive their signal SL. Signal thresholds are determined as before,
but now depend on whether default in region H occurred (state N for no default
and D for default). Hence, thresholds are denoted as ŜL,N , ŜL,D for signals and
10Note that a systemic crisis is not necessarily caused by systemic risk, as a sufficiently bad
signal in both regions will also lead to the default of both banks. This can be interpreted as a
macroeconomic shock as the cause of a systemic crisis.
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R̂L,N , R̂L,D for the conditional expectation about the long asset’s return. As be-
fore, households in region L then strategically decide whether or not to withdraw.
Consider households in region H who move first. Note that their payoffs are
independent of the withdrawal decision of households in region L. They receive
y+β(1−y)+b if they withdraw and 1
1−λH
[E[RH |SH ](1− y) + (y − λH + b)− φb]
otherwise. The cutoff values of the expected asset return is:
R̂H = λH + β(1− λH) +
φ− λH
1− y b (5.20)
Now consider a household in region L who has observed a default of region H’s
bank. Then, not withdrawing yields 1
1−λL
[E[RL|SL](1− y) + (y − b− λL)], while
withdrawing yields y + β(1− y)− b. This leads to a threshold:
R̂L,D = λL + β(1− λL) +
λL
1− y b (5.21)
Likewise, in the case of no default in H, withdrawing yields y + β(1 − y) − b +
βφb, whereas not withdrawing yields 1
1−λL
[E[RL|SL](1− y) + (y − λL − b) + φb].
Hence, the threshold of the long asset’s conditional expectation is given by:
R̂L,N = λL + β(1− λL) +
λL − φ [1− β(1− λL)]
1− y b < R̂L,D (5.22)
The larger cutoff value in region L after a default in region H is intuitive: the
default reduces the available assets in region L in period t = 2 and induces late
consumers to withdraw prematurely for a larger range of expected asset returns.
This is the classical contagion case.
Any threshold of the conditional expectation translates uniquely into a threshold
of the signal S:
Ŝj = 2R̂j − S for j ∈ {H,LD,LN} (5.23)
There are parameter constraints as in the baseline case: R̂L,N ≥ Rmin and









dH = 1 dH = 0
ŜL,D
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dL,N = 0dL,D = 0
dL,N = 1dL,D = 1
Figure 5.4: The support of the joint density g(SH , SL) if there is interbank contagion,
but no informational contagion.










, j ∈ {H, (L,D), (L,N)} (5.24)
Comparing this to the baseline case without interbank loans, it can be seen that
the area where a joint default occurs increases, since ŜH > Ŝ while ŜL,D can be
larger or smaller than Ŝ and ŜH > ŜL,D). At the same time, the probability of a
default of the bank in L decreases if there is no default in H.
The probability of a systemic crisis reads as:
a
(2)





While the impact on the probability of a systemic crisis is in general ambiguous,
imposing equilibrium conditions, a sufficient condition for the increase in systemic
risk is:
λLb
1− y ≥ (1− β)η (5.26)
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which is satisfied, unless liquidation values are tiny and liquidity shocks are huge.








L,N ≪ a(1) (1− a(1)) = a
(1)
N (5.27)
In the case of interbank loans the probability of default upon survival in region H
falls due to lower survival probability in region H (1− a(2)H < 1− a
(1)
H ) and lower




L ). This is
the mutual insurance character of interbank loans, a positive effect of interbank
linkages.
5.5 Informational Contagion
Informational contagion poses another form of systemic risk. If asset fundamen-
tals are correlated, the observation of region H’s signal helps households in region
L to infer their own asset fundamentals. In particular, region H’s signal may not
only trigger a bank run in this region but may suffice to induce a run in region L
as well, even in the absence of interbank markets. Let ρ ≡ corr(RH ,RL) ∈ [0, 1]
denote the correlation of long assets, where ρ = 0 excludes informational conta-
gion altogether. For tractability we focus on the case ρ = 1, a perfect common
shock, that implies RL = RH .
11
We start by calculating the two-dimensional density g(SH , SL). The pdf, depicted
in Appendices (5.14), is fully symmetric but differs from the baseline and inter-
bank contagion case’s pdf. We maintain our focus on low signal levels, that is
Sk ∈ [Smin, S] to match the emprirical relative frequency of bank defaults. The
support in this area is depicted in figure (5.5). The joint density in this area is










Figure 5.5: Support of g(SH , SL) with the partition into two regions A,B.
given as (see Appendix (5.8.2) for a proof):






(SH − Smin) in Region A
1
8χ2σ
(SL − Smin) in Region B
(5.28)
Households in region L use both signals to update their expectation about the
long asset’s return. The conditional expectation E[R|SH , SL] is then given as
(see Appendix (5.8.2) for a proof):




SH + χ in Region A
SL + χ in Region B
(5.29)
As the payoffs for early households are unchanged from the baseline case, the
thresholds for the conditional expectations are unchanged, R̂H = R̂. The signal’s
threshold is ŜH = Ŝ. Hence, dH = 1 if and only if SH ≤ Ŝ. Households in
region L take both signals into account and thus use the conditional expectation
E[R|SH , SL], which leads to a signal threshold S̃ = R̂−χ. Therefore, households
in region L always withdraw given that the signal in region H is smaller than

















Figure 5.6: Support of the joint density g(SH , SL) in the case of pure informational
contagion.
default pattern in the presence of informational contagion.
To determine default probabilities, it is useful to find the individual probabilities











































































Comparing these default probabilities to the ones of the baseline case, we find for





N ⇐ µ > λ+ β(1− λ) (5.39)
which is always satisfied. Finally, we compare the setup of information contagion










which is a mild condition and likely to be satisfied. This shows that informational
contagion acts stabilizing if no default occurs, destabilizing otherwise, and is thus
pro-cyclical.
5.6 Systemic Interaction Risk
5.6.1 Default Probabilities
Banks are now linked via interbank lending and the correlation of asset returns.
While the joint density of signals g(SH , SL) and the conditional expectation
E[R|SH , SL] are unchanged from the pure information contagion case, the payoff
structure and hence the signal thresholds are as in the pure interbank contagion
case.
The households’ withdrawal decisions are depicted in (5.7). Households in region
H default if and only if SH ≤ ŜH as before. Given no default in region H, house-
holds in region L default if and only if SL ≤ S̃L,N . Given default in region H,











dH = 1 dH = 0
dL = 0
dL = 1
dL = 1 dL = 0
dL = 1
Figure 5.7: Partitioning of the joint density g(SH , SL) in the presence of both forms
of contagion. Gains and losses are relative to the case of pure informational contagion.
if SH ≤ S̃L,D in area A.
The relevant default probabilities are again found by appropriately dividing the































The probability of default in region L and survival in region H is smaller than in
the case of pure interbank contagion. This illustrates the stabilizing or positive
effect of informational contagion, as S̃ ≤ Ŝ. Survival in region H is good news
for households in region L as their expected asset return is higher than without
the news, making default in region L less likely.
5.6.2 The Interaction Effect
Having studied the models with one form of systemic risk as well as the complete
model, we are now ready to proceed to the principal contribution of this chapter.
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First, let ∆SR denote the interaction effect of the different forms of systemic risk.
It is defined as the contribution to the probability of a systemic crisis in excess of
the sum of the individual contributions from information contagion and interbank
contagion:
∆SR ≡ (ā(4)D − ā
(1)
D )︸ ︷︷ ︸
total effect
− (ā(3)D − ā
(1)
D )︸ ︷︷ ︸
inform. contagion
− (ā(2)D − ā
(1)











D ) , (5.44)
where the second line decomposes the systemic interaction into the difference of
two components. The first one is the increase in the probability of a systemic
crisis when interbank lending is added to a model of informational contagion.
The second component refers to the increase in the probability of a systemic
crisis arising from the pure interbanking contagion case. As each component
used the same density, it makes the change more comparable.
5.6.3 Numerical Results
Figure (5.8) shows the probability of a systemic crisis in each of the four cases. As
a baseline calibration we chose the following set of parameters: µ = 1.1, χ = 1/3,
γ = 0.5, pH = 0.5, β = 0.15, and φ = 1.1. Systemic risk is plotted against the
volatility of the risky asset, σ ∈ [0.5, 0.9], and a measure of the volatility of liquid-
ity demand, η ∈ [0.0, 0.08]. Larger volatility of the long asset return is interpreted
as measure of crisis. Under sufficient conditions, larger regional liquidity shocks
map into larger interconnectedness on the interbank market.
As there is no interbank lending in the baseline case and in the case of informa-
tional spillover, the probability of a systemic crisis is independent of η but rises
with our measure of the financial crisis. While the probability of systemic crisis
rises after the introduction of each form of systemic risk, the effect is larger for
the case of informational contagion and common shocks. This is driven by the
large common shock and we expect a different effect once a generalized common
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Figure 5.8: Systemic risk in each of the four cases: ā
(1)





D (bottom left), ā
(4)
D (bottom right) for σ ∈ [0.5, 0.9] and η ∈ [0.0, 0.08].
shock with positive but less than full correlation ρ < 1 is considered. Our calcu-
lation, however, shows that there is non-negligible systemic risk associated with
common exposures, as they yield large informational spillovers. Also note that
the probability of systemic crisis is especially high when both the risky asset’s
volatility is high (financial crisis) and there are large regional liquidity shocks
(high extent of interconnectedness).
Figure (5.9) depicts the absolute systemic interaction risk ∆SR . It can be seen,
that the systemic interaction risk, the interaction effect of several forms of sys-
temic risk, is much larger in times of financial crises (high asset return volatility)
and in times of small bank interconnectedness. In tranquil times (low long-asset
return volatility), the systemic interaction risk is relatively small and can even be
negative for financially stable economies with a high degree of interconnectedness.
This highlights the pro-cyclical behaviour of the systemic interaction risk term.
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Figure 5.9: Absolute systemic interaction risk ∆SR for σ ∈ [0.5, 0.9] and η ∈ [0.0, 0.08].
5.7 Conclusion
The financial crisis has highlighted the necessity for a better understanding of the
different forms of systemic risk. The existing literature focusses largely on conta-
gion effects via interbank connections and only recently analyses common shocks
and informational spillovers. However,the different forms of systemic risk have
been studied in isolation only and a unified framework of systemic risk was still
missing. This papers closes this gap by developing a model of a banking system
that allows for the simultaneous analysis of interbank contagion, common shocks,
and informational spillovers. This theoretical framework allows us to study the
contribution of the various forms of systemic risk to financial (in-)stability. We
furthermore show that the size of the interaction effect of the different forms of
systemic risk, the systemic interaction risk, depends on the volatility of the long
asset and the regional liquidity shock. While low asset return volatility implies
small systemic interaction risk, high asset return volatility, as in times of financial
crises, leads to high systemic interaction risk.
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This highlights the importance of a unified systemic risk framework in the analy-
sis of regulation proposals that aim at strengthening financial stability. A number
of policy conclusions can be drawn from our analysis. First, prudential regulation
has to take all forms of systemic risk into account in order to be effective. The
different forms of systemic risk act pro-cyclical as the interaction term reduces
the overall systemic risk in normal times (emphasizing the insurance character
of interbank networks), while it significantly contributes to overall systemic risk
in times of distress. Regulation proposals that take only individual forms of sys-
temic risk into account will necessarily underestimate the overall systemic risk
and hence be less effective. Second, given the large overall effect if all forms of
systemic risk are considered (a
(4)
D in the notation above), the overall capital ade-
quacy requirements may need to be adjusted substantially. While the new Basel
III capital requirements strengthen the quality and quantity of regulatory capi-
tal, the risk weights used to calculate the amount of required capital are almost
unchanged. This incentivizes banks to hold financial assets and effectively in-
creases the interconnectedness in the financial system. Our results show that it is
precisely this situation where the systemic interaction effect is most severe. And
third, systemic risks emerging from common shocks and informational spillovers
have to be adequately regulated. There are currently no incentives for banks to
diversify their portfolio, which can lead to high correlations amonst banks’ port-
folios. Common shocks, however are not subordinate to contagion effects and
thus have to be taken into account. One way of incentivizing banks to diversify
their portfolios would be to employ dynamic asset value correlations in Basel III.
A macroprudential supervisory authority could calculate the asset value corre-
lations for certain classes of assets and disseminate them to banks who would
have to hold more regulatory capital for higher correlated assets. This proposal
is outlined in chapter (6) in more detail.
There are several promising avenues for future research. First, a natural next step
would be the analysis of design of optimal regulatory policy. In particular, Basel
III suggests the use of capital requirements, leverage ratio, and liquidity ratios. It
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would be interesting to study the role of these tools in the context of the unified
model of systemic risk. Second, we are interested in further exploring the role
of shadow banks within the proposed banking model. This should include the
non-trivial trade-off of enhanced liquidity provision and risk-sharing in tranquil






Banks offer deposit contracts
Households deposit
or store endowment
Banks select portfolio (y, 1− y)
b is agreed upon
t = 1
Short asset matures Realization of regional
liquidity shocks
b is transferred
Households draw liquidity demands
and observe them privately
Households in H receive signal
about long asset’s return.
Households in H withdraw
Households in L receive signal
Households in L withdraw
Banks observe deposit demand.
If liquid, banks pay out depositors.
If illiquid, banks liquidate long asset
and interbank claims.
Pay out equal share to all depositors.
t = 2
Long asset matures
Bank in L receive repayment
unless bank in H insolvent
Banks pay deposits
Figure 5.10: Timeline of the model
159
t = 1 t = 2
1
1−λH
[RH(1− y) + (y − λH)− (φ− 1)b]
1
1−λH
[RH(1− y) + (y − λH)− (φ− 1)b]
y + β(1− y) + b
y + β(1− y) + b
y + β(1− y)− b
y + β(1− y)− b+ βφb
1
1−λH
[RL(1− y) + (y − λL − b)]
1
1−λH








































Figure 5.13: Density of the signal S in the limiting case σ → χ(1− γ)/γ.










Figure 5.14: Support of g(SH , SL) with partitioning into three regions.
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5.8.2 Proofs
Distribution of the signal S




fX(z − y)fY (y)dy (5.45)
To rewrite our signal extraction problem accordingly, let R′ ≡ γR and E′ ≡
(1− γ)E where γ and (1− γ) are weights.12 Then,
R
′ ∼ U [γ(µ− σ), γ(µ+ σ)] (5.46)
E
′ ∼ U [−(1− γ)χ, (1− γ)χ] (5.47)
S = R′ + E′ (5.48)

















fR′(S − E ′)dE ′
It is useful to distinguish three cases throughout. The idea is that in the case II,
the intermediate case, the noise has full support. In other words, the signal is
not sufficiently bad or good to constraint the noise’s support.








fR′(S − E ′)dE ′ (5.49)
where the upper bound UB is a function of S. If S = Smin then UB = E
′ =
−(1 − γ)χ, and if S = S then UB = E ′ = +(1 − γ)χ. Given the linearity
of the setup, we conjecture that UB(S) = κ0 + κ1S. From the conditions
UB(Smin = γ(µ− σ) + (1− γ)(−χ)) = −(1− γ)χ (5.50)
UB(S = γ(µ− σ) + (1− γ)(χ)) = +(1− γ)χ (5.51)
12This explicitely allows for the special case of γ = 1 and (1− γ) = 1, as the two weights are
independent.
163
we obtain κ0 = −γ(µ− σ) and κ1 = 1. Thus, the upper bound is given by






fR′(S − E ′)dE ′ (5.52)
=




4(1− γ)χγσ for S ∈ [Smin, S] (5.54)










for S ∈ [S, S] (5.56)













fR′(S − E ′)dE ′ (5.57)
where the lower bound again is a function of S. Again we conjecture that
LB = κ′0 + κ
′
1S and obtain κ
′
1 = 1, κ
′
0 = −γ(µ − σ) and hence LB =
−γ(µ− σ) + S. This gives:
fS(S) =




4(1− γ)χγσ for S ∈ [S, Smax] (5.59)
Conditional Expectation
The calculation of the conditional expectation also uses the partitioning support
of the signal S support, giving rise to three three cases.
Case I: S ∈ [Smin, S] Even if the lowest possible value for R is attained, receiving
such a bad signal implies that not all realizations E are consistent with it.
Hence, we have ELB = −χ, and EUB = (S − (µ − σ)/(1 − γ). Note that
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EUB → −χ if S → Smin and EUB → +χ if S → S. This leads to:


































for S ∈ [Smin, S] (5.63)














for S ∈ [S, S] (5.65)
Case III: S ∈ [S, Smax] Similar to case I again. ELB = S−γ(µ+σ)1−γ , EUB = χ. Then:
E[R|S] = E[R|S − (1− γ)χ
γ












for S ∈ [S, Smax] (5.67)
Joint Density g(SH , SL)
The support of g(SH , SL) is shown in Figure (5.14) and partitioned into three
regions. Region (I) is described by the length l =
√
2(Smax − S) and the width
b = 2
√
2(1 − γ)χ; Region (II) is given by the two areas SL ∈ [Smin, S], SH ∈
[S, S + (1 − γ)χ] (II-A) and SL ∈ [S, S + (1 − γ)χ], SH ∈ [Smin, S] (II-B); Re-
gion (III) is given by the two areas SL ∈ [SH , Ŝ], SH ∈ [Smin, Ŝ] (III-A) and
SL ∈ [Smin, SH ], SH ∈ [Smin, Ŝ] (III-B).
We focus on the case Sk ≤ S. If χ = (1 − γ)/γσ, then half of the probability
lies in (i) SH ≤ S, SL ≤ S; (ii) SH ∈ [S, S], SL ≤ S; (iii) SL ∈ [S, S], SH ≤ S.
We solve the two-dimensional density g(SH , SL) explicitely and find the following
geometric figures in the three regions (I)-(III): Region I - prism; Region II - pyra-
mid with triangular base; Region III - pyramid with a quadratic base. In order
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to determine the two-dimensional distribution g(SH , SL) we proceed in two steps.
First, we obtain the height h at SH = SL = S by using geometric methods. The
volume of the distribution is normalized to unity: V
!
= 1 = I +4II +2III. Then
we determine g(SH , SL) for the three regions shown in Figure (5.14).
Region I. First, we partition the support as shown in Figure (5.14). Then,





γ(µ−σ)− (1−γ)χ] = 2
√





2(1−γ)χ. From this we obtain l = 2
√
2(γσ−(1−γ)χ) ≥ 0
as σ ≥ (1−γ
γ
)χ. The width b of the prism is given as b = 2
√
2(1 − γ)χ and
the base thus is Abase =
1
2
hb = h(1 − γ)χ and the volume Vprism is given as
Vprism = Abasel = h(1− γ)χ · 4(γσ − (1− γ)χ.
Region II. The volume of a pyramid with triangular base is given as Vpyr,3 =
1
3
hAbase with Abase =
1
2
(1− γ)χ · 2(1− γ)χ = (1− γ)2χ2.
Region III. The volume of a pyramid with squared base is determined by Abase =
[2(1− γ)χ]2 = 4(1− γ)2χ2 to be Vpyr,4 = 43h(1− γ)2χ2.
From the total volume Vtotal = Vprism + 2Vpyr,4 + 4Vpyr,3
!





We are now interested in the two-dimensional density g(SH , SL) in the region
SH , SL ∈ [Smin, S], which is Region III in Figure (5.14) and has the shape of a
pyramid with squared base. The apex of the pyramid is at the top right corner
(point C) of the base and has height h. This effectively partitions the base into
two triangular regions A and B, as shown in Figure (5.6). The points D,C,E of

























































Smin + δ1(S − Smin)





and interject it with the line k0 that goes through the point G = (SH , SL),
k0 = (SH , SL, t)
t where t = g(SH , SL).







(SH − Smin) (5.71)
where κ ≡ 4(1 − γ)γ2χπ and π ≡ 2σ 1−γ
γ
χ. Analogously, we obtain for SL ∈
[Smin, S], SH ∈ [SL, S] (Region B):
g(SH , SL) =
1
κ
(SL − Smin) (5.72)
Now, we consider Region II in Figure (5.14) and repeat the above calculation.
Therefore, SL ∈ [Smin, S], SH ∈ [S, S + (1− γ)χ]. The system of three equations
has more interaction now, as δ1 depends on δ0 as well and t = g(SH , SL) thus
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S + (1− γ)χ
S − (1− γ)χ
0



























Smin + (1− γ)χ[3− δ0 − δ1]





g(SH , SL) = h
(SL − SH) + (S + Smin)
S − Smin
≤ h (5.75)
Likewise, one obtains for SL ∈ [S, S + (1− γ)χ], SH ∈ [Smin, S]:
g(SH , SL) = h




Conditional Expectation E[R|SH , SL]
The conditional expectation has the same mathematical structure as g(SH , SL) for
Sk ∈ [Smin, S], k ∈ {H,L} (Region III). We thus use the same geometric approach
as before, with the height is now denoted asm instead of h and the reference point
O being Rmin. The height m is obtained by observing that for SH = SL = S:




The four points we now use to obtain the equations of the planes describing





































CH and the line k2 :
(SH , SL, t)
t:
t = Rmin +
1
2γ
(SL − Smin) = E[R|SH , SL] ∀SH ∈ [Smin, SL] (5.78)
Analogously we obtain for SH ∈ [Smin, S], SL ∈ [SH , S]:
E[R|SH , SL] = Rmin +
1
γ
(SH − Smin) ∀SL ∈ [SH , S] (5.79)
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Chapter 6
Conclusions for the Regulation of
Systemic Risk
One of the most pressing questions in the aftermath of the financial crisis is how
to deal with systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs). The purpose of
this chapter is to evaluate the regulation proposals in the recently endorsed Basel
III framework with respect to the main findings in this thesis and the liteature on
systemic risk. A number of shortcomings in the current framework are analyzed
and three measures for future reform are proposed: counter-cyclical risk-weights,
dynamic asset value correlation multipliers, and enhanced transparency require-
ments for SIFIs.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. After a brief introduction
in section (6.1), section (6.2) gives an overview of the regulatory responses to
the financial crisis. Section (6.3) outlines some shortcomings of Basel III and
proposes a way forward with systemic risk regulation.
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6.1 Introduction
The financial crisis of 2007/2008 unveiled the shortcomings in the regulation of
systemic risk and exposed the moral hazard that is associated with systemically
important financial institutions. Governments were forced to bail-out these large,
complex and highly interconnected financial intermediaries as they feared the un-
forseeable consequences of their default. The G20 responded to the crisis with a
new framework for banking regulation, commonly referred to as Basel III.1 Basel
III increases the quality and quantity of banking capital, introduces two liquidity
ratios and one leverage ratio. However, the question if Basel III can effectively
regulate systemic risk and resolve the moral hazard that is associated with sys-
temically important financial institutions remains. To answer this question, this
chapter evaluates the Basel III framework with respect to the main findings of
this thesis and the literature on systemic risk .
6.2 The Regulatory Response to the Financial
Crisis
In response to the financial crisis, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
(2010a) has compiled a set of new global standards which is commonly referred to
as Basel III. These standards were recently endorsed by the largest industrialized
and developing countries at the G20 summit in Seoul. They will be implemented
starting with January 1, 2013 and fully established by January 1, 2019. Basel III
comprises changes in all three pillars of the former Basel II standards. The first
1Basel III comprises of a number of documents that the G20 leaders have agreed upon:
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2010b), “Basel III: A global regulatory frame-
work for more resilient banks and banking systems”, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
(2010c), “Basel III: International framework for liquidity risk measurement, standards and
monitoring”, as well as the earlier document from Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
(2010a), “Report to the G20: The Basel Committee’s response to the financial crisis”. Down-
loaded from http://www.bis.org/list/basel3/index.htm on 12/29/2010.
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pillar consists of minimum capital requirements, while the second pillar describes
the banking supervision process and the third pillar aims to enforce market dis-
cipline through transparency of bank’s risks. Although Basel II was not fully
implemented by the time the financial crisis struck, it was agreed upon by the
G20 leaders that it has to be reformed in order to cope with systemic risk as well.
6.2.1 Design and Main Features of Basel III
The cornerstone of Basel III are changes regarding the first pillar of Basel II.
The aim is to reduce the probability of bank failures by improving banks’ loss
absorption capabilities. Besides extensions in capital requirements, an additional
non-risk based leverage ratio and two liquidity ratios will be established in Basel
III. Capital is about to increase both quantitatively and qualitatively. After a
transition period, banks will be forced to hold 4.5% common equity instead of
2%. A stricter definition of common equity augments its quality and higher risk
weights for several exposures intend to cover both on- and off-balance sheet risks.
The recent financial crisis revealed how crucial the break down of the interbank
market is, as many banks faced difficulties to refinance themselves. Therefore, liq-
uidity requirements are implemented to reduce insolvency problems arising from
contagion via the interbank market. Under Basel III, banks will have to meet two
liquidity ratios. Whereas the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) follows a short-term
approach, the net stable funding ratio (NSFR) addresses longer-term problems
arising from illiquidity. Under the LCR banks will be required to hold a sufficient
amount of liquid assets with a high quality to obviate short-term disruptions.
The NSFR will include the entire balance sheet to prevent structural longer-term
problems arising from liquidity mismatches. Details concerning both ratios are
not yet specified.
The capital requirement under Basel II form a Tier 1 risk-based ratio which is de-
fined as the ratio between a bank’s core equity, i.e. its common equity and certain
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other financial instruments qualifying for equity, and its risk weighted assets. In
the run-up to the crisis, the information content of this measure has been limited.
Banks circumvented the constraint and increased both on- and off-balance sheet
leverage levels but were able to report strong Tier 1 risk-based ratios at the same
time. As high leverage levels increase a bank’s probability of default, Basel III
implements an additional non-risk based leverage ratio thus limiting incentives to
circumvent capital requirements. Like the liquidity requirements, it is not agreed
upon a concrete ratio. The Committee suggests to start the transition period
with a minimum Tier 1 leverage ratio of 3%.
Beyond these increased requirements for banks, Basel III will improve the super-
visory guidance of regulatory authorities under Pillar 2. The authorities’ capacity
to act will increase to enhance their ability to manage different kinds of risks, like
liquidity, off-balance or concentration risks. Furthermore, conducting stress tests
aims to assist the detection of systemic risks.
Pillar 3 comprises standards for market disclosure which will be raised in order to
enhance transparency. On their websites, banks will have to report more details
regarding their balance sheets like revealing the terms and conditions of all in-
struments of their regulatory capital base and explaining which deductions were
applied. These requirements have to be fulfilled by the end of 2011.
Additionally, Basel III includes a macro prudential approach. The recent finan-
cial crisis has revealed that micro prudential regulation is insufficient to respond
to systemic risks, as it focuses only on firm-specific risks. Macro prudential reg-
ulation thus seeks to stabilize the financial system by taking into account risks
arising from the interactions between financial institutions. In order to prevent
systemic risks, Basel III stipulates two kinds of capital buffers. In good times,
banks will have to build up a capital conservation buffer of 2.5% so that the total
common equity requirement rises to 7%. In times of distress this buffer can be
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scaled down to absorb losses. Depending on national circumstances, the author-
ities will be authorized to raise an additional countercyclical buffer of 0 to 2.5%
in order to counteract excessive credit growth which might induce systemic risks.
6.2.2 Regulation of Systemically Important Financial In-
stitutions
The cases of Lehman Brothers and AIG have highlighted how single financial
institutions might trigger contagion effects or a common shock in the financial
market and thus affect not only the banking sector but the economy as a whole.
Hence, macro prudential regulation seeks to impose additional requirements on
institutions which are systemically important, thus reducing their default prob-
ability. Potential tools for such additional requirements might be for instance
capital surcharges, contingent capital or bail-in debt. At present, neither a defi-
nition of SIFIs nor details regarding these potential tools are specified in detail.
The definition of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) of SIFIs
is expected in the near future is announced to include both quantitative and
qualitative indicators. Moreover, the BCBS is currently conducting a survey to
reveal how much additional loss absorbency potential an SIFI needs and to an-
alyze which impact the different requirement tools might have on the financial
system. The survey is expected to be published by mid-2011.
At their Seoul summit, the G20 (2010) outlined cornerstones of a framework to
reduce the moral hazard risks posed by SIFIs and addresses the too-big-to-fail
problem. This framework was developed in Financial Stability Board (2010a).
The cornerstones of the framework are: (i) a resolution framework and other
measures to ensure that all financial institutions can be resolved safely, quickly
and without destabilizing the financial system and exposing the taxpayers to the
risk of loss; (ii) a requirement that SIFIs and initially in particular financial in-
stitutions that are globally systemic should have higher loss absorbency capacity
to reflect the greater risk that their failure poses to the global financial system;
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(iii) more intensive supervisory oversight; (iv) robust core financial market infras-
tructure to reduce contagion risk from individual failures; (v) other supplemen-
tary prudential and other requirements as determined by the national authorities
which may include, in some circumstances, liquidity surcharges, tighter large ex-
posure restrictions, levies and structural measures. Special emphasis was put on
globally systemically important financial institutions (G-SIFIs). The G20 agreed
that they should be subject to a sustained process of mandatory international
recovery and resolution planning. Furthermore, the G20 (2010) stress, that su-
pervisors should have appropriate tools and powers to identify systemic risks at
an early stage. This also highlights the importance of the Network Systemic Im-
portance Index as developed in chapter (3) as a tool to identify SIFIs and impose
prudential requirements that are commensurate with their systemic importance.
The Financial Stability Board (2010b) outlines in more detail how the intensity
and effectiveness of SIFI supervision can be enhanced. The findings are sum-
marized in ten recommendations relating to the mandates and independence of
supervisory authorities; the ressources and supervisory powers necessary to fulfill
the mandates, as well as accounts of improved techniques of banking supervision;
recommendations for group-wide and consolidated supervision which relates to
the supervision of a group of financial institutions; recommendations for continous
and comprehensive supervision; information-sharing of home and host countries
of globally active systemically important financial institutions; measures of for-
ward looking macro-prudential surveillance; and the use of third party services
by regulatory bodies.
Going forward, the G20 plan to strengthen the regulation and supervision of hedge
funds, OTC derivatives and rating agencies. They asked the FSB to develop
recommendations to strengthen the regulation of the shadow banking system by
mid 2011. Meanwhile, various G20 member countries launched national legislative
reforms that also address systemically financial institutions.
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6.2.3 National Legislative Reforms
The financial crisis revealed the need for a reform of the financial regulatory frame-
work. It became clear, that unregulated systemic risk can pose a major threat to
financial stability and economic growth. However, most G20 countries do not yet
have a formal definition of systemic risk (see International Monetary Fund et al.
(2009)) and different countries have differing views on what systemic risk is, even
on a non-formal level. Despite this fundamental problem, a number of govern-
ments reacted to the public pressure that was caused by the bail-out of supposedly
systemically important financial institutions and proposed changes to the national
regulatory frameworks. This chapter thus gives an overview of the legislative re-
forms and reform proposals in the United States, the Eurozone and the United
Kingdom.
In the United States, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protec-
tion Act was signed into law on July 21, 2010. This act can be regarded as the
broadest set of regulatory reforms since the reforms in response to the Great De-
pression. In over 2300 pages the Act comprises more than 240 rules across several
federal agencies. Different aspects of the financial system are approached such as
consumer protection, increasing transparency for derivatives or limits on propri-
etary trading and hedge funds. In order to address systemic risk the Dodd-Frank
Act establishes the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC). The main tasks
of the FSOC are identifying systemically important institutions and gaps in reg-
ulation, collecting information and monitoring the financial services marketplace
in order to identify potential risks. Both, systemically important non-bank finan-
cial institutions, as well as bank holding companies with more than $50 billion in
assets are facing stricter regulation standards under the Dodd-Frank Act. These
can include increased capital and liquidity requirements, leverage and concentra-
tion limits or enhanced public disclosures revealing how the institution could be
resolved. Moreover, the FSOC possesses further tools like the ability to impose
the issuing of contingent capital on distressed institutions. In case an institution
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is nevertheless in distress the Dodd-Frank Act provides the room for takeovers or
liquidations.
The main critique on the Dodd-Frank Act with respect to considering systemic
risk is that most of the details regarding stricter requirements are not constituted,
yet, except for the leverage limit, which should not exceed 15 to 1. Acharya et al.
(2010a) argues that marking institutions as systemically important enables these
institutions competitive advantages (see e.g. Akram and Christophesen (2010)
for an empirical verification) and incentivizes them to conduct excessive risk tak-
ing.
The European Parliament has given its final approval for a reform of the EU finan-
cial supervisory system on 22 September 2010.2 The new legislation establishes
a newly founded European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) which will be hosted at
the European Central Bank (ECB). It will be responsible for “macro-prudential
oversight of the financial system within the Community in order to prevent or
mitigate systemic risks, to avoid episodes of widespread financial distress, con-
tribute to a smooth functioning of the Internal Market and ensure a sustainable
contribution of the financial sector to economic growth”. The proposal by the
European Commission further establishes a European System of Financial Su-
pervisors, consisting of a network of financial supervisors who will work closely
with the newly created European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs). The ESAs
are created by the transformation of existing European supervisory committees
into a European Banking Authority (EBA), a European Securities and Markets
Authority (ESMA), and a European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Au-
thority (EIOPA). The ESRB is an entirely new European body, but will not have
any binding powers to impose measures on member states or national author-
ities. It rather acts as a standard setter which influences the action of policy
makers. The ESRB will not be limited to macroprudential supervision of banks,
2The adapted resolutions can be found at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/
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but rather monitors all types of entities or markets. It can issue warnings and
recommendations that “may address any aspect of the financial system which may
generate a systemic risk [...] An essential role of the ESRB is to identify risks
with a systemic dimension and prevent or mitigate their impact on the financial
system within the EU”.
In July 2010 the Government of the United Kingdom issued a consultation doc-
ument on proposed changes to the UK regulatory framework. A more detailed
proposal is expected early in 2011. HM Treasury (2010) confirms plans to re-
place the Financial Services Authority by a tripartite system consisting of the
Financial Policy Committee (FPC), the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA)
and the Consumer Protection and Market Authority (CPMA) which all form
subsidiaries of the Bank of England. The FPC will be responsible for macro-
prudential regulation by identifying systemic risks, deciding on macroprudential
tools and recommending to the other authorities in order to reduce imbalances
and weaknesses of the financial system, and to report to Parliament and the
public in order to increase the action’s transparency. As potential tools, the
document considers countercyclical capital requirements, variable risk-weights,
leverage limits, forward-looking loss provisioning, collateral requirements, and
quantitative credit controls and reserve requirements. The focus of PRA will lie
on the operational part of regulation and supervision by effectively coordinating
macroprudential with microprudential regulation. The CPMA will be responsi-
ble for consumer protection and promoting confidence in the financial system.
As information sharing among these authorities is essential a close cooperation is
considered in the design of the authorities.
6.3 Policy Conclusions
A number of authors have critically analyzed the Basel III framework and pro-
posed regulatory reform measures. Hellwig (2010) argues that there exist a num-
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ber of asset correlations that went unnoticed prior to the crisis. Firstly, correla-
tions arising from a common dependence on underlying macroeconomic factors,
i.e. of credit risks in mortgages or mortgage-backed securities and other deriva-
tives, were underestimated. And secondly, correlations of risks via similiar con-
tracts, such as counterparty credit risks and underlying risks in derivatives, were
insufficiently taken into account. This underestimation of correlations has drastic
consequences, as banks were enabled by Basel II to conduct internal risk models
in order to determine the appropriate amount of risk. Hellwig, however, points
out that the empirical basis for this internal risk modelling is unsatisfactory: time
series that are being used are often very short and do not allow reliable estima-
tions of the underlying process; credit risk events are very rare, which makes
them hard to estimate; these problems are amplified when it comes to the esti-
mation of asset correlations. He further argues that the model-based approach
amplified the interconnectivity in the financial system and thus contributed to
systemic risk. Hellwig (2010) proposes two major changes to the system of bank-
ing regulation: (i) eliminate the risk-calibration of regulatory capital; and (ii)
substantially higher regulatory capital.
Rochet (2010) argues that the explicit bail-out guarantees that were issued by
the G20 to large financial institutions erode market discipline and create moral
hazard. He further argues that the lack of resiliency of the interbank money mar-
ket to the relatively small shocks from the sub-prime mortgage market is a major
challenge for banking supervisors as banks were, prior to the crisis, deemed to
be very resilient on the micro-level. The author emphasizes the major difficulties
of identifying financial institutions that are too big to fail (TBTF) and would
thus require additional supervisory oversight. The paper suggests to adopt cen-
tral counterparty clearing for all “vital” market infrastructures (i.e. interbank
transactions and derivatives) instead of opaque over-the-counter transactions.
Furthermore, Rochet (2010) proposes that financial supervision should shift from
protecting individual banks to protecting “platforms” (i.e. interbank markets,
money markets, some derivative markets and large-value payment systems) and
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that the mandate of central banks should be refined accordingly.
Blundell-Wignall and Atkinson (2010) point out a number of shortcomings with
the Basel III framework, part of which are rooted in Basel II. They criticize
that promises in the financial system are not treated equally, regardless of where
they are located. This allows for regulatory arbitrage. They further point out,
that with increasing regulation in the banking sector, more capital will be in-
vested in the unregulated shadow banking sector, as the cost of capital in the
regulated sector increases. Blundell-Wignall and Atkinson (2010) show that the
Basel II risk-weighting resulted in a “perverse outcome in the crisis” as banks
with higher Tier 1 capital prior to the crisis generated higher losses when crisis
struck. As Basel III brings only minor changes to the risk-weighting procedure,
the danger of perverse incentives still exists. The authors further argue that the
risk-weighting approach might not work well together with the leverage ratio.
Blundell-Wignall and Atkinson (2010) propose to apply a quadratic minimum
capital penalty for deviations from a benchmark portfolio in order to deal with
lump-sum risks and argue that liquidity management should best be left to the
market, as the crisis was primarily a crisis of solvency and confidence.
6.3.1 Shortcomings of the Existing Reform Proposal
While Basel III can be considered a necessary step forward, it has a number of
shortcomings with respect to the regulation of SIFIs and systemic risk. Stronger
capital requirements can help to enhance the resilience of the financial system to
contagion effects, common shocks, and informational spillovers, as they effectively
reduce counterparty risk. In this respect, the increased core capital requirements,
as well as the increase in capital quality were steps in the right direction. This
is especially the case for the leverage ratio and liquidity requirements. A number
of problems remain, however.
(i) The core problem with capital requirements is their dependency on risk-
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weighted assets. As long as the risk-weights for interbank loans and other
financial assets do not reflect the true risk associated with these assets,
even the strongest capital requirements are rendered useless. In fact, the
risk-weights currently implemented largely contributed to the creation of
systemic risk as they incentivized banks to hold financial assets (interbank
loans, derivatives, etc.) instead of real assets (corporate loans, corporate
bonds, etc.) that have lower correlation. Basel III has missed the opportu-
nity to reform the risk weights and rule them out as a source of systemic risk.
The asset value correlation (AVC) factor proposed for large financial insti-
tutions in Basel III is a global factor and does not take into account the
different magnitudes of correlation of different assets. The correlation be-
tween two asset classes (i.e. the correlation between corporate loans and
interbank loans) will in general be lower than the correlation of two assets
of the same asset class. Banks thus have no incentive to diversify their
portfolios but will rather specialize on holding assets of a certain class and
gain profits from economies of scale and specialization, effectively creating
portfolio lump risks. Portfolio lumpiness, however, is a significant source of
systemic risk, as e.g. Georg and Poschmann (2010) show.
Therefore, the risk-weights and asset value correlation factor of Basel III
fail to mitigate systemic risk. As banks lack the relevant information about
the network structure of the financial system, they will necessarily under-
estimate the correlation of their portfolios and are thus unable to conduct
optimal risk management. Only the supervisory authority is able to appro-
priately map the financial network in a macroprudential risk analysis. The
network effect is amplified for SIFIs as the correlations between interbank
loans from smaller banks to SIFIs will be larger, as it is the very definition
of a SIFI that its default causes widespread failure in the financial system.
(ii) Basel III aims at regulating SIFIs by imposing additional capital require-
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ments that are deemed to be commensurate with their systemic importance.
The systemic importance of a bank, however, is a highly volatile quantity
that can rapidly change over time. As it is impossible for banks to raise
banking capital over night, they will be forced to hold as much banking
capital as is required at the time of their largest systemic importance for
the capital requirement to be effective. This argument makes it difficult for
regulatory authorities to justify the additional requirements to the banks.
Furthermore, capital requirements to prevent banks from gaining systemic
importance can only be effective, if these requirements generate costs for
the banks that are higher than the benefits from bail-out guarantees (see
e.g. Akram and Christophesen (2010) for an analysis of gains from sys-
temic importance). Otherwise, banks would still have an incentive to gain
systemic importance. The benefits of bail-out guarantees can be estimated
from two factors: (i) the amount of money governments had to spend on
recent bail-outs; and (ii) the implicit gains that stem from the extraordi-
nary monetary policy measures.3 It seems therefore unlikely that imposing
additional capital requirements for SIFIs works in practice. This raises the
question of what is left of the promise to regulate banks that are too large,
too interconnected, or otherwise of systemic importance. Basel III fails to
provide a valid answer to that question.
(iii) Another problem with imposing additional capital requirements for SIFIs
is, that the G20 yet failed to agree on a global lower bound of these re-
quirements. This will lead to a race to the bottom amongst countries, as no
country will voluntarily weaken its financial sector by imposing large cap-
ital requirements for systemically important financial institutions. I have
argued that it is very difficult to properly measure the systemic importance
of an individual financial institution and regulatory authorities will always
have to justify additional capital requirements for those banks that they
3One example would be that banks were able to use the extended collateral standards of
central banks and obtain central bank liquidity at a rate of 1% by depositing e.g. Greek
sovereign bonds that pay a much higher interest.
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deem to be of systemic importance. Without the appropriate measures of
individual financial institutions, it is almost impossible for a regulatory au-
thority to justify any additional capital charges of significant order. The
Financial Stability Board (2010b) addresses the same problem with respect
to the requirement that supervisory authorities be pro-active and intervene
early during the build-up of systemic risks. It is stated that “when super-
visors take an early intervention approach, there are often no tangible risk
indicators (i.e. losses) to confirm that this intervention is needed, so this
makes it difficult to convince a firm and their boards that such measures are
necessary to deal proactively with emerging areas of risk within a SIFI”. The
key question is, if it is generally possible to construct measures that detect
systemic risks while they are building up. While the indicators currently
available in the literature (see chapter 1.1.4 for an overview) are a huge step
forward when compared to the literature before the crisis, they might still
fail this particular task.
(iv) The different forms of systemic risk are interdependent and reinforce each
other. However, informational spillovers are a rarely addressed issue in the
G20 discussion on systemic risk. One of the few places where informational
spillovers are mentioned is the Financial Stability Board (2010b), stating
that “Having a capital level that is too low vis-a-vis the risks being taken,
especially for SIFIs, can lead to a highly vulnerable financial system. This
shortfall contributed to the loss of confidence among counterparties, funds
providers and investors”. The enhanced capital requirements of Basel III
will reduce the default probability of financial institutions. Therefore it will
also reduce the risk of informational spillovers and herding behaviour, as
market participants are aware of the higher resilience of the financial system.
This will strengthen the trust amongst banks, but the question remains
if it will prevent liquidity hoarding and fire-sales in a future crisis. The
recent experience suggests that banks are well aware of the shortcomings of
their risk-assessment and the devastating effects of informational contagion.
This manifested with the insolvency of Lehman brothers in September 2008.
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The systemic impact of this particular insolvency was modest in terms of
contagion effects and common shocks. But it was a signal to the remaining
banks that they had underestimated the risks they had taken in their asset
portfolios. The regulatory reform process thus has to focus on addressing
informational spillovers as a relevant form of systemic risk and propose
measures to address this issue.4
6.3.2 A Way Forward for Systemic Risk Regulation
The aforementioned shortcomings have to be addressed in the regulatory reform
process in order to effectively regulate systemic risk. Some authors have made
proposals about how the way forward with systemic risk regulation could look
like. Rochet (2010) proposes a rather radical approach and suggests that finan-
cial supervision should shift from protecting banks to protecting what he calls
“platforms”. These platforms are markets, such as the interbank market, money
markets, some derivative markets, but also large value payment systems. This
approach is appealing, but might be of purely academic interest, as it would
require a completely different financial architecture, and as the author suggests
himself, a new mandate for central banks and regulatory authorities. Hellwig
(2010) proposes to eliminate the risk-calibration of regulatory capital altogether
and a substantial increase in required capital. This would solve all problems with
the current risk-weights, but does not seem to be a realistic solution as banks
will lobby hard to prevent such a “thorough overhaul” of the financial system.
Blundell-Wignall and Atkinson (2010) propose to apply a quadratic minimum
capital penalty for deviations from a benchmark portfolio in order to deal with
lump-sum risks. This proposal is appealing for two reasons: it would solve the
lumpiness-problem of Basel II (and Basel III) and is more realistic than the rather
radical approaches of Rochet (2010) and Hellwig (2010).
4An interesting remark is made by Haldane and May (2011) who argue that liquidity
ratios will effectively limit liquidity hoarding shocks. While their point is arguably true,
Acharya and Yorulmazer (2008) show that informational spillovers also increase the endoge-
nous correlation of banks’ assets.
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While acknowleding that the crisis calls for a much more fundamental reform
of the financial system than currently provided by Basel III, this paper tries to
outline a realistic and viable way forward for systemic risk regulation. In order
to address the identified shortcomings of Basel III, this paper proposes three
measures.
(i) Risk-weights for interbank loans have to reflect the knife-edge property of
interbank markets in some way. In normal times the low risk-weights for
interbank loans are justified by the mutual insurance aspect of interbank
markets. In times of crisis, however, interbank loans will amplify systemic
risk and their respective risk-weights should be much larger. Thus, the static
risk-weights as currently implemented in Basel III exhibit a pro-cyclicality
with respect to systemic risk and a counter-cyclical risk buffer should be put
in place. While Basel III proposed a counter-cyclical capital buffer, this is
implemented as a global factor and does not change the incentive structure
of the risk-weights. The effect of a counter-cyclical capital buffer could
be realized by allowing national authorities to implement it as a counter-
cyclical buffer on the risk-weights. Such a counter-cyclical risk-weight would
counteract the time-dimension of systemic risk.
(ii) To enhance the risk-management capabilities of banks, the asset value cor-
relation multiplier should be dynamic. Banks should be given a set of
dynamic AVC for all asset classes (including cross sections) and then calcu-
late their individual multiplier. This would enable banks to enhance their
risk management and set an incentive for portfolio diversification. An ad-
ditional advantage of such a dynamic multiplier is that it can be used as
an effective regulatory tool in times of low economic growth but increas-
ing systemic risk. In such times there will be a lot of political pressure
on central banks to take measures stimulating growth. Even though most
central banks are independent, a dynamic AVC would be a much more
fine-tuned tool than just increasing the counter-cyclical buffer or imposing
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additional capital requirements on SIFIs. A further argument for the in-
troduction of a dynamic multiplier is that the correlation of assets captures
the cross-sectional dimension of systemic risk, and should thus be regulated
accordingly. This line of argument is the rationale to distinguish between
counter-cyclical risk-weights and a dynamic AVC multiplier as regulatory
measures.
(iii) Basel III does not provide adequate measures to regulate systemically im-
portant financial institutions. This is a particular shortcoming and should
be addressed in future regulation proposals. Instead of focussing on capital
requirements, this paper proposes to focus on market transparency. I have
argued above why informational spillovers played an important role in the
recent financial crisis and that Basel III does not take this source of sys-
temic risk into account. While increased capital buffers can help strengthen
the trust amongst market participants, they are not sufficient to counteract
the herding behaviour that was seen during the current crisis. In order to
counteract informational spillovers, asymmetric information between mar-
ket participants has to be reduced. It is thus necessary to emphasize the
third pillar of Basel III and to enhance market transparency considerably.
Especially banks that are considered to be of systemic importance should be
required to publish more frequently more detailed information. A practical
way to achieve this goal would be to introduce three categories of systemic
importance, low, medium and high. This simple scheme would account for
the high volatility of systemic importance. Banks that have a high systemic
importance only a limited amount of time are considered to be of medium
systemic importance while those who are almost always of high systemic
importance are in the high group and the rest is in the low group.5 Due
to the enhanced reporting and data publication requirements for systemi-
5One could envisage a rule that each bank will be put into the next higher (lower) peer
group if it has a higher (lower) ranking for two consecutive time periods. This would reduce
the number of up- and downgrades and still detect structural changes when systemic risks are
building up.
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cally important financial institutions there is no use in keeping the names of
the SIFIs secret. All market participants are aware who has which level of
systemic importance and they are aware that this level might change over
time. The regulators could publish a quarterly update on the systemic risk
ranking. This time interval is frequent enough in order for banks to react
to it and timely enough in order to detect the emergence of lump systemic
risk at a given financial institution.
Such a simple scheme would allow different countries to use different mea-
sures of sytemic importance in order to take the country-specific details of
their banking system into account. For banks that are of global systemic
importance there should be an internationally agreed upon minimum re-
quirement for reporting and data publication. In order for such a regulation
scheme to be effective, it is necessary to have a transparent communication
what criteria are taken into account when the systemic importance of an
individual financial institution is measured. Note that this does not give
rise to moral hazard, as each bank only knows its local properties but can-
not say with certainty how the rest of the banking system evolves. Even
if banks decide to gain systemic importance (i.e. if they want to benefit
from implicit bail-out guarantees) they cannot be sure that other banks do
not behave similar. Therefore all measures of systemic importance have to
be relative measures in the sense that they measure the relative systemic
importance of a bank with respect to other banks.
The approach of enforcing additional reporting and data publication of
SIFIs (or those who are suspected to be SIFIs) is a much weaker approach
than requiring banks to hold additional capital. As I have argued above,
it takes banks some time to acquire new capital, especially in times when
they most need it. Therefore additional measures have to be taken to
prevent banks from trying to gain systemic importance. It is safe to assume
that a bank with high systemic importance index over a long period of
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time is considered to be relevant for the system stability by other market
participants. An insolvency of such a bank will thus give rise to considerable
informational spillovers which are almost impossible to predict. Therefore,
these banks are subject to implicit bail-out guarantees which should not
come without a price. This price will not be imposed on the bank by other
market participants. The systemic importance of a bank does not relate to
its probability of default, which is the ultimate driver of refinancing costs
for the bank. Therefore, it might prove useful to impose a levy or tax on
systemic importance in order to set the appropriate incentives.
The proposed policy measures only sketch a way forward for systemic risk regu-
lation. Some parts of the picture are still missing, as the regulation of the large
shadow bank sector has not yet been discussed in detail. The measures aim to
be realistic in the sense that they do not call for a complete overhaul of financial




Das Ziel der vorliegenden Dissertation ist es, ein besseres Verständnis von sys-
temischen Risiken auf Interbankenmärkten zu entwickeln. Die Bedeutung sys-
temischer Risiken für die Stabilität des gesamten Finanzsystems ist durch die in-
ternationale Finanzkrise der Jahre 2007/2008 deutlich geworden, die zu einer der
schwersten Rezessionen der letzten Einhundert Jahre geführt hat. Ausgehend von
einer Krise auf dem US-Immobilienmarkt kam es in Folge der zunehmenden Ver-
flechtungen zwischen Finanzinstituten zu enormen Verwerfungen auf den inter-
nationalen Kapitalmärkten. Diese erreichten ihren Höhepunkt mit dem Zusam-
menbruch der US Investmentbank Lehman Brothers im September 2008 und
führten in den darauffolgenden Tagen zu einem beinahe vollständigen Zusam-
menbruch der Interbanken-Kreditmärkte. Banken sind auf diese gegenseitigen
Kredite angewiesen um kurzfristig auftretende Liquiditätsschwankungen auf der
Passivseite ihrer Bilanzen auszugleichen und die Aktivseite ausreichend zu diversi-
fizieren. Ohne funktionierende Interbankenmärkte können Banken keine Fristen-
transformation vornehmen und die Realwirtschaft nicht mit langfristigen Kred-
iten versorgen. Die Folge eines solchen Zusammenbruchs ist ein Rückgang der
Investitions- und Produktionstätigkeit, reduzierte Handelsaktivität und steigende
Arbeitslosigkeit.
Um die Stabilität des Finanzsystems zu gewährleisten waren Regierungen und
Zentralbanken weltweit gezwungen auf noch nie dagewesene Sondermaßnahmen
zurückzugreifen, von denen viele bis heute bestehen. Im Jahr 2009 hat der Inter-
nationale Währungsfonds die Gesamtkosten der Finanzkrise mit US$ 11.9 Tril-
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lionen beziffert, worin die Kosten für die Notmaßnahmen zur Rekapitalisierung
von in Schieflage geratenen Finanzinstituten eingerechnet ist. Die Notmaßnah-
men die in vielen Ländern notwendig waren um die nationalen Bankensysteme zu
stabilisieren hatten erhebliche Auswirkungen auf die Haushalts- und Schulden-
situation der einzelnen Länder. In der schlimmsten Phase der Krise (2007-
2009) sind die öffentlichen Schulden der industrialisierten G20-Länder um etwa
20 Prozentpunkte angestiegen. Etwa 5.5 Prozentpunkte dieser Neuverschuldung
stammen direkt aus den Stabilisierungsmaßnahmen für den Finanzsektor. Weit-
ere 2 Prozentpunkte stammen aus Konjunkturpaketen welche die direkten Krisen-
folgen abmildern sollten. Aus diesen Zahlen wird die Bedeutung des Themas der
vorliegenden Arbeit deutlich.
Der Schweregrad der Krise wurde nicht nur durch die Tiefe der Krise hervorgerufen,
sondern auch durch die Geschwindigkeit mit der sich die Krise entwickelte. Während
der als “great moderation” bezeichneten Periode mit geringer Assetvolatilität,
geringer Inflation und geringen Konjunkturzyklen entstanden systemische Risiken
in Form von erhöhter Vernetztheit von Finanzinstituten und geringerer Trans-
parenz von Finanzprodukten. Ab einem bestimmten Punkt war die Stabilität
des Finanzsystems nicht mehr sichergestellt und die aufgestauten systemischen
Risiken manifestierten sich. Dieses Eigenschaft von Finanzsystemen wurde von
Haldane (2009) als “auf Messers Schneide”, oder “robust-doch-fragil” bezeichnet
und stellt ein wohlbekanntes Phänomen in der Analyse komplexer Systeme in der
Biologie, Physik und Sozialwissenschaft dar.6
Um die Dynamik die diesem Verhalten zugrundeliegt zu verstehen, will die vor-
liegende Arbeit vier Fragen beantworten:
(Q1) Was sind die Ursachen und unterschiedlichen Manifestationen systemischer
Risiken?
(Q2) Wie können systemische Risiken gemessen werden, insbesondere wenn sie
6Siehe hierzu auch Haldane and May (2011), sowie Battiston et al. (2009).
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im entstehen sind?
(Q3) Wieviel tragen die einzelnen Formen systemischer Risiken zum Gesamtrisiko
bei? Welches ist die dominierende Form systemischen Risikos?
(Q4) Sind die vorliegenden Vorschläge für eine Reform des internationalen Fi-
nanzsystems ausreichend um systemische Risiken in Zukunft wirksam zu
unterbinden?
Die Struktur der vorliegenden Arbeit folgt diesen vier Fragen, die in nahezu allen
Kapiteln der Arbeit in gewissem Umfang behandelt werden. Die einzelnen Kapi-
tel setzen dennoch unterschiedliche Schwerpunkte. Während sich diese Einleitung
auf Frage (Q1) fokussiert, wird die Frage (Q2) hauptsächlich in Kapitel (3) be-
handelt. Die beiden Kapitel (4) und (5) konzentrieren sich hauptsächlich auf die
Frage (Q3), während die Frage (Q4) größtenteils in Kapitel (6) behandelt wird.
Die vorliegende Arbeit baut auf sechs Kapitel auf, welche unterschiedliche As-
pekte systemischer Risiken in Interbankenmärkten behandeln. Nichtsdestotrotz
geht Kapitel (2) etwas über den eigentlichen Fokus dieser Arbeit hinaus und
wendet die Mikrofundierung des Bankenverhaltens welche in diesem Kapitel en-
twickelt wird auf ein Modell endogener Geldschöpfung an. In Kapitel (3) werden
verschiedene Aspekte der Netzwerkstruktur des Südafrikanischen Interbanken-
marktes als Anwendung eines realen Interbankennetzwerks analysiert. Darüber
hinaus wird in diesem Kapitel ein Index zur Messung der Systemrelevanz einzel-
ner Finanzinstitute als Baustein für eine umfassendere Makroprudenzielle Anal-
yse entwickelt. Kapitel (4) beschreibt ein dynamisches Multi-Agenten Modell,
basierend auf der Mikrofundierung des Bankenverhaltens aus Kapitel (2). Eine
der Hauptaussagen dieses Kapitels ist, dass systemische Risiken in Form von
gemeinsamen Gefährdungen gegenüber systemischen Risiken durch Interbanken-
Ansteckungseffekte nicht nachrangig sind. Die beiden Formen systemischer Risiken
wirken durch unterschiedliche Kanäle auf das Finanzsystem und verlangen nach
unterschiedlichen, optimalen Reaktionen. Das Hauptergebnis dieses Kapitels wird
in Kapitel (5) weiter untersucht, wo ein allgemeines Gleichgewichtsmodell eines
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Bankensystems entwickelt wird, welches beide Formen systemischer Risiken in
einem vereinheitlichten Modell umfasst. Das abschließende Kapitel (6) zieht die
notwendigen Schlussfolgerungen für die Regulierung systemischer Risiken und un-
tersucht das kürzlich verabschiedete Rahmenwerk Basel III im Hinblick auf die
Ergebnisse der vorliegenden Arbeit.
Kapitel (2) entwickelt die Mikrofundierung des Banken- und Nichtbanken-ver-
haltens um den endogenen Geldschöpfungsprozess zu analysieren der durch die
Wechselwirkung der verschiedenen Akteure auf den Märkten für Zentralbankgeld,
Krediten und Bonds bestimmt wird. Das Modell erweitert den Ansatz von
Bernanke and Blinder (1988) und modelliert die Entscheidungen über Gewinn-
und Risikopräferenzen einer Bank mit einem Ansatz aus der Portfoliotheorie. An-
schließend wird Value at Risk as Modellierungsansatz für die Liquiditätspräferenz
einer Bank eingefhrt. Dieses Modell wird mit der Arbeit von Bofinger (2001)
verknüpft, der ein Modell für den makroökonomischen Kreditmarkt entwickelt
um den Geldschöpfungsprozess zu endogenisieren. Dieses kombinierte Modell
wird um einen Firmen- und Haushaltssektor, sowie um die Zentralbank als Akteur
erweitert. Den Einfluss von Zentralbankpolitik auf die Geldbasis wird abgeleitet
und es wird gezeigt, dasss Zentralbankpolitik in der langen Frist weniger effektiv
ist als in der kurzen Frist. Dies wirft die Frage nach der Wirksamkeit von Zen-
tralbankpolitik auf und wird in Kapitel (4) weiter untersucht.
Kapitel (3) gibt einen Überblick über Netzwerktheorie als Werkzeug zur Bes-
timmung systemischer Risiken in Interbankennetzwerken und hat zwei Ziele.
Erstens nimmt es eine Analyse der Struktur des Südafrikanischen Übernacht-
Interbankenmarktes mit Methoden der Netzwerkthoerie vor. Hierbei wurden
reale Daten des South African Multiple Options Settlement (SAMOS) System
zwischen Februar 2005 und Juni 2010 verwendet. Einfache Maße für die Topologie
eines Netzwerks werden vorgestellt und es wird gezeigt, dass der Südafrikanische
Interbankenmarkt eine skalenfreie Topologie besitzt. Das zweite Ziel dieses Kapi-
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tels ist es, den Netzwerk-Systemrelevanz-Index (Network Systemic Importance
Index - NSII) vorzustellen. Dieser basiert auf drei Maßen, welche die Bedeutung
einer Bank innerhalb des Interbankennetzwerks bestimmen: Größe, Verbunden-
heit und Betweenness (Zentralität). Obwohl der Index nur ein Baustein einer
umfassenderen Makroprudenziellen Analyse sein kann, umfasst er viele Eigen-
schaften welche die Systemrelevanz einer Bank bestimmen. Eine wichtige Eigen-
schaft des NSII ist, dass es sich hierbei um einen relativen Index handelt, der die
Systemrelevanz einzelner Finanzinstitute relativ zueinander bestimmt und daher
weniger anfällig für moral hazard ist. Es wird argumentiert wieso der NSII ein
geeignetes Maß zur Bestimmung der Systemrelevanz einer Bank ist und daher
dazu verwendet werden kann eine Steuer oder Abgabe auf Systemrelevanz zu er-
heben.
Die Finanzkrise hat deutlich gemacht dass es wichtig ist systemische Risiken
sowohl qualitativ, als auch quantitativ zu verstehen, um die Stabilität des Fi-
nanzsystems zu garantieren. Die Krise hat damit auch gezeigt, dass die Struktur
und Dynamik von Interbankenmärkten berücksichtigt werden muss, wenn die
Widerstandsfähigkeit des Finanzsystems analysiert wird. In Kapitel (4) wird da-
her ein dynamisches Multi-Agenten Modell systemischer Risiken in Interbanken-
märkten entwickelt. Dieses Modell stellt die dynamische Verallgemeinerung des
statischen Modells des Bankenverhaltens aus Kapitel (2) dar. Multi-Agenten Sim-
ulationen eignen sich zur Analyse dynamischer Effekte besonders gut und wurden
bereits etwa von Iori et al. (2006), sowie von Nier et al. (2007) hierzu verwendet.
Die in der Literatur existierenden Modelle haben jedoch eine Reihe von Mängeln
und eignen sich nur bedingt für die Beantwortung der in der vorliegenden Ar-
beit aufgeworfenen vier Fragen (Q1)-(Q4). Insbesondere wurde in der Literatur
stets von sicheren Investitionen und häufig von fixen Depositen ausgegangen.
Außerdem wurde stets eine exogen vorgegebene, fixe Netzwerkstruktur verwen-
det, wodurch eine Analyse vieler dynamischer Effekte gar nicht möglich ist. In
diesem Kapitel werden daher sowohl riskante Investitionen, als auch Depositen-
fluktuationen als Auslöser für Liquiditätsschwankungen (und damit als mögliche
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Ursachen von Illiquidität und Insolvenz einer Bank) verwendet. Darüber hinaus
bildet sich die Netzwerkstruktur des Interbankenmarktes in gewissem Sinne en-
dogen heraus, so dass viele Aspekte realer Interbankennetzwerke gut abgebildet
werden. Es wird die Wirksamkeit von Zentralbankpolitik untersucht und in Ein-
klang mit Kapitel (2) gezeigt, dass diese in der langen Frist weniger effektiv ist als
in der kurzen Frist. Es werden unterschiedliche Netzwerktopologien miteinander
verglichen und gezeigt, dass in Zufallsgraphen der Zusammenhang zwischen dem
Grad der Vernetztheit und der Instabilität des Finanzsystems nicht monoton ist.
Skalenfreie Netzwerke erweisen sich in der Analyse stabiler als Kleine-Welt Net-
zwerke, die wiederum stabiler sind als zufällige Netzwerke. Das in diesem Kapitel
vorgestellte Modell umfasst viele Aspekte der Dynamik realer Interbanknetzwerke
und kann daher genutzt werden um die Auswirkung unterschiedlicher Formen sys-
temisher Risiken miteinander zu vergleichen. Es wird gezeigt, dass gemeinsame
Gefährdungen, entgegen ihrer Bedeutung in der Literatur, die größere Bedrohung
für die Finanzstabilität darstellen und bei der Regulierung systemischer Risiken
berücksichtigt werden müssen.
Dieses Ergebnis wird in Kapitel (5) im Rahmen eines allgemeinen Gleichgewichts-
modells weiter untersucht. Basierend auf dem Modell von Diamond and Dybvig
(1983) existiert eine breite Literatur, welche die Auswirkungen einzelner Formen
systemischer Risiken untersucht. Allen and Gale (2000) und Freixas et al. (2000)
untersuchen Ansteckungseffekte in Interbankenmärkten, während Dasgupta (2004)
den optimalen Grad der Verneztheit auf diesen Märkten bestimmt. Gemein-
same Gefährdungen wurden etwa von Acharya (2009) untersucht, aber bisher ex-
istiert kein Modell in der Literatur, welches beide Formen gemeinsam analysiert.
Diese Lücke wird in diesem Kapitel geschlossen und wir zeigen, dass es zu nicht-
trivialen Wechselwirkungseffekten zwischen den unterschiedlichen Formen sys-
temischer Risiken kommen kann. Insbesondere können die einzelnen Effekte pro-
zyklisch wirken und stellen damit eine besondere Herausforderung für die Reg-
ulierung systemischer Risiken dar.
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Im abschliessenden Kapitel (6) wird das neue Basel III-Rahmenwerk im Lichte der
Erkenntnisse dieser Arbeit analysiert. Es werden unterschiedliche Schwachstellen
aufgezeigt und Vorschläge für weitere Reformschritte zur Regulierung systemis-
cher Risiken herausgearbeitet. Hierdurch wird die vorliegende Arbeit abgerundet
und die notwendigen Schlussfolgerungen aus den theoretischen Überlegungen der
Kapitel (2) bis (5) gezogen.
194
Promotionserklärung
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Céline Gauthier, Alfred Lehar, and Moez Souissi. Macroprudential regulations
and systemic capital requirements. Working Paper 2010-4, Bank of Canada,
January 2010.
R.G. Geldos and J. Roldós. Consolidation and market structure in emerging
market banking systems. Emerging Markets Review, 5:39–59, 2004.
Co-Pierre Georg. The effect of the interbank network structure on contagion and
financial stability. Graduate School ”Global Financial Markets - Stability and
Change” Working Papers 12, University of Jena, 2010.
203
Co-Pierre Georg. Basel III and systemic risk regulation - what way forward?
Graduate School ”Global Financial Markets - Stability and Change” Working
Papers No. 16, University of Jena, 2011.
Co-Pierre Georg and Markus Pasche. Endogenous money – on banking behaviour
in new and post keynesian models. Jena Economic Research Papers, 2008-65,
2008.
Co-Pierre Georg and Jenny Poschmann. Systemic risk in a network model of
interbank markets with central bank activity. Jena Economic Research Papers
2010-33, University of Jena, 2010.
Marvin Goodfriend and Robert G. King. Financial deregulation, monetary policy
and central banking. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Review, 74:
3–22, 1988.
A. G. Haldane. Rethinking the financial network. Speech at ”Financial Student
Association”, Amsterdam, 28.04.2009., 2009.
Andrew G. Haldane and Robert M. May. Systemic risk in banking ecosystems.
Nature, 469:351–355, 2011.
F. Heider, M. Hoerova, and C. Holthausen. Liquidity hoarding and interbank
market spreads: The role of conterparty risk. European Central Bank. Techni-
cal report, European Central Bank, 2009.
T. Hellmann and J. Stiglitz. Credit and equity rationing in markets with adverse
selection. European Economic Review, 44:281–304, 2000.
Martin F. Hellwig. Capital regulation after the crisis: Business as usual? Working
Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
2010-31, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, 2010.
HM Treasury. A new approach to financial regulation: judgement, focus and
stability. Hm treasury document, July 2010.
204
C.-F. Huang and Robert H. Litzenberger. Foundations for Financial Economics.
North-Holland, 1988.
Xin Huang, Hao Zhou, and Haibin Zhu. A framework for assessing the systemic
risk of major financial institutions. BIS Working Papers 281, Bank for Inter-
national Settlements, 2009a.
Xin Huang, Hao Zhou, and Haibin Zhu. Assessing the systemic risk of a het-
erogeneous portfolio of banks during the recent financial crisis. Finance and
Economics Discussion Series 2009-44, Board of Governors of the Federal Re-
serve System (U.S.), 2009b.
IMF Staff Note. Fiscal implications of the global economic and financial crisis.
IMF Staff Position Note SPN/09/13, International Monetary Fund, 2009.
International Monetary Fund. Assessing the systemic implications of financial
linkages. Global financial stability report, April 2009.
International Monetary Fund. World economic outlook. Technical Report April,
2010.
International Monetary Fund, Bank for International Settlements, and Financial
Stability Board. Guidance to assess the systemic importance of financial in-
stitutions, markets and instruments: Initial considerations. Briefing Paper for
the G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, October, 28, 2009.
G. Iori, S. Jafarey, and F.G. Padilla. Systemic risk on the interbank market.
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 61(4):525–542, 2006.
Giulia Iori, Giulia De Masi, Ovidiu Vasile Precup, Giampaolo Gabbi, and Guido
Caldarelli. A network analysis of the italian overnight money market. Journal
of Economic Dynamics and Control, 32(1):259–278, 2008.
Arvind Krishnamurthy. The financial meltdown: Data and diagnoses. North-
western working paper, Northwestern University, 2008.
205
Dan Ladley. Contagion and risk-sharing on the inter-bank market. Discussion
Papers in Economics 11/10, Department of Economics, University of Leicester,
2011.
Marc Lavoie. Foundations of Post-Keynesian Economic Analysis. Edward Elgar,
Aldershot, 1992.
Marc Lavoie. A post-keynesianamendment to the new consensus on monetary
policy. Metroeconomica, 57(2):165–192, 2006.
A. Lehar. Measuring systemic risk: A risk management approach. Journal of
Banking and Finance, 10:2577–2603, 2005.
Yaron Leitner. Inducing agents to report hidden trades: a theory of an interme-
diary. Working Papers 09-10, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, 2009.
Michele Lenza, Huw R. Pill, and Lucrezia Reichlin. Monetary policy in excep-
tional times. CEPR Discussion Paper, 2010.
N. Gregory Mankiw and David Romer. New Keynesian Economics. Vol. 1: Im-
perfect competition and sticky prices + Vol. 2: Coordination Failures and Real
Rigidities. MIT Press, Cambridge Mass./London, 1991.
Michele Manna and Carmela Iazzetta. The topology of the interbank market: de-
velopments in italy since 1990. Temi di discussione (Economic working papers)
711, Bank of Italy, Economic Research Department, May 2009.
Sheri Markose, Simone Giansante, Mateusz Gatkowski, and Ali Rais Shaghaghi.
Too interconnected to fail: Financial contagion and systemic risk in network
model of cds and other credit enhancement obligations of us banks. University
of Essex Discussion Paper Series, 683, 2010.
Christoph Memmel and Ingrid Stein. Contagion in the german interbank market.
Working paper, Deutsche Bundesbank, 2008.
Frederic S. Mishkin. The Economics of Money, Banking, and Financial Markets.
Addison-Wesley, Boston et al., 2006.
206
Paolo Emilio Mistrulli. Assessing financial contagion in the interbank market:
Maximum entropy versus observed interbank lending patterns. Temi di dis-
cussione (Economic working papers) 641, Bank of Italy, Economic Research
Department, 2007.
Basil J. Moore. Horizontalists and verticalists: the macroeconomics of credit
money. Cambridge University Press, New York, 1988.
Stephen Morris and Hyun Song Shin. Unique equilibrium in a model of self-
fulfilling currency attacks. The American Economic Review, 88(3):pp. 587–597,
1998.
Stephen Morris and Hyun Song Shin. Rethinking multiple equilibria in macroe-
conomic modelling. (1260), June 2000.
Erland Nier, Jing Yang, Tanju Yorulmazer, and Amadeo Alentorn. Network
models and financial stability. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control,
31:2033–2060, 2007.
Erland Nier, J Yang, T Yorulmazer, and A Alentorn. Network models and finan-
cial stability. Working Paper 346, Bank of England, 2008.
E. Nissan. Comparing bank concentration across developing and developed coun-
tries. Journal of Global Business, 15(28):15–24, 2004.
T. I. Palley. Endogenous money: What it is and why it matters. Metroeconomica,
53:152–180, 2002.
T. I. Palley. Macroeconomics without the LM: A post-keynesian perspective.
Technical Report 179, Political Economy Research Institute Working Paper,
2008a.
T. I. Palley. Endogenous money: Implications for the money supply process,
interest rates, and macroeconomics. Technical Report 178, Political Economy
Research Institute Working Paper, 2008b.
207
Ana Petrovic and Ralf Tutsch. National rescue measures in response to the current
financial crisis. Legal Working Paper Series No 08 / July 2009, European
Central Bank, 2009.
R. Pollin. Two theories of money supply endogeneity: some empirical evidence.
Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, 13(3):366–396, 1991.
Jean-Charles Rochet. Commentary: Systemic risk: Changing the regulatory
perspective. International Journal of Central Banking, 6(34):259–276, 2010.
Jean-Charles Rochet and Jean Tirole. Interbank lending and systemic risk. Jour-
nal of Money, Credit and Banking, 28(4):733–762, 1996.
Louis-Philippe Rochon. Credit, Money, and Production: An Alternative Post-
Keynesian Approach. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 1999.
Mara Rodriguez-Moreno and Juan Ignacio Pea Snchez de Rivera. Systemic risk
measures: the simpler the better. Open Access publications from Universidad
Carlos III de Madrid, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, 2010.
P. Romer. Keynesian macroeconomics without the LM curve. Journal of Eco-
nomic Perspectives, 14:149–169, 2000.
Angelika Sachs. Completeness, interconnectedness and distribution of interbank
exposures: A parameterized analysis of the stability of financial networks. Dis-
cussion Paper Series 2: Banking and Financial Studies 2010,08, Deutsche Bun-
desbank, Research Centre, 2010.
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